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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the individual importance of trade and climate change reform, the 
relationship between these two areas, and then identifies some of the trigger points that may 
cause conflict between trade law and climate change measures. Once those areas of tension 
have been identified, this thesis plots a way forward in attempting to resolve those selected 
conflicts, ultimately suggesting that the Appellate Body should take mutually supportive 
interpretations when finding themselves dealing with a conflict between WTO law and 
climate change reform measures. 
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Chapter I – Introduction  
Trade and the environment have long been seen as coming into conflict, and this 
is no different when considering trade law, enforced by the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization, and specific environmental measures designed to 
combat climate change. However, if the global community is going to continue to 
enjoy economic growth while combating climate change, then resolving these 
conflicts becomes a crucial task. This thesis attempts to offer a way forward.  
 
Chapter I sets down the foundation of this paper, by discussing the facts 
surrounding trade, the environment and climate change, and the intersection 
between the two areas. Chapter II then explains what is meant by “conflict” when 
saying that trade law and climate change reform can sometimes come into 
conflict. Chapter III identifies the potential areas of conflict, drawing on 
environmental measures, trade law, and academic literature. Chapter IV is an 
attempt to incorporate the concept of mutual supportiveness as a legitimate 
interpretative tool for the Appellate Body when deciding on trade disputes. 
Chapter V then applies mutually supportive interpretations to the areas previously 
identified by Chapter III, offering potential ways for the Appellate Body to resolve 
these trade-environment conflicts. Finally, Chapter VI provides this thesis’ 
conclusion.  
Trade 
The international trading system of today had its genesis in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, when the Western states met at Bretton Woods to plan a 
modern, post-war international economy.1 While also establishing the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, a decision was made to pursue 
an international organisation dedicated to trade.2 The first attempt was the 
International Trade Organization, which was aborted due to domestic US political 
pressure from protectionists in Congress.3  
 
                                                 
1    Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis and Michael Hahn The World 
Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 
at 1.  
2   David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke International Environmental Law and 
Policy – Second Edition (2nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2002) at 1146. 
3   Roger B. Porter 'The World Trade Organization at Twenty' (2015) 21(2) BJWA 104 at 105. 
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However, in the build up to forming the International Trade Organization, the 
proposed member states adopted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(‘GATT’), which came into effect on 1 January, 1948.4 The GATT became crucial 
to the development of international trade law, becoming the de facto international 
institution that evolved to oversee the reduction of trade barriers.5 States that 
contracted into the GATT had certain obligations they had to meet, such as 
reducing tariffs to a set amount and observing the principles that a nation’s 
domestic laws should not be used to “afford protection to domestic production”.6 
The GATT became a crucial forum, with negotiation rounds (at least one every 
decade) reducing barriers to trade.7 Out of one of these negotiation rounds, the 
Uruguay Round, was born the World Trade Organization.8  
 
The WTO created a more formal, structured regime for international trade to 
follow. It annexed a host of international agreements, updated the GATT, and 
importantly, set up an “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
Settlement of Disputes”, more commonly known as the Dispute Settlement 
Understand (‘DSU’).9  It allowed member states to settle trade disputes, where 
one party alleges that the other is breaking the rules set out in one of the “covered 
agreements”.10 The covered agreements are those, such as the GATT, which are 
annexed to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.11  
 
Member states of the WTO, through international agreements like the GATT and 
its sister agreement the General Agreement on Trade in Services (‘GATS’), have 
various obligations they have to uphold. These obligations are “almost entirely 
negative; in order to liberalize trade they prescribe the scope of national 
regulatory discretion, rather than requiring governments to positively enact 
                                                 
4    Matsushita, above n 1, at 2.  
5    Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 1147.  
6    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 UNTS 194 (signed 30 October 1947, entered into 
force 1 January 1948), art III(1).  
7    Matsushita, above n 1, at 9. 
8    Matsushita, above n 1, at 9. 
9    Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 14 (signed 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
10   Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, art 1(1).  
11   Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, art 1(1) and Appendix 1.  
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regulations.”12 Chief among them is the principle of removing discriminatory 
treatment of goods and services in trade.13 This ideal is expressed in two main 
ways: the principle of most favoured nation, and the principle of national 
treatment.14 The former asserts that states should not discriminate between like 
products on the basis of where they originated from.15 For instance, similar mobile 
phones from the United States and Japan should be treated the same by New 
Zealand laws. The principle of national treatment requires member states to treat a 
foreign product or service in the same way they would treat a domestic version.16 
Therefore, New Zealand lamb and British lamb must be treated the same by the 
laws of New Zealand. While there are many other facets to international trade law, 
the above two principles are the foundation of WTO law.  
 
These principles are not absolute and without exemptions. Article XX of the 
GATT, and Article XIV of the GATS, provides general exceptions to these 
principles.17 Meanwhile, the Enabling Clause allows countries to provide certain 
preferential treatment to developing countries.18 This is evident through the 
Generalized System of Preferences schemes, which are utilised by member states 
such as the European Union and Australia, which give developing countries 
preferential tariff treatment under certain conditions.19 However, in general, 
member states of the WTO have an obligation to uphold the laws and principles of 
the WTO and its various treaties.  
 
Since its creation in 1994, the WTO has experienced difficulties, though. The 
Doha Rounds have stalled to a near standstill, with developing and developed 
countries holding differing opinions about how further trade liberalisation should 
proceed. In the face of this lack of movement, countries are sidestepping the WTO 
completely to conduct bilateral and multilateral trade agreements outside of the 
                                                 
12 Hunter, Salzman, Zaelke, above n 2, at 1147.  
13 Matsushita, above n 1, at 155. 
14 Matsushita, above n 1, at 155. 
15 GATT, above n 6, art I.  
16 GATT, above n 6, art III. 
17 GATT, above n 6, art XX; General Agreement on Trade in Services 1869 UNTS 183 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995), art XIV.    
18 Peter Van den Bossche & Denise Prevost, Essentials of WTO Law (Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom, 2016) at 137.  
19 Van den Bossche, above n 18, at 138.  
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WTO’s umbrella, whether it is through the use of large trading blocs like the 
South Asian Free Trade Area, or smaller bilateral deals like between New Zealand 
and China.  
 
Despite this breakdown in WTO-led trade liberalisation, one of the “most 
fundamental and perhaps fateful innovations” of the WTO is the DSU that has 
allowed WTO members to “negotiate and adjudicate trade disputes”.20 In the first 
twenty years of the WTO, 491 cases have been heard, averaging 24 to 25 cases a 
year.21 The DSU is a multi-tiered system, with panels and an Appellate Body 
hearing and ruling on cases with such efficiency that it is now the busiest 
international dispute settlement mechanism.22  
 
The DSU created a quasi-judicial element to the world of international trade. It 
was a move away from the ethos of diplomats to the ethos of lawyers, 
incorporating the rule of law into trade disputes in a search for legitimacy.23 
However, that is not to say that the DSU mechanism is a wholly legal entity now. 
Pauwelyn suggests that the WTO managed what Weiler regarded to be impossible: 
having the rule of law without the rule of lawyers.24 Panels are still largely 
diplomats, without legal experience, who have still managed to create a respected 
legal jurisprudence.25 However, on top of the panels is now a “judicial power”, the 
Appellate Body, which is independent from the WTO political organs and has “a 
standing corpus of expert jurists”.26 The Appellate Body has seven members, 
“three of whom shall serve on any one case”,27 and those members must have 
expertise in law, international trade and be unaffiliated with any government.28 
This judicial tribunal operates independently in a culture still “dominated by the 
                                                 
20 Robert Howse 'The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the 
Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power' in Thomas Cottier et al (ed) Studies in International 
Economics: The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulations: Experiences and 
Lessons for the WTO (University of Michigan Press, US, 2009) at 11.  
21 Porter, above n 3, at 109.  
22 Matsushita, above n 1, at 19. 
23 J.H.H Weiler 'The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement' (2001) 35(2) JWT 191 at 196.  
24 Joost Pauwelyn 'The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators 
are from Mars, Trade Adjuciators from Venus' (2015) 109(4) AJIL 761 at 763.  
25 Pauwelyn, above n 24, at 763.  
26 Howse, above n 20, at 11.  
27 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, at Article 17(1).  
28 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, at Article 17(3).  
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values of bureaucracy and diplomacy, not those of the law.”29  
 
In light of this mixing between diplomats and lawyers, the description of a quasi-
judicial element seems appropriate. Regardless, the DSU mechanism is a crucial 
factor of international trade law. It has brought a stream of positives from 
providing a fair, legitimate forum to settle disputes to ensuring that member states 
take their international trade commitments seriously.30 Its body of jurisprudence 
has become a crucial part of international trade law,31  and is a major factor when 
considering any environmental reforms that a member state may wish to 
undertake.  
 
It has been remarked that the circumstantial evidence of the economic benefits of 
international trade is “overwhelming”.32 Butler Eamonn writes that the “one thing 
economists agree on is the benefits of free trade” and it has been “universally 
accepted” by economists.33 Business magazines run articles with the headlines 
“Actually, Everyone Benefits from Free Trade”.34 International trade is good for 
countries because it allows them to become more efficient and it improves their 
position in the export market, while consumers benefit by purchasing goods and 
services in a more competitive market.35 Indeed, “the voice of the consumers” was 
a factor that Milton Friedman considered heavily when coming down on the side 
of free trade.36 
 
The WTO itself states that the economic case for an open trading system is based 
“on commercial common sense.”37 The World Bank showed that in a group of 
countries that doubled their ratio of exports, their GDP per capita rose by 5% over 
                                                 
29 Howse, above n 20, at 11.  
30 Porter, above n 3, at 110. 
31 Matsushita, above n 1, at 19. 
32 Timothy Taylor 'The Truth about Globalization' (2002) 147 Public Interest 24 at 28.  
33 Butler Eamonn Milton Friedman – A Concise Guide to the Ideas and Influence of the Free-
Market Economists (Harriman House, 2011) at 72.  
34 Adam Ozimek “Actually, Everyone Benefits from Free Trade” (17 October 2015) Forbes 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2015/10/17/actually-everyone-benefits-from-
free-trade/#37f5db491221>.  
35 Richard Epstein 'Free Trade and Free Immigration: Why Domestic Competitive Injury Should 
Never Influence Government Policy' (2013) 80(1) U.Chi.L.Rev 201 at 207-208.  
36 Eamonn, above n 33, at 73.  
37 World Trade Organization, 'The case for open trade” 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm>. 
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the 1990s whereas a similar populated group of countries that saw trade fall, saw 
their GDP per capita drop by 1% for a year during the same period.38 The WTO 
agrees, stating that there is “a definite statistical link between freer trade and 
economic growth” and that it benefits all countries, “including the poorest”.39 For 
instance, for proponents of free trade in Latin America, it is said to help accelerate 
the ongoing socio-economic and political development of the region.40 Friedman 
argued that free trade could lead to “harmonious relations between nations” as 
they traded freely.41 It is therefore widely taken as a given that free trade is good 
and therefore the role of the WTO is incredibly important in continuing to achieve 
the gains of global economic growth from international trade.  
 
However, such a viewpoint ignores a groundswell of anti-free trade sentiment that 
is growing around the globe. Richard Epstein goes so far to say that international 
trade, along with immigration, are “two of the hot button issues of our time”.42 
This protectionist surge is most readily noted by the British decision to leave the 
European Union, and likely the Single Market, and the election of Donald Trump, 
who campaigned on policies to drop the Trans-Pacific Partnership and renegotiate 
NAFTA, two considerable free trade agreements. If the economic benefits of 
international trade are “overwhelming” then the question that is begging to be 
asked is why there is such a backlash against it.  
 
There are various reasons people have taken a view against free trade and 
globalisation. First, some argue that the stated economic benefits of international 
trade are actually “ambiguous”, often identifying causality where there might not 
be any.43 The UN Development Programme's study into global trade showed 
“little relation between trade liberalisation and growth.”44 Even if there are trade 
benefits, it can often be uneven with one study showing that though trade to GDP 
ratios rose 1.2% a year across ninety-three countries, forty-four of those states 
                                                 
38 Taylor, above n 32, at 28.  
39 World Trade Organization, above n 37.  
40 John D. Theodore 'The Process of Globalization in Latin America' (2015) 14(1) International 
Business & Economics Research Journal 193 at 196.  
41 Eamonn, above n 33, at 76.  
42 Epstein, above n 35, at 201.  
43 Joseph Stiglitz 'Trade agreements and health in developing countries' (2009) 373 The Lancelet 
363 at 363.  
44 Stiglitz, above n 43, at 363.  
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actually suffered a fall and the majority of the gains were pocketed by only ten 
countries.45 Therefore, the argument goes countries are opening up their doors 
while receiving nothing in return. In fact, it may deprive developing countries of 
needed revenue from tariffs.46 Another argument against free trade and 
globalisation is that it is a threat against marginalised groups, such as women who 
bear an unfair share of the burden,47 and limit governments from achieving certain 
social goals, such as promoting the family farmer.48 A third reason may be the 
effects of free trade on climate change, which will be discussed later in this paper.  
 
This paper does not seek to get to the bottom of this dispute between advocates 
and detractors of free trade. It works off the assumption that free trade, and 
therefore the WTO, are, on the whole, a benefit to the world through increase 
economic growth, which leads to rising living standards and a reduction in 
poverty. However, it is important to note that the value of free trade’s utility is not 
unchallenged and therefore it may not be deserved to be treated as a sacred value 
when considering how to deal with its conflict with environmental action and 
climate change reform.  
The Environment and Climate Change 
While the notion of protecting the environment is a relatively old idea, its 
intersection with trade law did not really become a discussed area until the 
1970s.49 Even then, it was mostly concerned with the preservation of endangered 
species.50 However, the main environmental factor of today, climate change, has 
an older history. In 1896, Arrhenius recognised the connection between the 
climate, CO2 emissions, the burning of coal in industry, and the importance of 
polar ice and water levels.51  
 
As L.D Danny Harvey points out, this means that “many key features of our 
                                                 
45 Julian Kunnie The Cost of Globalization: Dangers to the Earth and its People (McFarland & 
Company Inc., Publishers, North Carolina, 2015) at 22. 
46 Stiglitz, above n 43, at 363.  
47 Kunnie, above n 45, at 109.  
48 Hunter, Salzman, Zaelke, above n 2, at 1132. 
49 Bradly J. Condon Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO (Transnational Publishers, New 
York, 2006) at 1.  
50 Condon, above n 49, at 1.  
51 L.D Danny Harvey 'An overview of the climate change science in 1977 marking the 
publication of Volume 100 of Climate Change' in (2010) 100 Climate Change 15 at 15. 
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present understanding of how the climate reacts to increasing atmospheric CO2 
were identified over 100 years ago.”52 As early as 1977:53  
 
the basic outline of the “CO2 problem” was well 
established: humans were unquestionably 
increasing the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere, the concentration would double within 
a century under reasonable business-as-usual 
scenarios of increasing emissions, this increase 
would be irreversible on human time scales and 
would trap infrared radiation based on well-
establishment and non-controversial radiation 
physics, and this heat trapping would exert a 
warming effect on the climate. The magnitude of 
the warming effect at the time was uncertain but it 
was realized then that it was likely to be nontrivial 
and possibly catastrophic, with the only available 
estimates at that time based on admittedly simple 
and crude calculations using computer models. 
However, the potential consequences of a CO2 
doubling were grave, particularly with regard to 
drying of soils and sea level rise. 
 
Since the 1970s, climate change has become more of a problem. In fact, it is now 
“probably the most relevant problem to be tackled by the contemporary world”.54 
Since 1990, the “global mean temperatures have probably been higher than at any 
previous time during the last 1000 years.”55 By 2001, the average temperature 
increase had reached 0.6 degree Celsius and was projected to increase by 
anywhere from 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius by 2100.56 The Intergovernmental Panel 
                                                 
52 Danny Harvey, above n 51, at 15. 
53 Danny Harvey, above n 51, at 18.  
54 Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Cima 'WTO and Renewable Energy: Lessons from the Case Law' 
(2015) 49(6) JWT 1103 at 1104. 
55 Heinz Warner et al, 'Mid- to late Holocene climate change: an overview' in (2008) 27 
Quaternary Science Reviews 1791at 1792.  
56 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 2-3.  
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on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the “warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal” and that it is “very likely” anthropogenic greenhouse gases are the 
cause of such warming, which is an upgrade in certainty from an earlier report.57 
Such an increase in temperature, and an associated rise in sea levels, could lead to: 
increased and more severe weather events, population displacement, a rise in heat 
associated deaths, an increase in disease such as malaria and dengue fever, food 
shortages, and the inundation of small island states and coastal urban areas.58  
 
Even then, despite the potential catastrophic effects, a global response to climate 
change has been slow. It was only in the early 1990s that work began on the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ('UNFCCC'),59 nearly 
twenty years after it became self-evident that the planet was facing a large 
problem. The UNFCCC, though, required parties to make concerted efforts at 
adopting measures that attempt to stabilise greenhouse gases and prevent 
anthropogenic interference in the global climate.60 However, progress has been 
slow. Domestic politics and global issues, such as the philosophy around differing 
obligations for developed and developing countries, have meant that often 
negotiations have stalled. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which until two years ago 
was the leading climate agreement, is now described as an “embattled treaty” 
which has been “superseded by circumstances”.61 The United States was never a 
party to the Kyoto Protocol, and most countries no longer have obligations under 
the text.  
 
However, after high profiles failure to combat the problem of climate change, 
such as the failed negotiations at Copenhagen, the global community surprisingly 
finalised a climate agreement in Paris on 12 December 2015. The Paris Agreement 
is the first major, globalised agreement on climate change since the Kyoto 
Protocol.62 For the first time in international law, it sets down a target of limiting 
                                                 
57 Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova & Anirudh Shingal 'The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate 
Change Mitigation: Legal and Economic Analysis' (2014) 48(5) JWT 1007 at 1010-1011.  
58 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 3.  
59 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for 
signing 4 June 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994).  
60 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 59, art 2. 
61 Annalisa Savaresi 'The Paris Agreement: An Early Assessment' (2016) 46(1) Environmental 
Pol’y & L. 14 at 16. 
62 Savaresi, n 61, at 15.  
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global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, with a more aspirational target set at 1.5 
degrees.63 It requires parties to aim to reach “global peaking of greenhouse gas 
emissions as soon as possible” and to then “undertake rapid reductions 
thereafter.”64 Further, while the Paris Agreement continues the theory that 
developed countries should provide assistance to developing countries,65 it also 
breaks down the distinction between developing and developed countries, by 
requiring all parties to make efforts to reduce their emissions.66  
 
The Paris Agreement has a mixture of unequivocal obligations, and obligations 
which are expressed in far less strident terms.67 One of the central cogs to the 
Paris Agreement is the idea of Nationally Determined Contributions ('NDCs'), 
where each member details the climate action it intends to take.68 A NDC needs to 
be submitted every five years.69 The principle builds on the increasingly 
acceptable idea that climate governance should exist under a “pledge and review” 
approach.70 The Paris Agreement lays down the foundation of a system that can 
work toward a global goal while also measuring and checking the contribution 
being made by each country.71 Other provisions in the Agreement includes 
cooperation to increase “climate change education, training, public awareness, 
public participation and public access to information”72 and taking cooperative 
action on “technology development.”73 The Agreement also has provisions which 
are more recommendations rather than legal obligations,74 such as: recognising 
that adapting to climate change is a “global challenge”,75 recommending parties 
should report on climate change impacts,76 and recognising the need for 
                                                 
63 Paris Agreement (opened for signing 22 April 2016, entered into force 4 November 2016), art 
2(1)(a).  
64 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 4(1).  
65 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 9(1).  
66 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 4(4).  
67 Savaresi, n 61, at 15.  
68 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 4(2).  
69 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 4(9).  
70 Annalisa Savaresi 'The Paris Agreement: a new beginning?' (2016) 34(1) J.E.R.L 16 at 21. 
71 Savaresi, n 70, at 21.  
72 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 12.  
73 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 10(2).  
74 Daniel Bodansky 'The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement' (2016) 25(2) RECIEL 142 at 
147.  
75 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 7(2).  
76 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 13(8).  
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encouraging innovation to tackle climate change.77 
 
The exact legal nature of the Paris Agreement is relatively fluid. There has been 
the suggestion that because the Paris Agreement does not have enforceable rules 
or sanctions for parties that fail to comply, then it cannot be considered law but 
more a “a statement of good intentions.”78 Savaresi states there can be no doubt, 
though, that the agreement is a treaty, and like most treaties it is formally binding 
on its parties.79 It is a point agreed with by Daniel Bodansky who writes that “the 
Paris Agreement is a treaty within the definition of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, but not every provision of the agreement creates a legal 
obligation.”80 Bodansky’s conclusion arises because the Agreement creates some 
legal obligations, compliance is not voluntary and it has clauses that only make 
sense in the context of it being a treaty, such as expressing content to be bound 
and the minimum requirements for the Agreement to come into force.81  
 
The legally binding obligations of the Paris Agreement are largely focussed on 
merely the communicating and updating of each state's NDC, whereas the actual 
content of the NDCs are not binding.82 Each party is granted “ample leeway” on 
deciding how to fulfil their obligations and which climate actions should be 
taken.83 The Agreement can perhaps be largely considered as having “strong 
procedural obligations” while having “relatively few legal obligations” on the 
subject of implementation.84 However, Article 15 does establish a mechanism, 
through committee, to promote compliance with the Agreement.85 While the 
provision had been significantly cut down from earlier texts, the fact that any 
compliance provision at all made it into the Agreement is a “significant 
achievement, as there was long-standing opposition to any compliance 
                                                 
77 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 10(5).  
78 Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The Paris Approach to Global Governance' Project-Syndicate (28 
December 2015) <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-agreement-model-for-
global-governance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12>.  
79 Savaresi, n 61, at 15.   
80 Bodansky, n 74, at 150.  
81 Bodansky, n 74, at 142, 145.  
82 Christina Voigt in 'The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement' 
(2016) 25(2) RECIEL 161 at 161.  
83 Savaresi, n 61, at 15.  
84 Bodansky, n 74, at 146-147.  
85 Paris Agreement, above n 63, at Article 15.  
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arrangement.”86 
 
An important question is if “a national pledge, once officially submitted without 
qualifications and conditions, is binding on a party.”87 The answer is likely not 
with the Paris Agreement's power resting more on “economic, social and political 
obligations” that may lead to states taking action simply to protect their 
reputation.88 It would appear that the legal obligation of the Paris Agreement is to 
set targets and plans, not necessarily to meet those targets. Therefore, until the 
agreement begins to be implemented and interpreted, the Paris Agreement's exact 
form remains in flux.89 It must also be noted, though, that early research has 
suggested that the Paris Agreement may only have a “negligible effect”,90 and 
therefore if it is to truly combat climate change, parties will likely need to be 
aggressive with their actions under the agreement.  
 
Therefore, when talking about the environment and climate change, it is 
noticeable that the science behind the issues has been recognised for at least a 
century. Since the 1970s, the world has known of the potential dangers of climate 
change. It is now “the world’s most difficult and complex collective action 
problem.”91 Yet steps taken to combat the dangers have been slow coming. The 
Paris Agreement is now a new way forward, hoping to see countries across the 
world take environmental actions to limit global emissions and ensure that the 
planet does not descend into serious harm.   
Intersection Between Trade and the Environment 
The relationship between international trade and environmental issues can appear 
to be a fraught one. Often, the link between trade and environment is regarded as 
one of opposition.92 In terms of the environment, the WTO has been said to 
undermine “existing local, national and international environmental and 
                                                 
86 Voigt, above n 82, at 164.  
87 Lucas Bergkamp 'The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: A Risk Regulation Perspective' 
2016 1 EJRR 35 at 37.  
88 Jennifer Jacquet and Dale Jamieson 'Soft but significant power in the Paris Agreement' (2016) 
6 Nature Climate Change 643 at 645. 
89 Savaresi, n 61, at 15.  
90 Bergkamp, above n 87, at 35.  
91 Jacquet and Jamieson, above n 88, at 643.  
92 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716.  
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conservation policy”.93 This is a view shared not just by the general public, but 
also by specialists.94  
 
At its most simplest, the argument of the main threat to the environment is that 
free trade increases the economic activity that has already proven to be 
environmentally destructive.95 Simply put, more trade means more emissions, 
which means an even higher increase in temperature. Meanwhile, increased 
economic activity from China to France has seen a decrease in air quality.96 With 
increasing trade liberalisation driven by the WTO, there is the possibility that 
environmental protections will fall as countries engage in a “race to the bottom” 
to remain competitive.97  
 
However, when further analysis is considered, many writers argue that trade does 
not have to be an enemy of the environment. In fact, trade relies on environmental 
health to continue to provide economic gains. In the event of unchecked global 
warming, climate change could cause havoc to the world economy and 
international trade. Mark Carney, the current Governor of the Bank of England, 
has remarked that “once climate change becomes a defining issue for financial 
stability, it may already be too late'.98 Overall, at a global cost, reports have 
suggested that by the second half of this century the average cost of climate 
change could reach 5% of GDP, and that by 2100 onward there could be an annual 
loss of 20% of per capita consumption.99 However, if more risks are incorporated 
into a review, the annual cost could rise to 20% of global GDP each year.100 At a 
more local level, the British economy, according to one study, would face an 
increase of 150% in economic damage from flooding alone due to the effects of 
climate change.101 The cost to Africa over the next 50 years could be a loss of 2 to 
                                                 
93 Lori Wallach Whose Trade Organization? – A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO (New Press, 
New York, 2004) at 20.  
94 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716.  
95 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 1131. 
96 Kunnie, above n 45, at 232.  
97 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 1133.  
98 Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England “'Breaking the tragedy of the horizon: Climate 
Change and Financial Stability” (Speech given at Lloyd's of London, 29 September 2015) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx>. 
99 Peter Bartelmus, ‘How bad is climate change?’ 2015 14 Environmental Development 53 at 58.  
100 Cottier, Nartova & Shingal, above n 57, at 1013.  
101 P.B Sayers et al Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Projections of Future Flood Risk in the 
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4% of its GDP and up to $30 billion a year in adaptation costs.102  The cost of 
droughts in Europe over the past three decades amount to $100 billion.103 Further, 
it is suggested that the “inconvenient truth” is that “we do not know how bad” the 
cost of climate change will be.104 For international trade and economic growth not 
to be threatened, the welfare of the environment is a critical consideration. 
 
Further, international trade can be beneficial to the environment. Unless there is a 
paradigm shift in how much energy people use, the world cannot combat climate 
change by merely reducing the production of non-renewable energy without a 
replacement. There needs to be renewable energy to replace the less efficient, 
more damaging industries.105 International trade can help spread the benefits of 
new technology. In the trade dispute of India – Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules,106 the Indian government was trying to build a 
domestic solar industry. That may be a worthy goal. However, through 
international trade, solar cells and modules could be provided from overseas, 
possibly at a lower cost. Therefore, international trade could prove to be a real 
benefit in helping India turn to solar power.  
 
To turn to the WTO in particular, Matsushita and his co-authors note that there are 
three main reasons to suggest that the WTO is not incompatible with addressing 
environmental concerns. First, often the values of international trade and the 
protection of the environment do not conflict and in fact should be mutually 
supportive.107 Secondly, taking environmental action is beyond the scope of the 
WTO since it deals only with trade law; it is not its role to apply measures to 
protect the environment.108 Finally, the WTO does not give the principle of free 
trade priority over environmental protection.109 In fact, the Preamble to the WTO 
                                                                                                                                     
UK' Report Prepared for the Committee on Climate Change (UK, London, 2015).  
102 Alemu Mekonnen ‘Economic Costs of Climate Change and Climate Finance with a Focus on 
Africa’ (2014) 23 Journal of African Economies 50 at 74.  
103 Kunnie, above n 45, at 222.  
104 Bartelmus, above n 94, at 60.  
105 Rolf H. Weber & Rika Koch ‘International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for Renewable 
Energy’ (2015) 49(5) JWT 757 at 757. 
106 India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R, 14 
October 2016 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
107 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716.  
108 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716.  
109 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716.  
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Agreement states that trade must allow for:110  
 
the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels 
of economic development.  
 
Therefore, the main issue when considering international trade and environmental 
concern is not one of either or but rather one of balance since both protecting the 
environment and trade are essential and beneficial to society.111 However, there 
are times where international trade and environmental concerns do come into 
conflict. 
 
Chapter II – Defining Conflict  
Before assessing the field of literature around conflicts between trade and the 
environment, it is crucial to first actually define the concept of conflict. The 
Appellate Body of the WTO has provided a definition of conflict in Guatemala – 
Cement I as “a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a 
violation of the other provision.”112 It is a definition that has similarities with the 
historical definition of conflict in international law, such as the one provided by 
Wilfred Jenks who defined treaties as being in conflict when a party “cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.”113 More recently, 
Marceau has largely agreed with this definition.114 
 
This is a reasonably strict definition.115 However, it possibly exists because 
                                                 
110 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 14 (signed 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995), Preamble.  
111 Matsushita, above n 1, at 717.  
112 Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 
WT/DS60/AB/R, 25 November 1998 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [65].  
113 Wilfred Jenks 'The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties' (1953) 30 BYIL 401 at 426.  
114 Gabrielle Marceau ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflict of Jurisdictions – The Relationship 
between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’ (2001) 35(6) 1081.  
115 International Law Commission ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006 at 24.  
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international law favours a presumption against conflict when discussing two 
contradicting rules under international law.116 This presumption exists because, in 
theory, when states come together to form new treaties, they are doing so in the 
context of pre-existing rules and obligations that they will seek to continue to 
follow and therefore, there is an assumption that the new rule will build upon the 
old treaty.117 In such a world, potential conflicts are not conflicts at all because 
they can be “interpreted away”.118 Therefore, it is only when an interpretation 
cannot be found which allows both rules to exist does a legal conflict arise, which 
means “genuine legal conflicts should be rather scarce.”119 
 
There are problems with such a definition which could be regarded as too strict.120 
For example, it ignores the tension between an obligation and an explicit right.121 
This was seen in Indonesia – Autos where the panel refused to recognise a conflict 
between the national treatment prescription and permission to maintain certain 
subsidies under the SCM.122 This was because a conflict only occurs where there 
are “obligations which cannot be complied with simultaneously”.123 This flow on 
effect of the narrow definition is a particularly pressing concern when considering 
environmental concerns. Pauwelyn suggests there could be a WTO rule that 
imposes an obligation not to restrict trade, and an environmental convention 
which provides states with permission to restrict trade to protect the 
environment.124 Under the above definition of conflict, favoured by the Appellate 
Body, there would be no conflict in this situation.125 However, there are “looser 
understandings on conflict as well.”126 
 
Under the narrower definition, any conflicts rules would not be triggered because, 
                                                 
116 Joost Pauwelyn 'The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?' 
(2001) 95 AJIL 535 at 550.  
117 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 550.  
118 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 550.  
119 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 551.  
120 Erich Vranes 'The Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in International Law and Legal Theory' (2006) 
17 EIJL 17 395 at 395-396.   
121 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 551.  
122 Vranes, above n 120, at 400-401.  
123 Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 23 July 1998 (Report of the Panel) at footnote 649.  
124 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 551.  
125 Pauwelyn, above n 116 at 551.  
126  International Law Commission, above n 115, at 24.  
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under a strict definition, there is no conflict.127 However, this fails to recognise 
that if the environmental measure is to have any impact, then that right to restrict 
trade may need to be utilised.128 As the International Law Commission noted, “a 
treaty may sometimes frustrate the goals of another treaty without there being any 
strict incompatibility between their provisions.”129 As such, under the Pauwelyn 
example, there is a conflict between the obligation of the WTO and the right to 
take steps to protect the environment.130  
 
In order to resolve that conflict, Vranes proposes a new definition based more on 
prevailing legal theory, that there “is a conflict between two norms, one of which 
may be permissive, if in obeying or applying one norm, the other one is 
necessarily or possibly violated.”131 It is a similar definition of conflict that was 
adopted by the International Law Commission, who defined conflict as “a 
situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a 
problem.”132 
 
In this paper, when seeking out potential conflicts between environmental 
measures combating climate change and WTO law, I propose to use a definition 
far closer to the broader definition sought by the International Law Commission, 
Vranes and Pauwelyn than the more traditional narrow definition. A conflict, for 
the purposes of this paper, is a situation where an environmental measure is 
hindered or in some way limited due to a WTO obligation, or will cause a party to 
breach their WTO obligations if undertaken. It is a broad definition designed to 
assess how much freedom is there for the international community to adequately 
tackle the threat of climate change while ensuring the continued respect for WTO 
law. With this definition in mind, a literature review of the areas of potential 
conflict between trade and the environment can be properly undertaken.  
 
Chapter III – Reviewing the Field – Potential Conflicts between 
                                                 
127 Vranes, above n 120, at 398.  
128 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 551. 
129 International Law Commission, above n 115, at 24.  
130 Pauwelyn, above n 116, at 551.  
131 Vranes, above n 120, at 415.  
132 International Law Commission, above n 115, at 25.  
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Trade & Climate Change Reform 
The literature review has been guided foremost by actual climate change policies 
that could possibly be enacted. Measures have been identified and then it has been 
considered what area of WTO law could possibly be in conflict with such policies. 
From there, the initial focus has been on the actual treaties and case law from the 
WTO, panels and the Appellate Body. Finally, the academic literature from this 
area has been read and discussed. It is hoped that such an approach ensures that a 
wide expanse of literature is read while still remaining firmly focussed on 
practical climate change policies and actual areas of potential conflict.  
Measures Tackling Efficiency and the Principle of National Treatment 
Rather than reinventing the wheel, one of the more low-hanging fruits of climate 
change reform is to make our current technology more efficient. The less energy a 
product uses, the less impact it has on the climate. An example of this can be seen 
through the lens of fuel efficiency schemes.133 Reducing the environmental effects 
of the transport sector will need to be a central part of any plan to combat climate 
change.134 In 2004, the transport sector was responsible for 23% of all global 
energy-related emissions.135 Even in Texas, which is the oil production capital of 
the United States, vehicle-related emissions still clock in at 21% of the state's total 
emissions.136 Meanwhile, in the United States, transport-emissions amount to 30% 
of the country's total emissions.137 Further, as developing countries continue to 
industrialise, their share of transport-related emissions will only increase.138 If the 
United States could increase fuel efficiency requirements for cars by 8.5km per 
litre, this would reduce CO2 emissions by around 400 million tonnes per year.139 
Therefore, fuel efficiency standards could be an important weapon in the arsenal 
of countries trying to combat global emissions. The same can be said for various 
products and industries, from factories to energy-efficient light bulbs.  
 
                                                 
133 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Johannes Norpoth 'Is World Trade Law a Barrier to 
Saving Our Climate' (September 2009), Center for International Environmental Law 
<http://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ClimateTradeReport_foee-ciel_sep09.pdf> 
at 15.  
134 Norpoth, above n 133, at 15.  
135 Norpoth, above n 133, at 15.  
136 Kunnie, above n 45, at 240.  
137 Kunnie, above n 45, at 226.  
138 Norpoth, above n 133, at 15.  
139 Norpoth, above n 133, at 15.  
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However, it is possible that such measures could come into conflict with the non-
discrimination principles of WTO law, namely Article III of the GATT and the 
principle of National Treatment. These environmental measures described above 
would differentiate between products that are, on the surface, similar but through 
some background factor have different environmental implications.140 Depending 
on how Article III is interpreted, it could either provide flexibility for countries to 
implement environmental measures or restrict them from doing so.141  
Current Legal Position 
Article III:1 sets down the central principle that domestic laws and taxes should 
not be applied in such a way “so as to afford protection to domestic 
production”.142 Article III:2 and Article III:4 then sets down the more specific 
laws that member states agreed to be governed by:143 
 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other 
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 
 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
The provision of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation charges which are based 
exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport 
                                                 
140 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al Environment and Trade – A Guide to WTO 
Jurisprudence (Earthscan, London, 2006) at 9.  
141 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 10.  
142 GATT, above n 6, art III:1. 
143 GATT, above n 6, art III:2 and art III:4. 
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and not on the nationality of the product. 
 
An ad to Article III:2 notes that the second sentence involves situation where the 
two products are “directly competitive or substitutable.”144 Both Article III:2 and 
Article III:4 use in some form the expression “like products”, though Article 
III:2's use of “like product” is narrower because of that provision's ad adding 
another factor of “directly competitive or substitutable” products.145 It is a crucial 
question for environmental measures. Article III can only defeat an environmental 
measure if it is treating “like products” differently. The definition of “like 
products” is therefore critical in deciding if there is a conflict between trade law 
and potential environmental measures.146  
 
“Like products” is a term that has been considered in numerous panel and 
Appellate Body reports.147 A clear summary of the term, though, is found in the 
Appellate Body report of EC – Asbestos.148 First of all, the Appellate Body noted 
an earlier observation of theirs in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II when they 
remarked that “there can be no precise and absolute definition of what is like” but 
rather that likeness is an accordion that can be stretched and squeezed depending 
on what provision of a WTO Agreement is being applied.149  
 
The Appellate Body noted that an ordinary meaning of “like” meant products that 
“share a number of identical or similar characteristics or qualities.”150 Further, the 
use of “similar” was consistent with the French and Spanish versions of Article 
III:4, which used “produits similaires” and “productos similares” respectively.151 
However, the Appellant Body noted that an ordinary meaning of the word leaves 
                                                 
144 GATT, above n 6, Ad to art III:2.  
145 Henrik Horn and Joseph H. H. Weiler 'EC – Asbestos European Communities – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products' (2004) 3(1) WTR 129 at 136.  
146 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 9.  
147 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 
November 1996 (Report of the Appellate Body) United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
148 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, 5 April 2001 (Report of the Appellate Body). 
149 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 21.  
150 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [91].  
151 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [91]. 
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many questions left unanswered.152 Instead, the Appellant Body noted that the 
“general principle” of Article III:1 “informs” the interpretation of the other parts 
of Article III, including “like products”.153  
 
Article III:1’s general principle is that internal measures should “not be applied to 
imported and domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production”. The Appellate Body had previously considered such a term as 
meaning that member states must provide “equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products”.154 Therefore, when 
considering “like products” specifically under Article III:4, the Appellate Body 
remarked that the word “like... is to be interpreted to apply to products that are in 
such a competitive relationship”.155 Further, they noted that the Report of the 
Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments outlined an approach for considering 
“likeness” and that such an approach had been confirmed and built on by Panel 
and Appellate Body decisions.156 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II confirm that the 
Border Tax Adjustment approach also applies to Article III:2.157 It involved four 
general criteria:158  
 
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the 
end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits – 
more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions and 
behaviour – in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff 
classification the products.  
 
The Appellate Body noted that these criteria essentially set down four 
“characteristics” that the products may share:159 
 
(i) the physical properties of the product; (ii) the extent to which 
the products are capable of serving the same or similar end-
                                                 
152 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [92].  
153 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [98].  
154 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 16.  
155 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [99].  
156 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
157 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 21. 
158 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
159 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
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uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the 
products as alternative means of performing particular function 
in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the 
international classification of the products for tariff purpose.  
 
The Appellate Body was quick to write that the above criteria were only “a 
framework for analyzing the “likeness” of particular products on a case-by-case 
basis.”160 The criteria were neither “treaty-mandated nor a closed list” that would 
determine whether products were alike; they are merely “simple tools to assist in 
the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence.”161 Emily Lydgate, when 
writing about EC – Seal Products, notes that the “status quo” of the Appellate 
Body's position on analysing “like products” is still in place.162  
 
The question of “likeness” is only the first step that a panel or the Appellate Body 
will look at when considering an Article III breach. Article III has two distinct 
provisions; Article III:2, which is concerned with internal taxes or charges, and 
Article III:4 which is concerned with treatment under domestic laws and 
regulations. Both of them require “likeness”, but Article III:2 has the second step 
of ensuring that the imported like product does not face a charge “in excess of” 
domestic products.163 Article III:4’s second step is to ensure that the imported like 
product is “accorded treatment no less favourable” than the domestic product.164 
While being different tests, with different terms, they are both informed by the 
guiding principle that a member state should not use their internal taxes or laws 
“so as to afford protection to domestic production”.165  
 
Reinhard Quick and Christian Lau attempt to tackle the distinction regarding 
likeness between Article III:2 and Article III:4. They note that it might be tempted 
to suggest Article III:2 is broader because it imposes obligations “with respect to 
                                                 
160 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
161 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
162 Emily Lydgate 'Sorting Out Mixed Messages under the WTO National Treatment Principle: A 
Proposed Approach' (2016) 15(3) WTR 423 at 428.  
163 GATT, above n 6, art III:2.  
164 GATT, above n 6, art III:4.  
165 GATT, above n 6, art III:1.  
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directly competitive and substitutable products”.166 However, if one provision of 
Article III is broader than the other, it could end up frustrating “the general 
principle of GATT Article III:1”.167 It seems to be a point that the Appellate Body 
is conscious of. In Japan – Alcohol Beverages II they state that Article III:1 assists 
in the understanding of all paragraphs in Article III.168 In EC – Asbestos, the 
Appellate Body went further, saying:169  
 
we do conclude that the product scope of Article III:4, 
although broader than the first sentence of Article III:2, is 
certainly not broader than the combined product scope of 
the two sentences of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.  
 
Quick and Lau considers the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body on this issue 
and concludes that the Appellate Body interprets “like product” in Article III:4 in 
an identical fashion to how they interpret “directly competitive or substitutable 
products” in Article III:2, therefore meaning “that notwithstanding their different 
wording, the product scope of both provisions is identical.”170 James Flett seeks to 
reconcile the situation by arguing that the first sentence of Article III:2, with a 
narrower definition of “like product”, refers specifically to de jure breaches of the 
National Treatment principle.171 The second sentence, concerned with “directly 
competitive or substitutable”, is focussed on de facto breaches.172 
 
Flett also makes the argument that “like products” and “directly competitive or 
substitutable” have been erroneously interpreted as “different degrees of the same 
concept”.173 Instead, he argues, “like product” refers to a horizontal comparison, 
                                                 
166 Reinhard Quick and Christian Lau 'Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinctions and WTO 
Law – The European's Commission Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in Light of the 
'Like Product' and 'PPM- Debates' (2003) 6(2) J Intl Econ L 419 at 425.  
167 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 426.  
168 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 18.  
169 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [99].  
170 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 428-429.  
171 James Flett 'WTO Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test' (2013) 
16(1) J Intl Econ L 37 at 58. At page 51 Flett defines de jure breaches as where a member 
states takes an action that “explicitly discriminates exclusively based on origin.”   
172 Flett, above n 171, at 58.  
173 Flett, above n 171, at 58.  
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while “directly competitive or substitutable” is a vertical relationship.174 It would 
not appear to be a line of argument forcefully taken up by other academics. 
Indeed, Lydgate writes herself that any attempt to differentiate the two provisions 
would be missing “the forest for the trees” because it would be implying that 
“taxation measures should be treated less strictly than regulatory measures, when 
Article III:1, the chapeau, equally informs the interpretation of all of Article 
III.”175  
 
The Appellate Body considered the term of “so as to afford protection” in the case 
of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, where they rejected an intent analysis in 
favour of an objective examination of the measure and whether it protected the 
domestic product.176 The Appellate Body said:177 
 
It is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons 
legislators and regulators often have for what they do and weigh 
the relative significance of those reasons to establish legislative 
or regulatory intent. If the measure is applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production, then it does not matter that there may not have been 
any desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the 
legislators or the regulators who imposed the measure. 
 
Likewise, the term of according “treatment no less favourable” is treated with a 
similar analytical eye, rather than a subjective interpretation. The Panel in US – 
Gasoline noted that less favourable treatment would exist if an imported product 
had fewer equal competitive opportunities than the domestic like product.178 Since 
the United States did not challenge the ruling made with regard to Article III, the 
Appellate Body did not discuss that matter.179 However, the Appellate Body has 
recently reaffirmed the sentiment in the panel decision of US - Gasoline in the 
                                                 
174 Flett, above n 171, at 58.  
175 Lydgate, above n 162, at 441.  
176 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 29.  
177 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 27-28.  
178 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/R, 20 May 
1996 (Report of the Panel) at [6.10].  
179 US – Gasoline, above n 148, at p 9.  
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case of EC – Seal Products.180 In that decision, the Appellate Body said that “the 
term “treatment no less favourable” requires effective equality of opportunities for 
imported products to compete with like domestic products”.181 The result of such 
a definition means:182 
 
Article III:4 permits regulatory distinctions to be drawn 
between products, provided that such distinctions do not modify 
the conditions of competition between imported and like 
domestic products. Hence, a determination of whether imported 
products are treated less favourably than like domestic products 
involves an assessment of the implications of the contested 
measure for the equality of competitive conditions between 
imported and like products.  
 
The current law around National Treatment and Article III is therefore analytical 
and objective. Like products are defined by shared characteristics, and terms such 
as “so as to afford domestic product” and “treatment no less favourable” are 
interpreted in an objective way, without normally considering things such as 
legislative intent.  
Discussion on Interpretation 
Both Emily Lydgate and the pair of Aaron Cosbey and Petros C. Mavroidis have 
noted that the current interpretation of Article III has not always been the case.183 
Cosbey and Mavroidis write that the last report of the GATT era concerned with 
Article III was the Panel report of US – Taxes on Automobiles.184 Rather like the 
fuel efficiency standard example used above by Bernasconi-Osterwalder and 
Norpoth, the United States wanted to set a tax scheme that was partly based on a 
larger tax for companies which had a fleet of “gas guzzlers” cars.185 The Panel 
implemented an “aims and effects” test:186 
                                                 
180 European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, 18 June 2014 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
181 EC – Seal Products, above n 180, at [5.101].  
182 EC – Seal Products, above n 180, at [5.116].  
183 Lydgate, above n 162, 437-438; Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis 'Heavy Fuel: Trade and 
Environment in the GATT/WTO Case Law' (2014) 23(3) RECIEL 23(3) 288 at 291.  
184 United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 11 October 1994 (Report of the Panel).  
185 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 291.  
186 US – Taxes on Automobiles, above n 184, at 5.10.  
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The Panel noted that the term “so as to” suggested both aim and 
effect. Thus the phrase “so as to afford protection” called for an 
analysis of elements including the aim of the measure and the 
resulting effect. A measure could be said to have the aim of 
affording protection if an analysis of the circumstances in which 
it was adopted, in particular an analysis of the instruments 
available to the contracting party to achieve the declared 
domestic policy goal, demonstrated that a change in competitive 
opportunities in favour of domestic products was a desired 
outcome and not merely an incidental consequences of the 
pursuit of a legitimate policy goal. A measure could be said to 
have the effect of affording protection to domestic production if 
it accorded greater competitive opportunities to domestic 
products than to imported products. The effect of a measure in 
terms of trade flow was not relevant for the purposes of Article 
III, since a change in the volume or proportion of imports could 
be due to many factors other than government measures. 
 
Mavroidis and Cosbey describe this “aims and effect” test as one concerned with 
“the regulatory aims pursued by the intervening government” and not the 
prevailing perceptions in the marketplace.187 Lydgate agrees with this 
interpretation of US – Taxes on Automobile, noting that the aim part of the “aims 
and effect” test was really just “a synonym for 'intent'”.188 When attempting to 
explain the motive of the Panel, Mavroidis and Cosbey write that the Panel were 
trying to create “the necessary device to understand likeness as originally 
designed: a term giving flesh to the obligation not to discriminate, and not a term 
condoning de-regulation.”189 
 
Regardless of any merit in this argument, the first decision in the WTO era on 
Article III, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, expressly rejected the “aims and 
effects” test.190 Lydgate states that the reasoning for this rejection by the Appellate 
                                                 
187 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 291.  
188 Lydgate, above n 162, at 438.  
189 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 291.  
190 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 27-29.  
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Body was twofold: first, it failed to consider the key principle of protectionism, 
and secondly that the idea of “government intent was too subjective.”191 The latter 
of the two points was confirmed in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages when 
the Appellate Body said the “subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of 
individual legislators or regulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because 
they are not accessible to treaty interpreters.”192  
 
Lydgate notes that the Appellate Body has consistently reaffirmed that “likeness” 
is a “market-based, not a policy-based, concept.”193 Henrik Horn and Joseph 
Weiler agree, noting that EC – Asbestos was an example of the 'objective' 
methodology.194 They define that objective methodology as being one where 
taxation and regulation may not be applied in a way that results in protection 
being afforded to domestic production, regardless of its intent.195 David Wirth 
notes that while health considerations were considered:196   
 
only one of the three Appellate Body members hearing the 
appeal thought that health considerations alone would be 
sufficient to support the conclusion that asbestos and 
alternatives to it are not “like”. 
 
Because of this situation, Wirth believes that it “may be difficult for national 
governments to apply product regulations with any confidence as to the outcome 
in cases in which risks are less clearly established.”197 Such a conclusion would 
tend to suggest that policy considerations are still largely off-limit for member 
states to argue. Lydgate's paper would seem to confirm such a conclusion, while 
being ultimately dismissive of such an interpretative stance.  
 
She notes that there is “a kind of double consciousness” where the Appellate Body 
                                                 
191 Lydgate, above n 162, at 438.  
192 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, 12 January 2000 
(Report of the Appellate Body) at [62].  
193 Lydgate, above n 162, at 438.  
194 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 141. 
195 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 133-134.  
196 David A. Wirth 'European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products' (2002) 96(2) AJIL 435 at 438.  
197 Wirth, above n 196, at 438.  
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refuses to recognise subjective intent while still concluding that “a measure's 
purposes are relevant to whether it is applied so as to afford protection to domestic 
products”.198 Horn and Weiler noted such a fact, pointing out that Chile – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages used language that would appear to affirm some sort of 
“intent” test.199 Matsushita and his co-authors also write that the “aims and 
effects” test's demise has been less complete than one would think when reading 
the pertinent Appellate Body report.”200 
 
In fact, Lydgate notes that the evolving jurisprudence of Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (‘TBT’) Article 2.1 and the comment in Dominican Republic – 
Import and Sale of Cigarettes that a negative impact “explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product” does not necessarily 
mean there is less favourable treatment occurring,201 led the European Union in 
EC – Seal Product to argue that a “legitimate regulatory distinction” could exist in 
Article III.202 
 
While not directly addressing the point, the Appellate Body reasserted itself that 
“less favourable treatment” is an assessment of competitive condition, effectively 
shutting down any line of jurisprudence that could be built from the comments in 
Dominican Republic - Cigarettes. The Appellate Body stated that:203 
 
a determination of whether imported products are treated less 
favourably than like domestic products involve an assessment 
of the implications of the contested measures for the equality of 
competitive conditions between imported and like domestic 
products. If the outcome of this assessment is that the measure 
has a detrimental impact on the conditions of competition for 
like imported products, then such detrimental impact will 
amount to treatment that is 'less favourable' within the meaning 
of Article III:4.  
                                                 
198 Lydgate, above n 162, at 439.  
199 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 141.  
200 Matsushita, above n 1, at 186.  
201 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/AB/R, 19 May 2005 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [93].  
202 Lydgate, above n 162, at 439.  
203 EC – Seal Products, above n 180, at [5.116].  
29 
 
© James Rowland 
 
 
Several academics have suggested that the current interpretative path should not 
be stuck to. Robert Howse and Donald Regan have argued that the “aims and 
effect” test should be returned and that the Appellate Body should look into the 
regulatory intent of the measure in question.204 Grossman and his colleagues in a 
chapter in Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law argue that the 
“aims and effect” test in US – Taxes on Automobile while ultimately incorrect, still 
had the right instinct.205 They argue that Article III is a prohibition on protectionist 
measures and protectionist measures only. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret 
“like products” as having both a market dimension and a policy dimension, which 
both must be met before Article III can be violated.206 Cosbey and Mavroidis 
continue this argument by noting that:207  
 
products are policy ‘unlike’ when it would be desirable from an 
international efficiency point of view to treat them differently. 
Typically, the reason why there is a need to treat them 
differently is that buyers do not make the desire distinction – 
that is, market likeness is often part of the reason why products 
are not policy like. 
 
However, they do note that “market likeness” is still an important criterion to keep 
separate.208 Cosbey and Mavroidis gives the example of a possibility where diesel 
trucks and coffee cups should have the same production tax for policy reasons, 
therefore making coffee cups and diesel trucks “like products” in a policy 
dimension.209 A “market like” criteria therefore ensures that Article III would not 
be violated when the level of taxation of trucks and cups are at a different level.210  
 
Horn and Weiler provides two alternatives to the 'objective' methodology 
                                                 
204 Robert Howse & Donald Regan 'The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11(2) EJIL 249 at 257.  
205 G.M Grossman, H. Horn and P.C Mavroidis 'Domestic Instruments' in H. Horn and P.C 
Mavroidis, Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law (Cambridge University Press, 
USA, 2013) at 205.  
206 Grossman, above n 205, at 205.  
207 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294.  
208 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294. 
209 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294. 
210 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294. 
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currently favoured by the Appellate Body. The first is an affirmation of the 
position adopted by other academic like Howse and Grossman, which they call 
the 'Effect and Purpose' approach.211 The 'Effect and Purpose' requires there to be 
a mens rea, an “intent – actual or constructed” of protectionism.212 Meanwhile, a 
further pushing out of the boat would be their 'Alternative Comparators' approach, 
which challenges the very way the two “like products” are compared.213 In such a 
system, instead of considering market likeness, the regulating state would choose 
how the two products might be considered like, such as their ecological 
efficiency.214 
 
Lydgate provides a slight difference in approach when proposing a three-step 
assessment to National Treatment, but it still has the underlying principle of the 
methods proposed by Howse, Grossman, and others. Lydgate sets out her three-
step approach as followed:215 
 
The first two steps are the same as those the Appellate Body has 
affirmed in EC – Seal Products: discerning whether the 
products in dispute are in a competitive relationship, and 
whether there is an impact on the conditions of competition to 
the detriment of the imported product. There should then 
however be a third step of considering whether the detrimental 
impact can be explained based upon a non-protectionist 
regulatory rationale.  
 
Lydgate’s reasoning for this interpretation is not based solely on policy reasoning, 
such as environmental need. She notes that under the current situation confirmed 
by EC – Seal Products, the proper functioning of certain WTO provisions have 
been threatened.216 The TBT Agreement, despite being the newer provision is now 
marginalised because it is an easier test to pass due to its “legitimate regulatory 
                                                 
211 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 137.  
212 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 138.  
213 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 139.  
214 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 140. 
215 Lydgate, above n 162, at 425.  
216 Lydgate, above n 162, at 426.  
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distinction” factor.217 This factor comes from Article 2.2 of the TBT which notes 
that technical regulations can have a “legitimate objective”.218 It provides space to 
go deeper into the design and structure of the measure in question to consider if it 
is a legitimate regulatory distinction to serve a regulatory goal.219  
 
Flett wrote before EC – Seals Product that the TBT Agreement’s Article 2.1 and 
its “legitimate regulatory distinction” test was guiding a way forward for Article 
III, “heralding a further improvement in the previously unsettled balance between 
the trade interest and national regulatory autonomy.”220 However, EC – Seals 
Product slammed the door on such an interpretation of Article III, stating that 
there are contextual differences between the TBT and Article III, and further that 
Article III can rely on Article XX for policy concerns in a way that the TBT 
cannot.221 Lydgate is strongly against there being a justification for a divergence 
between Article III of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.222 Further, 
because Article 2.1 is seen as an easier test to meet, there is now an incentive to 
only bring claims under the GATT despite the TBT being the newer agreement; 
Lydgate notes that Norway did just that in EC – Seals Product.223 By relying 
solely on the GATT, a complaining member state can avoid having to argue 
against a “legitimate regulatory distinction” test, which could save environmental 
measures. The GATT therefore becomes a more effective tool at shutting down 
certain measures than the TBT Agreement.  
 
Gabrielle Marceau seems hesitant to come to a similar conclusion, while still 
retaining many questions arising from the Appellate Body’s decision in EC – 
Seals Product.224 She writes that it “remains to be seen” whether the differences 
between the GATT and TBT will have a substantive impact as proposed by the EU 
(which are largely the same concerns detailed by Lydgate above).225 Instead, she 
                                                 
217 Lydgate, above n 162, at 426. 
218 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force 1 January 1995), 
art 2.2. 
219 Lydgate, above n 162, at 443.  
220 Flett, above n 171, at 39.  
221 EC – Seals Product, above n 180, at [5.125].  
222 Lydgate, above n 162, at 443.  
223 Lydgate, above n 162, at 443.  
224 Gabrielle Marceau ‘A Comment on the Appellate Body Report in EC – Seal Product’ in the 
Context of the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2014) 23(3) RECIEL 318.  
225 Marceau, above n 224, at 325.  
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notes that “these clarifications are important in the context of trade and the 
environment” and can show how environmental concerns can be reflected through 
the GATT and TBT.226  
 
It has to be noted that a considerable amount of the literature suggesting that the 
interpretation of Article III requires an “intent” element came between the two 
Appellate Body decisions of EC – Asbestos and EC – Seal Product. Yet, the 
Appellate Body remained indifferent in the latter, reaffirming the objective, 
market-based approach. The question of their motive to sticking to such a view 
becomes important when considering how the environment might be better 
accommodated.  
 
Horn and Weiler speculate on two potential motives for their “reluctance to move 
away from” the strictly market-based approach.227 First, it may be a question of 
legitimacy and not overstepping their jurisdiction.228 Secondly, it might just be the 
case that the Appellate Body feels that Article XX is the better arena for this issue 
because it reflects “the multilateral dimension of the WTO”.229 Yet Matsushita and 
his co-authors speculate that the rejection of any “intent” based system may be 
motivated:230 
 
more by the wish to avoid intrusive inquiries into the inner 
workings of the decision-making procedures in the 
heterogeneous membership – which includes absolute 
monarchies, communist dictatorships, military governments, 
one-party regimes, and Western-style democracies. 
 
Currently, the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article III could be unfriendly to 
environmental measures that might be taken to combat climate change. Measures 
that government might want to take to increase efficiency and decrease emissions, 
such as promoting fuel efficiency, might fall afoul of Article III and the principle 
of National Treatment. The current interpretation of “like products”, based on the 
                                                 
226 Marceau, above n 224, at 325.  
227 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 143.  
228 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 143.  
229 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 143.  
230 Matsushita, above n 1, at 188.  
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product itself, might either stop these measures dead or, at least, provide 
uncertainty about their WTO consistency and therefore cause governments not to 
act.  
 
In light of this, several academics have agreed that the interpretation of Article III 
should change. Most suggestions are based on reviving the old “aims and effect” 
test, but with various changes to make it better suited for WTO law. Such a 
change would allow policy considerations to be factored into Article III, therefore 
meaning that member states would no longer have to rely on Article XX to bring 
about environmentally friendly measures that might have the side effect of 
restricting trade in some way. Before considering the relevancy of Article XX, 
though, it is appropriate to also look at the issue of processing and production 
methods.  
Processing and Production Methods 
There is an additional dimension when talking about National Treatment and 
potential environmental actions that might be taken to combat climate change: 
production and processes method (PPMs).231 It has been remarked by Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke that “clarifying the PPM issue is one of the most important 
and difficult challenges in the trade and environment debate.”232 The reason for 
this is that if countries cannot distinguish goods on the basis of the environmental 
impact of their production, then countries without rigorous environmental 
standards gain a competitive advantage.233 Yet:234 
 
GATT jurisprudence with respect to Article III has been 
characterized by the near complete refusal to allow a product's 
conditions of production (notably the social, labour, and 
environmental conditions of production) per se as a criterion for 
determining “likeness” or, rather, “unlikeness”.  
 
The academic debate around PPMs is split with writers taking diametrically 
opposed views about whether the way a product is processed or produced can be a 
                                                 
231 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 203.  
232 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 1274-1275.  
233 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, above n 2, at 1274-1275.  
234 Matsushita, above n 1, at 190.  
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factor in determining what is a “like product”. Joost Pauwelyn goes so far as to 
say that people who argue that PPMs cannot be considered in the “like product” 
assessment do so in a way that “defy understanding”.235 He characterises the 
opinion against PPMs as being founded on “two unadopted GATT panel reports”, 
which are “not even public documents” and that “the value of these two GATT 
reports is almost nil”.236 The two panel reports in question are the two cases 
involving the United States and tuna, US – Tuna (Mexico) and US – Tuna-Dolphin 
II. In US – Tuna (Mexico), the panel declared that production processes did not 
factor into a “like product” interpretation.237  
 
Bradley Condon agrees with Pauwelyn that “as an unadopted GATT report, US – 
Tuna (Mexico) has no normative value.”238 This statement finds support in Japan 
– Alcoholic Beverages II. The Appellate Body noted that “adopted panel reports 
are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by 
subsequent panels”239 However, “unadopted panel reports “have no legal status in 
the GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed through decisions 
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members”.”240 Unlike 
Pauwelyn, though, Condon still believes that the report might have some value 
since “a panel may find useful orientation in its reasoning”.241 Again, this 
statement finds support, since the Appellate Body has said that “we agree that “a 
panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted 
panel report that it considered to be relevant”.”242 
 
The issue around PPMs stems from how “like products” are interpreted, as 
detailed above with the four main criteria: physical properties, end uses, 
consumers' preference and tariff classification.243 A product-based methodology, 
such as Article III, is therefore inconsistent with an assessment of how the product 
                                                 
235 Joost Pauwelyn 'Recent Books on Trade and Environment: Gatt Phantoms Still Haunt the 
WTO' (2004) 15 EJIL 575 at 585.  
236 Pauwelyn, above n 235, at 585.  
237 US – Tuna (Mexico) DS21/R, 3 September 1991 (Report of the Panel) at [41].  
238 Bradly J. Condon 'Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law' (2009) 12(4) J Intl 
Econ L 895 at 908.  
239 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 14.  
240 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 14-15.  
241 Condon, above n 238, at 908.  
242 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 15.  
243 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at [101].  
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was made or processed.244 Quick and Lau note that a PPM distinction would have 
to rely on the consumers' preference factor to successfully argue the products are 
unalike.245 This is because for a PPM distinction, the physical properties, end uses 
and tariff classification of the two products are likely to all be the same.246 Both 
Howse and Pauwelyn use this consumer-based argument to suggest that PPMs can 
be considered during an Article III dispute,247  as do Matsushita and his co-
writers.248 Indeed, Pauwelyn write that it is “essentially the market place of 
consumers that decides whether products are like/DCS [directly competitive or 
substitutable]”.249 Therefore:250 
 
if consumers do make sufficient difference between 'green' and 
other electricity (or between 'natural' and GMO food) so can the 
government, the logic being that any governmental intervention 
(say a lower tax on green electricity or a label on GMO food) 
will then not alter the conditions of competition between green 
and non-green electricity or between 'natural' and GMO food 
since consumers do not regard them as sufficiently substitutable 
in the first place.  
 
However, this view is challenged by other academics. The book written by 
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al suggests that the “aims and effect” test 
might need to be revived before the PPMs can truly be factored in Article III.251 
Quick and Lau submits that consumers' taste and habits cannot make two identical 
products unalike.252 Marceau and Trachtman notes that “it is difficult to envision a 
circumstance where the effect would be great enough to render physically similar 
products unlike”.253 The main concern is that governments can lean on their 
                                                 
244 Robert Read 'Like Products, Health & Environmental Exceptions: The Interpretation of PPMs 
in Recent WTO Trade Dispute Cases' (2004) 5(2) The Estey Center Journal of International 
Law and Trade Policy 123 at 127.  
245 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 431.  
246 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 431.  
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for the Trade and Environment Debate' (2002) 27(2) Colum.J.Envtl.L 491 at 515; Pauwelyn, 
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253 Gabrielle Marceau and Joel Trachtman 'The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
36 
 
© James Rowland 
 
consumers' perception of certain products and therefore shape consumers' 
preference for the purpose of protectionism.254 Quick and Lau therefore proposes 
that consumers' preference can only be decisive in rare situations where 
consumers have made their own mind up without any government intervention, 
noting that Marceau and Trachtman suggest this is very rare to happen.255  
 
Condon also agrees that the Howse and Pauwelyn approach of relying on 
consumers' preference is problematic, distinguishing EC – Asbestos from other 
potential PPM measures.256 Condon writes that Howse's argument overlooks the 
fact that the health effects of asbestos are still related to the product itself, and is 
not a factor about how it is produced.257 When coupled with the panel report of 
US – Tuna (Mexico) and its principle that the a “like product” should only look at 
the product itself and not its production processes, then Condon concludes that 
Article III is not the right forum for this debate.258  
 
Despite this conclusion, Condon looks at another option for tackling processing 
and production method under the assessment of “like products”, suggesting it may 
be possible to consider the “carbon content” of a product in a way similar to 
alcohol content.259 The Panel Report of US – Malt Beverages decided that low 
alcohol beer and high alcohol beer were not “like products” under Article III:4 and 
that the differentiation in treatment between the two did not afford protection to 
domestic production.260 Such an approach might allow products with a high 
carbon content to be different products to those with a low carbon content.261 
However, such an interpretation would be tempered by the decision of the 
Appellate Body in Chile – Alcoholic Beverages. In that decision, the Appellate 
Body found the differentiation in taxation between low and high alcohol beer did 
amount to a Article III:2 breach because the products were in a competitive 
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relationship and the measures did give protection to domestic products.262 Further, 
it still struggles with the fact that a high alcohol content is a part of the product 
itself, whereas a carbon content is not related to the product, but rather its 
production method.263 
 
When considering the motive of the Appellate Body's refusal to consider PPMs 
within Article III, Matsushita and his co-authors speculate that it may be 
“influenced in equal parts by principle and pragmatism”.264 The GATT's strength 
is its efficiency for a place for international trade to be regulated, via only 
economic factors, and by bringing in non-economic concerns (such as the 
environment and climate change), it may upset the equilibrium that member states 
are happy with.265  
 
Instead of considering PPMs measures under the “like product” assessment of 
Article III of the GATT, various academics have suggested that Article XX and its 
exceptions is where PPMs measures should be considered.266 Even Pauwelyn 
suggests that a PPMs measure that violates the GATT can still be salvaged by 
Article XX on the basis of being a PPMs measure.267 This would seem to be the 
only clear area of consensus on the matter and as such it would seem appropriate 
to turn our attention to Article XX.  
Article XX 
Strictly speaking, Article XX is not an area that is a source of conflict between 
trade and the environment. However, it is crucial to the field. Article XX provides 
exceptions to the GATT rules, which might salvage a host of environmental-based 
measures. Therefore it is necessary to consider Article XX, its case law, and the 
academic literature around it. Article XX(b) and (g), in particular, are the crucial 
provisions when considering measures related to the environment.268  
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Article XX is said to be “one of the most well-established safety valves”, which 
allows WTO members to still pursue public policy goals while sticking to the free 
trade ideals of the WTO.269 The reason for this largely comes from how Article 
XX has been interpreted. While the accepted principle of interpretation suggests 
that exceptions should be interpreted narrowly, the Appellate Body has not done 
this.270 Instead, it has considered that the general exceptions are more a balancing 
act between the substantive obligations of the GATT and Article XX.271 This was 
expressed by the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline when they remarked:272 
 
The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the rest 
of the General Agreement, including in particular Article I, III 
and XI; conversely, the context of Article I and III and XI 
includes Article XX. Accordingly, the phrase 'relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources' may not be read 
so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of 
Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 be given so broad a reach as 
effectively to emasculate Article XX(g) and the policies and 
interests it embodies. The relationship between the affirmative 
commitments set out in, e.g. Article I, III and XI, and the 
polices and interests embodied in the 'General Exceptions' listed 
in Article XX, can be given meaning within the framework of 
the General Agreement and its object and purpose by a treaty 
interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by careful scrutiny of 
the factual and legal context in a given dispute, without 
disregarding the words actually used by the WTO Members 
themselves to express their intent and purpose.  
 
As Van den Bossche and Zdouc conclude, the Appellate Body is striking “a 
balance between, on the one hand, trade liberalisation, market access, non-
                                                 
269 Wenwei Guan ‘How General Should the GATT General Exceptions Be?: A Critique of the 
‘Common Intention’ Approach of Treaty Interpretation’ (2014) 48(2) JWT 219 at 220. 
270 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization: Text, Cases and Material (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 
at 547.  
271 Reinhard Quick 'Do We Need Trade and Environment Negotiations or Has the Appellate Body 
Done the Job?' (2013) 47(5) JWT 957 at 968. 
272 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at 18.  
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discrimination rules and, on the other hand, other societal values and interests.”273 
This is a crucial approach when considering the environment, since it essentially 
places its importance on equal footing with the goal of free trade.  
 
Article XX is a two-tier test.274 According to US – Shrimp, this is “not 
inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994.”275 The two-tiered analysis has most recently been 
stated in India – Solar Cells, where it was described as being:276 
 
in which a measure must first be provisionally justified under 
one of the paragraphs of Article XX, and then shown to be 
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.  
 
Article XX(g) 
Article XX(g) is concerned with measures “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restriction on domestic production or consumption”.277 Van den Bossche and 
Zdouc writes that Article XX(g) is essentially a three-step test, which requires a 
measure to:278 
1. relate to the 'conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources'; 
2. 'relate to' the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources; and 
3. be 'made effective in conjunction with' restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.  
 
At first glance, the first two steps appear to be identical. However, there is a 
difference. The first step is that there is a 'conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources'. That is to say that the first stage of the test is ensuring that the natural 
                                                 
273 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 547.  
274 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 552.  
275 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 
November 1998 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [119].  
276 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.56].  
277 GATT, above n 6, art XX(g).  
278 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 565.  
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resource is in fact one that is exhaustible and is capable of being conserved.279 The 
second step of the test is then the causal connection between the measure and the 
exhaustible natural resource; that the measure “must be reasonably related to the 
end pursued, i.e. the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.”280 As the 
Appellate Body expressed in China – Raw Materials, “for a measure to relate to 
conservation in the sense of Article XX(g), there must be 'a close and genuine 
relationship of ends and means.”281 
 
Therefore, when considering climate change measures, the important question is 
whether the world's climate is an “exhaustible natural resource.”282 However, it is 
first worthwhile to note that the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline opened the door 
to broadening the definition for the term “measure”. The Appellate Body noted 
that “measure” for Article XX interpretations had been consistently focussed on 
the provisions of the measure that was found inconsistent with the GATT.283 In 
other words, panels did not view the measure as a whole, but rather concentrated 
on whether the section of the measure that had been found inconsistent fell within 
Article XX. They did not assess provisions that had not been found 
inconsistent.284  
 
This was not a live issue in US – Gasoline, since no one had argued that 
“measure” should be interpreted broadly to include the entire conservation 
measure in issue.285 However, when assessing the measure, the Appellate Body 
noted that the inconsistent part of the measure, the baseline rules, could “scarcely 
be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves, totally divorced from other 
sections of the Gasoline Rule which certainly constitute part of the context of 
these provisions.”286 Therefore:287 
 
                                                 
279 Van den Bossche, n 270, at 565.  
280 Van den Bossche, n 270, at 567. 
281 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R / 
WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, 22 February 2012 (Report of the Appellate Body) at 
[355].  
282 Condon, above n 238, at 911.  
283 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 13-14.  
284 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 14.  
285 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 14.  
286 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 19.  
287 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 19.  
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The relationship between the baseline establishment rules and 
the "non-degradation" requirements of the Gasoline Rule is not 
negated by the inconsistency, found by the Panel, of the 
baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4.  
 
In effect, the Appellate Body was suggesting that “measure” should apply to the 
entire conservation measure in issue, and not just the parts of it that offended 
GATT principles.288 Bernasconi-Osterwalder and her co-authors note that this was 
an important victory for environmental consideration, broadening the scope of 
paragraph (g).289 A measure is far more likely to meet paragraph (g) if a panel or 
Appellate Body is looking at the measure in its totality, rather than observing a 
provision of the measure without its full context.  
 
With this in mind, we can now turn our attention back to whether climate could be 
an “exhaustible natural resource.” In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body considered 
both living and non-living natural resources as being capable of being 
“exhaustible natural resources.”290 Their interpretation of the term carried many 
important branches in understanding its breadth. They noted that “exhaustible” 
and “renewable” were not “mutually exclusive.”291 Further, while noting the 
sustainable development principle within the WTO Agreement, the Appellate 
Body also said that the term “natural resources” was “by definition, 
evolutionary”.292 Manjiao Chi notes that such a conclusion will be “far reaching” 
for future environmentally-sensitive disputes.293  
 
Beyond this broad definition, various subjects have been found to be “exhaustible 
natural resources”: clean air in US - Gasoline,294 sea turtles in US – Shrimp,295 
salmon and herring in Canada – Salmon and Herring,296 and dolphins in US – 
                                                 
288 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 78.  
289 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 78.  
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Tuna/Dolphin II.297 When considering climate change, Condon notes that US – 
Gasoline, which considered clean air to be an exhaustible natural resource, 
potentially provides a way forward in holding the global climate as falling under 
Article XX(g).298  When deciding that clean air was an “exhaustible natural 
resource”, the Panel noted that clean air was a resource with value, it was natural, 
and it could be depleted.299  
 
Felicity Deane noted that this reasoning could justify “the application of this 
exception [(g)] to measures implemented to mitigate climate change.”300 Deane 
suggests it could be phrased as “conservation of the atmosphere.”301 Condon 
writes that the existence of multilateral environmental agreements could be used 
as an indication that the global climate is an exhaustible natural resource.302 The 
Paris Agreement, for instance, could be as evidence to show that the global 
climate is at threat and greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced to keep 
temperature rises to within 2 degree Celsius. In the end, Matsushita and his co-
authors believes that under the expansive interpretation of the Appellate Body 
“virtually any living or non-living resource, particularly those addressed by 
multilateral environmental agreements, would qualify.”303  
 
Condon also suspects that the requirement for there to be sufficient jurisdictional 
nexus (for instance, sea turtles spent some of their life cycle in American waters), 
will not be a problem because the effects of climate change will be experienced 
globally and as such a sufficient jurisdictional nexus is likely to be met.304 
Meinhard Doelle agrees, writing that:305 
 
given the threat to human health, forests, agriculture and 
                                                                                                                                     
March 1988 at [4.4].  
297 United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, 13 June 2012 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [5.13].  
298 Condon, above n 238, at 911.  
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CCLR 149 at 154. 
301 Deane, above n 301, at 154.  
302 Condon, above n 238, at 912.  
303 Matsushita, above n 1, at 725.  
304 Condon, above n 238, at 912.  
305 Meinhard Doelle 'Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on 
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biodiversity more generally, it must be considered likely that 
any measure to reduce GHG emissions will be found to be 
provisionally consistent with Article XX(b) and (g) of the 
GATT 1994.  
 
The next question is if the measure is “relating to” combating climate change.  
This has widely been considered to mean that the measure must be “primarily 
aimed at”.306 However, it is not quite as simple as that since the “primarily aimed 
at” test no longer seems to be compulsory.307 The Appellate Body in US – 
Gasoline, while not expressly rejecting the “primarily aimed at” test, noted that 
the term was “not itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus 
test for inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g).”308 The Appellate Body in US 
– Shrimp went further saying that “relating to” requires a “close and genuine 
relationship of ends and means”.309 Bernasconi-Osterwalder and her co-authors 
note that the US – Shrimp essentially sets a test of whether the relationship 
between the measure and the legitimate policy of conserving the exhaustible 
natural resources “plays a decisive role”.310 Van den Bossche and Zdouc states 
that the test is essentially whether the measure is “reasonably related to the end 
pursued”.311 Again, Condon suggests that multilateral environmental agreements 
could be used to show that measures aiming to limit and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions are related to the conservation of the global climate.312  
 
The final factor in considering Article XX(g) is that the trade measure needs to be 
in conjunction with “restrictions on domestic production or consumption”.313 The 
Appellate Body in US – Gasoline considered this to mean a government measure 
that was “in force” or having “come into effect.”314 It does not have to be identical 
treatment between domestic and imported products, but it does require a certain 
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even-handedness for Article XX(g) to be met.315  
 
Article XX(g) is therefore likely to be favourable to any measure seeking to 
combat climate change, with Philip Joseph Wells believing that its interpretation is 
“wide and expansive.”316 Chi challenges the idea that the interpretation is 
“expansive”, suggesting it is “premature” to come to such a conclusion.317 
However, he does acknowledge that the interpretation is “friendly” and “flexible” 
to environmental concerns, and that it will be utilised by countries when taking 
environmental action in the future.318 Will concludes that as long as a measure is 
efficient, it is likely to meet (g) since the test does not question the regulatory 
autonomy of a WTO member.319 As Niccolo Pietro Pietro Castagno writes about 
Article XX(g):320 
 
It is not difficult to understand that this second exception bears 
more importance for the purposes of permitting member states 
to enact sound environmental policies that are in violation of 
their WTO communities. In particular, this is because of the 
wider reach of the exception resulting from the explained 
“Related to test” and from the broad interpretation that case law 
has given to the concept of “exhaustible natural resources”. 
 
Article XX(b) 
Article XX(b) is designed to protect measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”.321 It is a two tier test: the first step being that the 
measure's policy objective is the protection of the life or health of humans, 
animals or plants, and secondly that the measure is necessary to meet that goal.322 
Such a provision, in the panel report of Brazil – Retreated Tyres, was accepted to 
include measures which aimed to protect the environment, where they remarked 
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that “few interests are more 'vital' and 'important' than protecting human beings 
from health risks, and that protecting the environment is no less important.”323 
This finding was agreed with by the Appellate Body.324  
 
When addressing the first part of the test, Van den Bossche and Zdouc have noted 
that it has not caused any “major interpretative problems.”325 While the Appellate 
Body will examine the measure the question, in reality, they have given “a 
significant degree of deference in accepting that the policy objectives of a 
measure was to protect life or health of humans, animals or plants.”326  
 
The important, more complex issue in Article XX(b) is the test of whether the 
measure is “necessary” to secure the measure’s stated policy goal.327 The key 
early decision on “necessary” is the Appellate Body's decision in Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef, which noted that “the word 'necessary' is not limited to that 
which is 'indispensable'.”328 While measures which are indispensable or an 
absolute necessity will obviously meet the requirement, there are “degrees of 
necessity.”329 However, “necessary” is “significantly closer to the pole of 
“indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply “making a contribution to.”330 
In the end, making the assessment of if something is “necessary” involves:331 
 
a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which 
prominently include the contribution made by the compliance 
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by that 
law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or 
regulation on imports or exports. 
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It must be said that not all academics consider that the Appellate Body was clear 
in its stance. Donald Regan believes this “weigh and balance” test is a 
misunderstanding.332 He writes that “a standard cost-benefit balancing test is 
inconsistent with allowing the Member to choose its own level of protection.”333 
However, he also notes that while Appellate Body decisions note the balancing 
test, none of them “actually involves standard cost-benefit balancing, and none 
depends on a weighing of the underlying benefit.”334 Shortly after Regan's article 
was published, the Appellate Body again clarified the “weigh and balance” 
approach in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres by saying that:335 
 
The weighing and balancing is a holistic operation that involves 
putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating 
them in relation to each other after having examined them 
individually, in order to reach an overall judgement.  
 
In that decision, the Appellate Body noted that when a measure leads to restrictive 
effects on international trade, then it would be necessary for that measure to 
“make a material contribution to the achievement of its objective.”336 The 
Appellate Body did acknowledge that when measures are “adopted in order to 
attenuate global warming and climate change” then any contribution “can only be 
evaluated with the benefit of time.”337 Therefore, it appears that the Appellate 
Body will, at least in part, “accept the measure if it is capable of making a future 
contribution.”338 A side issue to this is noted by Condon, who points out that if the 
contribution of a measure is weighed by the measure’s part of a “comprehensive 
regulatory strategy” then it seems only likely that the impact on trade will be 
measured in the same way.339 Any “comprehensive” strategy to combat climate 
change is therefore much more likely to restrict trade in a significant way.340  
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However, in earlier decisions, the Appellate Body noted that ““the more vital or 
important [the] common interests or values” pursued, the easier it would be to 
accept as “necessary” measures designed achieve those ends”.341 Ultimately, the 
Appellate Body reiterated the “weighing and balancing” approach in EC – Seal 
Products. The Appellate Body said that the “weighing and balancing” approach 
involves “a series of factors, including the trade importance of the objective, the 
contribution of the measure to that objective, and the trade-restrictiveness of the 
measure.”342 Therefore, the contribution of a measure is “only one component of 
the necessity calculus”. The “nature, quantity and quality of evidence” on the 
measure is also important.343 The Appellate Body concluded that due to the 
“weighing and balancing exercise” a measure which is “highly trade-restrictive in 
nature” could still be capable of being found “necessary” depending on the 
specific circumstances of the situation.344 When considering the information we 
now know about climate change, and the threat it caused to human, animal and 
plant life, these comments from EC – Asbestos and later EC – Seal Products seem 
to make Article XX(b) more hospitable to climate change related measures. 
 
If a panel determines that a measure appears to be necessary, then before it 
confirms that conclusion it must compare “the measure with its possible 
alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent 
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued.”345 There are important 
factors to note about the issue of possible alternatives.  
 
First, the Appellate Body made clear in EC – Asbestos that it is up to member 
states to select their desired level of protection.346 As Van den Bossche and Zdouc 
write, other countries cannot question the level of protection chosen but rather 
“they can only argue that the measure at issue is not ‘necessary’ to achieve that 
level of protection”.347 In other words, if a country wants to protect the human life 
by protecting the climate at a high level, member states cannot argue against that 
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level of protection. Their only option is to suggest that the measure in question, 
maybe higher tariffs for gas guzzling cars, is not necessary to achieve that 
protection. Therefore, for something to be a “possible alternative”, the Appellate 
Body noted that the alternative must match the “desire level of protection” sought 
by the member state.348  
 
Secondly, Van den Bossche and Zdouc note that the Appellate Body in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres also reiterated comments from US – Gambling.349 In US – 
Gambling, the Appellate Body ruled that an alternative measure is not reasonably 
available if it is “merely theoretical in nature”, the member state in question is 
“not capable of taking it”, or it “imposes an undue burden”.350 Therefore, the 
Appellate Body ruled that if the alternative measure is not “reasonably available” 
or does not match the desire level of protection, then “the measure at issue is 
necessary.”351 
 
The final part of the “alternative measure” puzzle is the question of where the 
burden of proof falls. Here again, Van den Bossche and Zdouc note, the Appellate 
Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres drew on the decision of US – Gasoline.352 The 
Appellate Body ruled that:353 
 
It rests upon the complaining Member to identify possible 
alternatives to the measure at issue that the responding Member 
could have taken. As the Appellate Body indicated in US – 
Gambling, while the responding Member must show that a 
measure is necessary, it does not have to ‘show, in the first 
instance, that there are no reasonably available alternatives to 
achieve its objectives’.” 
 
Considering the difficulties in ascertaining the effect of an environmental 
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measure, Condon wonders how an alternate measure can be proposed.354 
Essentially, the issue is how the Appellate Body can decide if an alternate measure 
is as effective as the one in question if the Appellate Body cannot quantify such a 
thing. However, Ulrike Will, while noting this problem, gives the impression of 
being reasonably unconcerned about it. He writes that while there “might not 
always be a clear result” when seeing which measure is least restrictive, the issue 
of determining the “exact effectiveness of a measure is not as important as a well-
justified comparison with alternative measures considering both the contribution 
to the desired level of protection and the restrictiveness.”355   
 
In a similar vein, the question of the level of scientific evidence necessary will 
also have to be addressed.356 In that regard, the Appellate Body has said that 
evidence may be made “by resorting to evidence or data, pertaining to the past or 
the present” that the measure makes a material contribution.357 However, the 
evidence may also take the form of “quantitative projections in the future, or 
qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested and supported by 
sufficient evidence.”358 Therefore, the Appellate Body has shown a tendency to be 
reasonably flexible when dealing with Article XX(b).  
 
Despite any concern Condon may have over Article XX(b), Wells writes that 
“necessary” can now considered to be “an unusually lenient interpretation.”359 
Pietro Castagno agrees, noting that there has been “a relative relaxation of the 
“necessity test””.360 It must be noted that Quick believes that, “at times”, Article 
XX(b) can be “quite difficult to meet”.361 Korea – Beef provides evidence in 
favour of Quick’s assessment over Wells’s, where the Appellate Body ruled that 
the necessary test had not been met because Korea had “reasonably available” 
alternatives to their measure.362 Therefore, meeting the necessary test of Article 
XX(b) is not a foregone conclusion. Overall, though, it seems hard to argue 
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against Doelle's statement that “it must be considered likely that any measure to 
reduce GHG emissions will be found to be provisionally consistent with Article 
XX(b)”.363  
 
Chapeau 
The chapeau of Article XX reads that the paragraph exceptions are:364 
 
subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade... 
 
As noted above, the Appellate Body has said that if a measure does meet one of 
the Article XX paragraph exceptions, it is then necessary to see if it “shown to be 
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.”365 It is an 
important step in the Article XX test. Van den Bossche and Zdouc note that the 
chapeau has been the critical issue in “several of the most controversial decisions 
by panels and the Appellate Body”.366 
 
The object and purpose of the chapeau have been expressed by the Appellate 
Body in the cases of US – Gasoline and US – Shrimp.367 In US – Gasoline, the 
Appellate Body said that the chapeau was concerned with not the content of the 
measure in question “but rather the manner in which that measure is applied.”368 
This is because the general exceptions “should not be applied as to frustrate or 
defeat the legal obligations” of the General Agreement.369 Therefore, “the 
fundamental theme” of the chapeau “is to be found in the purpose and object of 
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available 
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in Article XX.”370 The Appellate Body said much the same thing in US – Shrimp, 
noting that Article XX is a balancing act and therefore if it is “abused or misused” 
then the balancing act will go astray.371 As such, the object and purpose of the 
chapeau can be considered to be ensuring that Article XX is not misused or 
abused and ensuring that a balance is struck between “the right of a Member to 
invoke an exception under Article XX and the substantive rights of the other 
Members under the GATT 1994.”372 Essentially, the chapeau is “an expression of 
the principle of good faith.”373 Will sets down that the purpose of the chapeau is to 
be “the gatekeeper”.374  
 
An important factor of the chapeau and how it is interpreted, though, is that the 
Appellate Body has placed the burden of proving that the chapeau of Article XX 
has not been breached on “the party invoking the exception.”375 They have 
acknowledged that this is “a heavier task than that involved in showing that an 
exception, such as Article XX(g), encompasses the measure at issue.”376 The 
Appellate Body confirmed this burden again in US – Shrimp, noting that:377 
 
On the other hand, it does not follow from the fact that a 
measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g) that that 
measure also will necessarily comply with the requirements of 
the chapeau.  
 
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body explained that the chapeau consists of three 
separate standards:378 
 
first, there must be no "arbitrary" discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail; second, there must 
be no "unjustifiable" discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail; and, third, there must be no 
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377 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [149].  
378 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [118].  
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"disguised restriction on international trade". 
 
The Appellate Body has already commented that the concept of sustainable 
development is important when interpreting the chapeau.379 However, despite this, 
there are some academic concerns about the chapeau and what it could mean for 
climate change measures. Deane has noted that the interpretation of the chapeau 
“may be a concern for climate change mitigation measures.”380 This is because 
many climate change reforms might require discrimination, for instance some 
countries might be domestically pricing carbon emissions but others are not and 
therefore requires a border tax adjustment.381 Doelle agree, stating that the 
chapeau of Article XX is “the only real issue” for environmental measures.382 It is 
not a universal position, though. Pietro Castagno, while recognising that the 
chapeau receives its fair share of criticism, does not agree that the chapeau is “an 
unnecessary barrier to the enactment of environmental sound national policies.”383 
To better understand where this disagreement comes from, it is prudent to see how 
the chapeau has been interpreted.  
 
The issue here is that, despite his support for the interpretation of the chapeau, 
Pietro Castagno acknowledges that the Appellate Body has “struggled to find a 
univocal approach to their application” for the chapeau.384 The Appellate Body 
from as early as 1996 in US – Gasoline acknowledged that the chapeau was “not 
without ambiguity.”385 However, they considered that “the fundamental theme” of 
the chapeau “is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or 
illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.”386 
Due to this, the Appellate Body considered that the three heads of the chapeau: 
arbitrary discrimination, unjustifiable discrimination, and disguised restrictions on 
trade could be read “side-by side” since they imparted meaning to one another.387 
                                                 
379 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [152].  
380 Deane, above n 300, at 155.  
381 Deane, above n 300, at 155.  
382 Doelle, above n 305, at 98.  
383 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 150.  
384 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 148.  
385 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 23.  
386 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 25.  
387 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 25.  
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Or, in another way:388 
 
the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the 
application of a particular measure amounts to "arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination", may also be taken into account in 
determining the presence of a "disguised restriction" on 
international trade.  
 
On the subject of discrimination itself, the Appellate Body makes the point that 
the chapeau does not refer to all discrimination, or the discrimination found in 
other parts of the GATT, such as Article III:4, but rather arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination.389 As Van den Bossche and Zdouc put it, the “discrimination at 
issue in the chapeau of Article XX must necessarily be different from the 
discrimination addressed in other provisions of the GATT 1994.”390  
 
Despite the Appellate Body’s comments of reading the three separate heads of the 
chapeau “side by side”, Pietro Castagno notes that in US – Shrimp, the Appellate 
Body took arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination as distinct headings and did 
not address disguised restrictions at all.391 Further, in that decision, the Appellate 
Body stated that when considering arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, there 
are three elements that must exist:392 
 
First, the application of the measure must result in 
discrimination... Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary 
or unjustifiable in character… Third, this discrimination must 
occur between countries where the same conditions prevail.  
 
As an example of unjustifiable discrimination, the Appellate Body noted that the 
United States measure specified other member states to adopt a regulatory 
programme that was “essentially the same” of the United States, rather than 
                                                 
388 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 25.  
389 US – Gasoline, above n 147, at p 23.  
390 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 574.  
391 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 148.  
392 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [150].  
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something which was just “comparable.”393 Going further, they noted that:394 
 
We believe that discrimination results not only when countries 
in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but 
also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow 
for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory 
program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting 
countries.  
 
The Appellate Body was also concerned with negotiation when considering 
unjustified discrimination. They said that the United States' failure to negotiate 
with some states, but not others, was “plainly discrimination and, in our view, 
unjustifiable.”395 Meanwhile, when considering “arbitrary discrimination”, the 
Appellate Body said that the measure was “a single, rigid and unbending 
requirement” and that this rigidity and inflexibility was “arbitrary discrimination 
within the meaning of the chapeau.”396 As Quick points out, once the United 
States allowed more flexibility and began to “negotiate in good faith” with Asian 
countries, the Appellate Body found the United States’ measure compatible with 
WTO law.397  
 
In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body again took a slightly different 
approach by grouping together “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” as one 
combined requirement, with the disguised restriction on trade as the second 
requirement.398 Further, the Appellate Body decided when looking at if arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination had occurred, the assessment “should be made in 
the light of the objective of the measure”.399 Therefore, discrimination is 
unjustifiable or discriminatory if:400  
 
                                                 
393 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [163].  
394 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [165].  
395 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [172].  
396 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [177].  
397 Quick, above n 271, at 973; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 21 November 
2001 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [144]  
398 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 324, at [215]. 
399 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 324, at [227].  
400 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 324, at [227].  
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the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational 
connection to the objective falling within the purview of a 
paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective. 
  
Therefore, while the chapeau might not have historically been interpreted 
consistently, the general theme espoused in US – Gasoline still holds true, that the 
chapeau is about stopping abuse or illegitimate use of the Article XX provision. 
Pietro Castagno also makes that point, stating the chapeau's purpose is “to prevent 
member states to enact legislation in an abusive manner.”401 Philip Joseph Wells 
agrees, noting that the chapeau is a “bottleneck” which ensures states “cannot 
abuse their rights and exercise the exceptions to their obligations in Article XX in 
bad faith for an improper purpose.”402 Van den Bossche and Zdouc consider the 
interpretation of the chapeau as finding:403  
 
the appropriate line of equilibrium between, on the one hand, 
the right of Members to adopt and maintain trade-restrictive 
legislation and measures that pursue certain legitimate societal 
values or interests and, on the other hand, the right of other 
Members to trade.  
 
Considering the relative broadness of Article XX, the chapeau is likely to be the 
tipping point for many climate change measures. As previously noted, Deane 
writes that the chapeau is likely to be “a concern for mitigation measures”,404 and 
Doelle suspects that for measures to meet the chapeau they will need clear 
environmental objectives and also be as flexible as possible.405 This idea that the 
chapeau may prove to be the biggest issue is shared by Wells, who writes that the 
chapeau's current interpretation is “strict and limiting” and proving that “a 
measure is consistent with the chapeau is a difficult endeavour”.406 Pietro 
Castagno also notes that:407 
 
                                                 
401 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 148.  
402 Wells, above n 316, at 227.  
403 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 574.  
404 Deane, above n 300, at 155.  
405 Doelle, above n 305, at 99.  
406 Wells, above n 316, at 227.  
407 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 150.  
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there is some criticism with regard to the interpretation of the 
chapeau, which has been deemed to constitute an unnecessary 
barrier to the enactment of environmental sound national 
policies.  
 
Despite this, not all academics agree that this is necessarily a bad thing. Both 
Wells and Pietro Castagno defend the interpretation of chapeau with varying 
levels of strength. Pietro Castagno writes that the chapeau is “a necessary fence 
against the misuse of Article XX exceptions in a manner that resemble the abuse 
de droit.”408 Further, the chapeau's focus on negotiation and good faith therefore 
allows Article XX exceptions to avoid the spectre of unilateralism and ensures 
measures are “consistent with the multilateral cooperative approach.”409 
 
Wells is even more full-throated in his defence of the current interpretation of the 
chapeau. The chapeau's interpretation allows it to remain “a suitable 
gatekeeper.”410 Any dilution of the chapeau would allow member states “to 
frequently pursue protectionist measures.”411 He suggests that while the chapeau 
sets a high standard, that is a good thing because:412  
 
those measures that do reach the chapeau's rightly restrictive 
requirement often do so because the panel has extensively 
screened them for the unilateral and protectionist features it is 
adamant to avoid.  
 
Van den Bossche and Zdouc note that the public perception of the Appellate Body 
has been unsympathetic due to some of its decisions surrounding the chapeau.413 
Yet they point out that the Appellate Body had expressed its own defence of its 
decision in US – Shrimp.414 In that case, the Appellate Body noted what it had not 
decided during its decision, namely that the environment was not worth protecting 
or that WTO members cannot take adopt effective measures to protect endangered 
                                                 
408 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 151.  
409 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 151.  
410 Wells, above n 316, at 228.  
411 Wells, above n 316, at 228.  
412 Wells, above n 316, at 228.  
413 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 581.  
414 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 582.  
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species.415 Rather, the Appellate Body had merely decided that the measures in 
question were examples of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.416 
Essentially, it appears that the Appellate Body was saying much the same as Wells 
or Pietro Castagno, that the chapeau serves as a necessary safeguard to protect 
Article XX from abuse. Quick agrees, noting that a “high environmental standard” 
measure can comply with the chapeau if it is implemented carefully and fairly.417  
 
If the chapeau is to be made friendlier to environmental measures, Pietro 
Castagno notes that Gaines suggests changing the presumption or burden of the 
provision.418 Gaines argues that if a measure meets a paragraph of Article XX then 
there should be a presumption of compliance with the chapeau unless 
“complaining Members can demonstrate obviously discriminatory treatment of 
traded goods or a clear effort to disguise trade restrictions behind a green 
mask.”419 Thus, Pietro Castagno notes that Gaines's argument would suggest 
that:420 
 
the complaining party should be required to demonstrate that 
the measure at stake violates all the chapeau's requirements, 
thus achieving a considerable relaxation of the standard as we 
know it today. 
 
Conclusion 
Article XX currently provides environmentalists with their best hope of finding 
compatibility between climate change measures and trade law. Indeed, Matsushita 
and his co-authors notes that Article XX is “an adequate tool for a balanced 
approach to the trade and environment controversy.”421 Both Article XX(b) and 
(g) are likely to be friendly to any climate change measure that is adopted by 
member states. This includes measures that may breach Article III as it is 
                                                 
415 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [185]-[186].  
416 US – Shrimp, above n 275, at [185]-[186].  
417 Quick, above n 271, at 973.  
418 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 153.  
419 Sanford Gaines, 'The WTO'S Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised 
Restriction on Environmental Measures” (2001) 22 J. Int'l L. 739 at 852.  
420 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 153.  
421 Matsushita, above n 1, at 731.  
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currently interpreted. This would tend to suggest that the academic fretting over 
Article III is unnecessary and governments can still take environmental action 
even if “likeness” is defined solely through a market lens. 
 
However, there are questions still surrounding the chapeau. It is a tougher 
provision to fulfil for climate change measures and may be the main stumbling 
step for any climate change provision. Bearing in mind the idea of a “soft 
conflict” defined above, there is the possibility that Article XX might still be able 
to salvage environmental measures while still limiting their true effectiveness 
because they must be watered down to meet the tough test of the chapeau. 
However, that might not always be the case. Brazil – Retreaded Tyres highlights 
this situation. The Appellate Body found that the MERCOSUR exemptions for 
certain countries constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.422 Therefore, 
Brazil had two ways to bring its measure into WTO consistency. It could grant all 
countries the MERCOSUR exemptions, therefore lowering the level of 
environmental protection and highlighting the fear noted above. However, Brazil 
could have simply got rid of any exemptions, therefore increasing the 
environmental protection of the measure. Therefore, while the chapeau can 
frustrate environmental protections; the chapeau also has the ability to lead to 
more environmentally stringent measures.  
 
While some academics believe that the chapeau is a necessary bottleneck to 
protect the international trading system, the current threat of the climate change 
might demand some sort of change to make it easier for member states to protect 
the environment. One such way might be to flip the presumption of who should 
prove that the chapeau has been met or breached. On the other hand, another 
approach may be to interpret the substantial provisions of the GATT, like Article 
III, in a more mutually supportive way, which leaves Article XX and its chapeau 
with its necessary bottleneck. This paper will ultimately suggest that the latter is 
the best way forward.  
 
                                                 
422 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, above n 324, at 258(b)(i).  
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Subsidies, Feed-in Tariffs & Canada – Renewable Energy 
Kati Kulovesi remarks that unlike trade bans and border carbon adjustments, 
which dominate areas of academic research but are largely theoretical ideas which 
have yet to been put into practice, “government policies to boost renewable 
energy and clean technology are emerging as the most concrete testing ground for 
assessing the mutual supportiveness of WTO rules and climate change law.”423 
Such a statement is backed up by the Appellate Body decisions of Canada – 
Renewable Energy424 and India – Solar Cells.425 These two cases tackle two 
environment-related issues:  
i. Feed-in tariffs and WTO rules around subsidies, which will be 
dealt with now; and 
ii. Local content requirements and WTO consistency with Article III, 
which will be dealt with in the next section. 
Environmental Subsidies and Feed-In Tariffs   
Around 70% of global greenhouse emissions come from the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity and, as such, de-carbonzing the power 
sector is a critical step in combating climate change.426 The development of 
renewable energy is, therefore, crucial. However, renewable energy is “more cost-
intensive than conventional energy” and therefore it needs fiscal supports from 
governments.427 This governmental assistance can come in many forms, such as 
tax incentives, grants, or pricing support.428 Feed-in tariffs, a form of pricing 
support, are increasingly used to promote renewable energy.429 In fact, feed-in 
tariffs are “one of the most effective incentives for fostering GHG reductions... 
with the production of renewable energy.”430 
 
                                                 
423 Kati Kulovesi, 'International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy: Testing Ground for Mutual 
Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate Change Law' (2014) 23(3) RECIEL 342 at 342.  
424 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, 24 
May 2013 (Report of the Appellate Body). 
425 India – Solar Cells, above n 106.  
426 Weber & Koch, above n 105, at 757.  
427 Weber & Koch, above n 105, at 757-758.  
428 Farah & Cima, above n 54, at 1104.  
429 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 344. 
430 S. Gupta and others, Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements, in R Howse & P 
van Bork (ed) Options for Liberalising Trade in Environmental Goods in the Doha Round 
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2007).  
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Feed-in tariffs work by creating long-term contracts between governments and 
energy producers, which offer a premium price for the electricity generated by 
renewable industries.431 This set, attractive price therefore means companies can 
be assured that their investment will not be at risk.432 The question of feed-in 
tariffs and their consistency with WTO law was raised in Canada – Renewable 
Energy. 
Trade Laws on Subsidies 
Subsidies can raise issues under not only the GATT, but also the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the SCM Agreement.433 All three of these treaties are found in 
Annex 1A from the Uruguay Rounds, and in the event of a conflict the GATT is 
put to one side in favour of the more specific agreements.434 The relevant 
provisions of those agreements are Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and Article VI and XVI of the GATT.435 The SCM Agreement in its 
entirety is relevant to the question. Between these three treaties, there could be the 
potential of having “pure climate policies” which “promote renewable energy” as 
being declared incompatible with WTO law.436  
 
In terms of measures taken to combat climate change, the most likely agreement 
that will be looked at initially is the SCM Agreement. The Agreement on 
Agriculture is likely to be relevant only in occasional situations. Meanwhile, 
under Article XX of the GATT, there is the potential to salvage environmentally 
friendly measures from incompatibility with trade law. However, it is unclear if 
Article XX could be used to help justify measures found wanting by the SCM 
Agreement. Such an approach has been described as requiring a “heroic approach 
to interpretation.”437 This point will be discussed later.  
 
The SCM Agreement is concerned with subsidies and countervailing measures. 
Article 1 defines a subsidy. A subsidy requires two ingredients under Article I. 
                                                 
431 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 344.  
432 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 344.  
433 Condon, above n 238, at 899; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1869 
UNTS 14 (entered into force 1 January 1995). 
434 Agreement on the Establishment of the World Trade Organization, above n 110, at Annex 1A, 
General Interpretative Note.   
435 Condon, above n 238, at 900. 
436 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 343.  
437 Marceau & Trachtman, above n 253, at 874.  
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First, there must be either some “financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member”438 or there must be “any form of 
income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 1994”.439  
Secondly, “a benefit” must be conferred.440 As the Appellate Body noted in Brazil 
– Aircraft, these two factors are “separate legal elements” and together “they 
determine whether a ‘subsidy’ exists”. 441 This latter issue about “a benefit” 
proved to be the key point in the Canada – Renewable Energy case and appears to 
be the key point when considering climate change reform. However, before 
turning to that decision, it is prudent to just briefly make note of several other 
provisions of the SCM Agreement.  
 
For a subsidy to potentially be subject to other parts of the agreement, it also has 
to meet the requirements of specificity found in Article 2.442 A subsidy is specific 
if it is limited to certain industries or enterprises, or certain enterprises in 
designated geographical regions.443 In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China), the Appellate Body remarked that specificity should be 
understood through “concurrent application” of the principles of Article 2.1, 
though there may be some cases where specificity is obvious by reason of fact or 
law.444  
 
Any prohibited subsidy under Article 3 is regarded to be specific.445 Prohibited 
subsidies are not allowed under the SCM Agreement and exist if the subsidy is 
contingent upon export performances or the use of domestic goods over imported 
ones.446 The Appellate Body noted that the key word in Article 3 is 
“contingent”.447 De jure and de facto contingency have the same “legal standard”, 
but de jure contingency relies on the “words of the relevant legislation” whereas 
                                                 
438 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 1.1(a)(1).  
439 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 1.1(a)(2).  
440 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 1.1(b).  
441 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, 20 August 1999 (Report 
of the Appellate Body) at [157].  
442 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 2.  
443 SCM Agreement, above n 443, art 2.  
444 United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WT/DS379/AB/R, 25 March 2011 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [371].  
445 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 2.3.  
446 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 3.  
447 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, 20 August 1999 
(Report of the Appellate Body) at [166].  
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de facto contingency “must be inferred from the total configuration of the facts 
constituting and surrounding the granting of the subsidy”.448 In the end, 
“contingent” means “’conditional’ or ‘dependent on something else’”.449 
Meanwhile, other subsidies may be “actionable” if they cause “adverse effects” to 
the interests of another SCM Agreement member states, whether that be through: 
injury to the domestic industry of another member, nullification or impairment of 
benefits to other members under the GATT, or causing serious prejudice to the 
interests of another member.450  
The Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada – Renewable Energy  
The Canadian province of Ontario implemented a feed-in tariff programme in 
2009 to increase the levels of electricity generated by renewable energy.451 
Generators who participate in the scheme are guaranteed a certain price per kWH 
of electricity from the government for the term of either a 20 or 40 year long 
contract.452 It was this part of the feed-in tariff scheme that Japan argued triggered 
the subsidy rules around the SCM Agreement.  
 
The first factor that had to be considered was whether the feed-in tariff 
programme met one of the criteria of Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. The 
Panel had characterised the programme as failing under Article 1.1(a)(iii) “a 
government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods”.453 The Panel noted that Article 1.1(a)(iii) is met when a 
government obtains some sort of possession or entitlement over a good via the 
making of some sort of payment.454 The Panel concluded that Ontario was 
purchasing an entitlement to electricity and therefore Article 1.1(a)(iii) had been 
met.455 The Appellate Body agreed with this classification.456 They rejected the 
appeal from Japan that the more apt classification was under Article 1.1(a)(i), 
                                                 
448 Canada – Aircraft, above n 447, at [167].  
449 Canada – Aircraft, above n 447, at [166].  
450 SCM Agreement, above n 433, art 5.  
451 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [4.17].  
452 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [4.17].  
453 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and 
Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013 (Report of the Panel) [7.222] & [7.243].  
454 Canada – Renewable Energy (Panel), above n 453, at [7.231].  
455 Canada – Renewable Energy (Panel), above n 453, at [7.229] at [7.231]-[7.239].  
456 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.128].  
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being a “direct transfer of funds”.457 However, the Appellate Body did note that 
the Panel was incorrect to find that (i) and (iii) of Article 1.1(a) were mutually 
exclusive.458 
 
The main question the Appellate Body concerned itself with was whether a 
“benefit” had been conferred.459 The Appellate Body had earlier considered the 
meaning of “benefit” in Canada-Aircraft. They noted that a dictionary definition 
of the word aligned with the comments of an earlier panel in saying that benefit 
“clearly encompasses some form of advantage.”460 The Appellate Body went 
beyond a dictionary meaning, though, noting that “benefit” implies a recipient.461 
Therefore, the question of a “benefit” is concerned with the recipient and not with 
any potential cost to the government.462 Further, “benefit” requires some kind of 
comparison and therefore there is no benefit “unless the “financial contribution” 
makes the recipient “better off than it would otherwise have been, absent that 
contribution.”463 Of this discussion found in Canada – Aircraft, the Appellate 
Body in Canada – Renewable Energy affirmed the conclusion that a benefit has 
been conferred “if the recipient has received a “financial contribution” on terms 
more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.”464 Therefore, 
a marketplace assessment is required.465  
 
The Panel in Canada-Renewable Energy were divided over whether a benefit had 
been conferred.466 The majority ruled that Japan did not provide enough evidence 
to prove a benefit. However, one dissenting voice suggested that because solar 
energy would not have been in the market without the feed-in tariff, a benefit 
therefore existed.467 However, the Appellate Body decided that all members of the 
Panel had erred in their decision by failing to first correctly identify the relevant 
                                                 
457 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.132]. 
458 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.121].  
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market mentioned in the test in Canada-Aircraft.468  
 
The Panel had identified the market as the electricity market in general.469 
However, the Appellate Body decided that the relevant market was narrower. They 
noted that while “electricity is physically identical, regardless of how it is 
generated”, there are “additional factors that may be used to differentiate on the 
demand-side, which the Panel did not consider in its analysis of the relevant 
market.”470 Further, they did not analyse supply-side factors at all.471 This failure 
to take into account demand-side substitutability was inconsistent with the 
approach in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft where both 
demand-side and supply-side factors were considered important.472 
 
The first observation the Appellate Body made on the supply-side factors was that 
they “suggest that windpower and solar PV producers of electricity cannot 
compete with other electricity producers because of differences in cost structures 
and operating costs and characteristics.”473 Wind and solar technologies have high 
capital costs, low operations cost, produce electricity intermittently and cannot be 
relied on for base-load and peak-load electricity.474 Further, while conventional 
generators can put price constraints on renewable generators, the same cannot be 
said for the opposite situation.475 When all of this is considered, the Appellate 
Body came to the conclusion that:476 
 
the differences in costs for conventional and renewable 
electricity are so significant, markets for wind- and solar PV-
generated electricity can only come into existence as a matter of 
government regulation. It is often the government’s choice of 
supply-mix of electricity generation technologies that creates 
markets for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity. 
                                                 
468 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.169].  
469 Canada – Renewable Energy (Panel), above n 453, at [7.318]. 
470 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.170].  
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In light of this, the Appellate Body ruled that the benefit comparison for Article 
1.1(b) should be conducted not in the wholesale electricity market as a whole, as 
the Panel had done, but rather “within the competitive markets for wind- and solar 
PV-generated electricity, which are created by the government definition of the 
energy supply-mix.”477 When discussing the relevant benchmarks for such a 
comparison, the Appellate Body wrote:478 
 
Thus, where the government has defined an energy supply-mix 
that includes windpower and solar PV electricity generation 
technologies, as in the present disputes, a benchmark 
comparison for purposes of a benefit analysis for windpower 
and solar PV electricity generation should be with the terms and 
conditions that would be available under market-based 
conditions for each of these technologies, taking the supply-mix 
as a given.  
 
The Appellate Body also rejected the dissenting opinion in the panel report 
(endorsed by Japan) that a benefit was conferred because “but for” the feed-in 
tariff programme, generators would not have entered the market.479 Such an 
approach would be using the wholesale electricity market, which as noted by the 
Appellate Body, was the wrong market benchmark.480  
 
Ultimately, despite the considerable reasoning given to the area of subsidies and 
feed-in tariff programmes, the Appellate Body felt they had insufficient evidence 
presented before them and as such were unable to come to a conclusion on if the 
programme was a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.481  
Academic Debate on Canada – Renewable Energy 
Luca Rubini, who has written numerous papers on the Appellate Body's 
decision,482 made the observation that despite the diversity of articles on the case, 
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“virtually all pieces share one common denominator. Their assessment is 
negative.”483 Rubini concludes in his own literature review that it is “highly 
significant that (with a couple of exceptions) virtually all commentary so far is 
highly critical of the benefit analysis of the Panel (majority) and the Appellate 
Body.”484  
 
Rajib Pal writes that the Appellate Body's decision in Canada – Renewable 
Energy was flawed for four reasons.485 His first concern was that:486  
 
the Appellate Body had no basis for concluding that the supply-
side factors it deemed to be important... should have had any 
influence in determining the relevant market for purposes of its 
benefit analysis. 
 
Others have agreed with such an assessment. Rubini notes that by considering 
supply-side factors, “the Appellate Body has made a fundamental mistake of 
economic methodology.”487 This error came about by taking a competitive 
approach, where supply side factors can be important, for what is a state aid 
situation, where supply side factors should not be relevant.488 Rubini concludes 
that “supply-side analysis is largely irrelevant”.489 Similarly, Cosbey and 
Mavroidis argue that supply-side factors are “irrelevant to determining the 
definition of the relevant market for the purposes of establishing a benchmark.”490 
Meanwhile, even those who do not dismiss supply-side factors as a consideration, 
                                                                                                                                     
Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT Ruling' (2015) 14(2) WTR 211; Luca Rubini 'The Good, the 
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484 Rubini, above n 483, at 218.  
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486 Pal, above n 485, at 129.  
487 Rubini, above n 483, at 219.  
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489 Rubini, above n 483, at 219.  
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such as Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer, do suggest that the Appellate 
Body's argument has a “lack of cogency.”491 
 
Pal argues that the Appellate Body has incorrectly applied an approach from 
Article 6 to Article 1, despite their differences in terminology.492 Cosbey and 
Mavroidis agree, noting that the Appellate Body took the decision of EC and 
Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft out of context.493 They all agree that 
while supply-side factors might be relevant when considering “serious prejudice” 
under Article 6, there is no good reason to incorporate it into a “benefit” 
analysis.494 However, while ultimately disagreeing with the Appellate Body 
decision, Alexandre Genest is open to considering the use of EC and Certain 
Member States – Large Civil Aircraft when considering Article 1.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement.495 
 
Pal's second identified flaw in the Appellate Body's decision was that it “had no 
basis for concluding that those factors should outweigh the demand-side factors 
for determining the relevant market.”496 Genest also agrees with this assessment, 
saying there was no legal basis.497 It is a point that also troubles Charnovitz and 
Fischer, who note that there is no explanation from the Appellate Body as to how 
supply and demand factors should be weighed.498 Pal writes that there is nothing 
to suggest that the demand-side factors should not have outweighed the supply-
side and this would have gave better effect to the SCM Agreement,499 essentially 
repeating the arguments above that the supply-side factors were irrelevant.  
 
Pal's third concern is that “the Appellate Body had no basis to attach significance 
to 'the Government of Ontario's choice of energy supply-mix' in its benefit 
                                                 
491 Steve Charnovitz & Carolyn Fischer, 'Canada-Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law 
on Green and Not-So-Green Subsidies' (2015) 14(2) WTR 177 at 204.  
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analysis.”500 Charnovitz and Fischer note that by “equating politician preferences 
with consumer preferences” there is a risk of creating a “slippery slope” that 
introduces policy considerations into the benefit analysis.501 This slippery slope 
fear is nearly universally shared by academics. Rubini argues that “there is no 
(full) overlap between policies and markets”.502 By providing space for 
governmental preference for type of goods, Pal argues, the decision “risks 
rendering the SCM Agreement's subsidy disciplines meaningless.”503 Genest 
suggests the Appellate Body’s approach has “signalled a greater tolerance of 
protectionist policies.”504 Cosbey and Mavroidis highlight this via an example:505 
 
If country A sells widgets, and country B's producers come up 
with a new substitute for widgets that is uncompetitive because 
of cost structures and other supply-side factors, this ruling 
seems to give legal flexibility for country B to subsidize its 
uncompetitive producers. No benefit will be assessed because 
country B's producers are not in the same market as country A's 
producers, even though the two goods are substitutes. 
 
Pal's final objection to the Appellate Body's decision was that they had “mis-
applied the distinction it established between government interventions that create 
markets and those that support existing markets.”506 This concern is based on the 
Appellate Body's comment that:507  
 
while the creation of markets... does not in and of itself give rise 
to subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, 
government interventions in existing markets may amount to 
subsidies. 
 
While analysing this development, Rubini provides a useful summary of what that 
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501 Charnovitz and Fischer, above n 491, at 205.  
502 Rubini, above n 483, at 220.  
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paragraph means. He writes that the Appellate Body is:508 
 
not saying that market creation does never amount to a subsidy 
but that this does not automatically happen. You need to have 
other factors or circumstances present that may turn this act of 
creation into a subsidy problem. Absent them, the Appellate 
Body is crucially suggesting, you do not have a subsidy. 
 
Pal argues that the Appellate Body was wrong to characterise the Ontario 
government as creating a new market, but rather was intervening in an existing 
market by “altering the electricity supply-mix and reducing demand for 
conventional electricity.”509 Cosbey and Marvroidis go further by noting that this 
distinction between new and existing markets “has no statutory underpinning”.510 
The SCM Agreement does “not contain any language to this effect”.511 Rubini's 
characterisation of this new distinction is that the Appellate Body has created a 
“'carve-out', 'exception' or 'exclusion' of certain types of action from subsidy 
laws.”512 This idea of a “carve out” has also been endorsed by Genest.513  
 
Rubini has serious misgivings about this development, noting “the language of 
market creation, is dangerously open-ended.”514 Further, it is something which has 
no “legal or economic justification.”515 Rubini is also concerned with the sheer 
lack of clarity in the distinction, whether it is the question of how you identify a 
new market or how you define an appropriate level of costs and profits; 
ultimately, Rubini writes that “the boundaries of the 'market creation' scenario... 
are ultimately undefined and unclear.”516 Cosbey and Mavroidis also note that it is 
difficult to decide what a new market is.517  
 
Rubini believes that the Appellate Body's motive for developing both supply-side 
                                                 
508 Rubini, above n 483, at 221.  
509 Pal, above n 485, at 134.  
510 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 27.  
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importance in market definition and the distinction between new and existing 
market comes from:518  
 
the belief that renewable energy is 'special' and that for this 
reason action to support it cannot be considered as exceptional 
or derogating (which is the essence of the legal notion of 
subsidy). 
 
It is speculation that finds favour with other academics. Charnovitz and Fischer 
note that the Appellate Body is still haunted by Tuna-Dolphin and has gone out of 
its way to highlight its “environmental bona fides”.519 Kulovesi also agreed that 
the Appellate Body’s decision came about from hoping to “avoid creating an open 
conflict between WTO law and one of the key policy instruments used to support 
renewable energy.”520 The question then becomes, if, at the very least, this 
decision has been beneficial for the environment despite its questionable legal 
reasoning.  
 
Cosbey and Mavroidis do not agree this has been a green victory.521 There is first 
the element of if this has guaranteed feed-in tariff's continued consistency with 
trade law. They write that “policy makers should not rely on the expectation that 
the legal acrobatics performed in this case will be repeated. FITs have not been 
offered a safe haven.”522 Even under the legal acrobatics of Canada – Rewewable 
Energy, they have their doubts that even the “cleanest of green measures” have 
been granted a safe habour, since “relatively generous FIT schemes” are still 
likely to be found to be subsidies despite the new and existing market 
distinction.523 Kulovesi does not believe a definitive answer has been provided 
about the WTO consistency of feed-in tariffs.524 At a more principle-based level, 
Charnovitz and Fischer note that the Appellate Body has approached the issue of 
“green energy” the wrong way, suggesting that its necessity comes from replacing 
                                                 
518 Rubini, above n 483, at 224.  
519 Charnovitz and Fischer, above n 491, at 207.  
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fossil fuels to ensure guaranteed electricity supply, rather than the more pressing 
environmental reason of “facing the challenge of climate change”.525  
 
On top of the fact that this decision might not be a safe haven for green measures, 
academics are concerned at how broad the door is. Rubini speculates that such 
broad language has given breathing space for action “beyond the clean energy 
sector” which could deliver a “huge blow to subsidy discipline, lessening 
transparency and control of potentially trade-distorting measures”.526 Charnovitz 
and Fischer are also worried, noting that while the Appellate Body's interpretation 
could bode well for renewable energy schemes, “it could also open the door to 
less desired interventions.”527 As an example of this, Pal considers corn-based 
ethanol production, which is less efficient than sugar-based production, could be 
justified under the reasoning of Canada – Renewable Energy.528 Ultimately, 
Genest suggests that the decision could open “the floodgates for a surge of 
protectionist industrial policies.”529 
 
Therefore, the academic literature has come to three conclusions with varying 
levels of unanimity: the decision has been made on faulty and unsustainable 
reasoning, it does not necessarily grant safe passage to all future renewable energy 
feed-in tariffs, and it has the potential to be exploited by less environmentally 
friendly to circumvent the SCM Agreement. The question becomes what options 
are being presented as a way forward from the Canada – Renewable Energy.  
 
Rubini's attitude would seem to be to forget the whole thing had happened, 
suggesting that the best-case scenario, while unlikely, would be “to simply ignore 
the ruling”.530 He goes on further to say that since the consideration of supply-side 
factors when defining the market was “simply wrong”, it is difficult to make the 
interpretation “less wrong”.531 His option for the best forward is confrontational, 
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suggesting:532   
 
To step through the narrow gate would, by contrast, require 
adjudicators to shamelessly expose the deficiencies of the 
system (that is certain, desirable measures may be caught and 
even objected by subsidy disciplines), and force Members to 
recognise them and react. 
 
Cosbey and Mavroidis consider that feed-in tariffs are likely a public good; 
addressing climate change is a public good, feed-in tariffs are not protectionist in 
nature, without domestic content requirements investors from all countries can 
experience the benefits, and a number of studies have suggested that feed-in tariffs 
“foster a rapid deployment of capacity for renewably generated electricity.”533 In 
fact, in their opinion, this fact is why the Appellate Body was so desperate not to 
find the Ontario scheme a subsidy.534 Therefore, they endeavoured to find a way 
that feed-in tariffs could be rescued under the SCM Agreement.  
 
It must be noted that not everyone agreed with the idea that a feed-in tariff was a 
public good. Genest notes that the Auditor General of Ontario had concerns with 
the programme, but the Appellate Body ignored any doubts so as to fully embrace 
“the sustainable development claims associated with the FIT program.”535 He 
remarked that a situation could occur, due to the way that electricity supply and 
demand works, where the Ontario market would have to stop “hydroelectricity 
production to favour wind and solar (which amounts to no environmental gain) 
and reducing nuclear production, which causes Ontario to incur significant costs 
and causes much disruption”.536  
 
Even if we do work off the assumption that a feed-in tariff programme is a 
fundamental good, Cosbey and Mavroidis note that there is nothing approaching a 
public goods defence in the SCM Agreement.537 Charnovitz and Fischer run into 
                                                 
532 Rubini, above n 483, at 230-231.  
533 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
534 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 31.  
535 Genest, above n 495, at 254.  
536 Genest, above n 495, at 254.  
537 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 36.  
73 
 
© James Rowland 
 
the same difficulties when they suggest that while they believe that WTO law did 
take into account policy considerations, it a difficult question to answer if benefit 
should have a policy-based factor.538 It is possible that an “adequate 
remuneration” argument could be used to salvage some sort of public goods 
defence. Cosbey and Mavroidis consider a situation where the financial 
contribution is “simply payment of the full benefits conferred by the firm's actions 
– an internalization of external environmental costs.”539 Indeed, Charnovitz and 
Fischer note the Appellate Body has suggested that competitive bidding could be 
used as a way of setting prices that would limit any feed-in tariff to “adequate 
remuneration”.540  
 
When discussing such an idea, Cosbey and Mavroidis suggest it is not clear if a 
benefit would be conferred if “government's financial contributions were 
somehow exactly matched to the unpaid social benefits that would be derived 
from the investment that they support”.541 However, they do not consider the idea 
of competitive bidding and conclude that it would be difficult to ensure that a 
subsidy exactly matched the social benefits it created, and therefore reject this 
approach as being possible.542  
 
Another factor to try and protect environmentally friendly feed-in tariffs could be 
through some form of Article XX GATT defence. Several academics have 
considered Article XX's relevancy to the SCM Agreement. Charnovitz and Fischer 
would appear to be neutral on the idea, suggesting that there is not currently an 
exception analogous to Article XX but one could be incorporated if the SCM 
Agreement was revised “or interpreted”.543 Genest is also neutral on the subject, 
saying that Article XX’s relevancy to the SCM Agreement is “unanswered”.544 
 
However, there is a strong school of thought that this would be going an 
interpretative step too far. Cosbey and Mavroidis note that there are clear 
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indications that Article 8 of the SCM Agreement was the “only provision” that 
was meant to deal with these “green” subsidies, and that negotiators did not mean 
for Article XX to apply to the SCM Agreement.545 Kulovesi agrees, writing that 
the SCM Agreement does not have environmental exceptions like Article XX and 
“thus, arguably even the ‘cleanest’ of green measures would find no safe harbour 
in facing the SCM Agreement”.546 Marceau and Tratchman has described it as 
requiring a “heroic approach to interpretation.”547 Condon would seem to be in 
agreement, noting that Article XX refers to “this Agreement”,548 and echoing the 
comments of Cosbey and Mavroidis that negotiators did not make an attempt to 
incorporate the language of Article XX by its language or directly.549  
 
In light of this apparent gulf between the SCM Agreement and Article XX, 
academic thought turns back to the now expired Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. 
Article 8 declared subsidies that met certain requirements and were concerned 
with regional aid, the environment, or research development were “non-
actionable”.550 Essentially, this was creating a traffic light system of prohibited 
subsidies (red), actionable subsidies (yellow), and non-actionable subsidies 
(green).551 However, Article 8 expired in 2000 without any consensus to renew 
it.552 
 
While it might be possible that a reinstatement of Article 8 is the best way 
forward, Cosbey and Mavroidis goes even further suggesting that “a wider 
exemption is warranted”.553 They suggest a “hybrid approach that incorporated 
elements of Art. XX GATT and Art. 8 SCM Agreement” would be the best way 
forward.554 They are not alone in such a viewpoint. Bigdeli also notes that a 
revival of Article 8 “may not have any substantial effect”,555 and that any new 
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environmental exemption for subsidies should instead be based on Article 
XX(b).556 Considering the stalling nature of the Doha round, Cosbey and 
Mavroidis would also seek to de-link any negotiation on this new provision from 
the normal trade rounds.557 Essentially, this is the same conclusion reached by 
Rubini, who argues that the “only solution to the current 'turquoise mess' is law 
reform”.558 
Conclusion on Subsidies and the SCM Agreement 
Environmental subsidies can play an important role in moving the world away 
from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy. In particular, feed-in tariffs are 
being considered as a way of incentivising investment into renewable energy, 
which for investors can be a risky option. However, it is not clear if these 
programmes are subsidies and would be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy refused to say either way, but 
endeavoured to carve out a space for feed-in tariffs to possibly survive.  
 
The reasoning of that decision has nearly been universally challenged by 
academics. The criticism is varied, worried about the preferential treatment giving 
to supply-side factors in a market analysis, to the newly created distinction 
between new and established markets. In near unison, writers are worried about 
whether the SCM Agreement has been severely hampered and that subsidies with 
a protectionist bent have unintentionally been given room to breathe.  
 
While some academics have tried to consider how the SCM Agreement can be 
better interpreted to give more freedom to environmentally friendly policies, 
perhaps by applying Article XX of the GATT, there is a clear school of thought 
that the only way forward is law reform. Member states, under that line of 
reasoning, will need to come together and craft a new exemption, using Article 8 
of the SCM Agreement and Article XX as a basis. However, consider the current 
stagnation of multilateral trade negotiations, any chance of treaty change seems 
unlikely, and at the very least, will take time and cannot be relied on. Pietro 
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Castagno describes, when discussing Article XX, any intervention by member 
states through treaty change as being “the last resort.”559 
Domestic/Local Content Requirements – India – Solar Cells 
The shared concern in both Canada – Renewable Energy and India – Solar Cells 
and Modules are the domestic content requirements that both programmes 
included. In terms of renewable energy and combating climate change, domestic 
content requirements can allow a member state to build an industry that can assist 
in making the energy sector more environmentally friendly. Both the Ontario and 
Indian scheme sought to do this. Considering the recent nature of the panel and 
Appellate Body reports of India – Solar Cell, they have had very little written 
about their contents. This point, coupled with the fact that both reports cited the 
major parts of Canada – Renewable Energy, provides an opportunity for this 
literature review to consider the India case before reviewing the academic 
literature. 
 
Before turning to the India – Solar Cells case, though, it is important to note that 
the Appellate Body’s decision in Canada – Renewable Energy masked another 
area of concern with domestic content requirements. Under Article 3.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement, subsidies are prohibited if they are “contingent… upon the use 
of domestic over imported goods”.560 It will become apparent when discussing 
domestic content requirements in the India – Solar Cells case that the practice 
struggles with being consistent under the GATT. However, domestic content 
requirements can also sink environmental subsidies under the SCM Agreement as 
well.  
India – Solar Cells & Modules 
In 2010, the government of India launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission (‘JNNSM’) which had the objective “to establish India as a global leader 
in solar energy”.561 The way the JNNSM primarily worked was for the Indian 
government to enter into long-term agreements with solar power developers 
(‘SPDs’). The issue that caused the United States' complaint were the domestic 
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content requirements (‘DCR’) that imposed certain mandatory requirements on 
the participating SPDs, which required them to use modules and cells 
manufactured in India.562 
 
The United States claimed that the DCR measures were inconsistent with Article 
2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement and Article III: 4 of the GATT.563 India rejected this 
viewpoint.564 The Panel noted that the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable 
Energy / Feed-In Tariff Programme had taken the viewpoint that if something was 
found to fall within 1(a) of the Illustrative List then that was enough to conclude 
that the measure was a violation of both Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and 
Article III:4 of the GATT.565 The Appellate Body agreed when it stated that falling 
within an example of the Illustrative List has be a decisive determinant of 
consistency with Article III:4 and not just an initial threshold to be met.566  
 
The Panel found that the DCR measures were “TRIMs”.567 They accepted the 
United States' argument that the measures were investment measures because they 
encouraged the production of solar cells and modules in India.568 This was 
consistent with the Panel's approach in Indonesia – Autos which considered 
investment measures in light of if they “pursued the promotion and development 
of specific industries with explicit reference to investment-related 
implications”.569 India's own policy objective stated that a “domestic solar 
manufacturing base to provide solar components” was an important part of the 
policy.570  
 
Further, the Panel agreed with the United States that the DCR measures “require 
the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin”.571 The DCR 
measures mandated that SPDs had to use solar cells and/or modules manufactured 
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in India.572 Finally, the United States pointed out that SPDs must certify that they 
will meet the requirement for domestic content and they can be penalise for 
failing to do so and therefore they were mandatory.573 Further, those who do 
comply with the DCR measures receive an advantage by being able to bid for an 
agreement to produce solar power.574 The Panel noted this was similar to that seen 
in Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Program and accepted the 
considerations of the United States.575 As such, the Panel considered that the DCR 
measures fell within paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative and were therefore 
inconsistent with both Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement and Article III:4 of the 
GATT.576  
 
Despite their conclusion, the Panel decided to undertake an Article III:4 analysis 
anyway. There was no dispute that solar cells and modules manufactured 
domestically in India and those imported from the United States were “like 
products”.577 When considering whether the measure at issue was a “law, 
regulation or requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution, or use”, the Panel noted that panels have repeatedly 
come to the conclusion this criteria is met where measures include a “condition 
that an enterprise accepts in order to receive an advantage”.578 The DCR measures 
required compliance in order to receive the advantage of being able to bid for an 
agreement with the Indian government.579  
 
The final factor that had to be considered was that of “less favourable treatment”. 
The Panel noted the Appellate Body’s decision of Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef which said that less favourable treatment is a question of “whether a measure 
modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of 
imported products”.580 The DCR measures prohibited certain imported solar cells 
and modules, where the domestic versions were not prohibited, and as such the 
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Panel concluded less favourable treatment had occurred.581 As such, the DCR 
measures were inconsistent with both Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement and, in 
a separate analysis, Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. This finding was not appealed 
to the Appellate Body.  
 
India’s submissions followed an alternate line of reasoning, being that the DCR 
measures fell under the government procurement derogation under Article III:8(a) 
and therefore were not inconsistent with WTO law.582 Article III:8(a) reads: 
 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, 
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by 
governmental agencies of products purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial 
resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale.  
 
When considering the provision, the Appellate Body set out that Article III:8(a) is 
a “derogation” that exempts a member state from the national treatment 
obligation.583 The United States’ position was that the situation was 
indistinguishable to that seen in Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff 
Program and as such Article III:8(a) was inapplicable.584  
 
The Panel considered the “threshold matter” that was the decisive factor in 
Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Program.585 The Appellate Body 
also considered this “threshold matter” in detail. In Canada – Renewable Energy, 
the Appellate Body said that:586 
 
the scope of the terms “product purchased” in Article III:8(a) is 
informed by the scope of “products” referred to in the 
obligations set out in other paragraphs of Article III. Article 
                                                 
581 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.99].  
582 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.101].  
583 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.18].  
584 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.102].  
585 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.106].  
586 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.63].  
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III:8(a) thus concerns, in the first instance, the product that is 
subject to the discrimination. 
 
The Appellate Body reiterated this point in India – Solar Cells, noting that “the 
product of foreign origin must be either “like” or “directly competitive” with or 
“substitutable” for – i.e. in a “competitive relationship” with - “the product 
purchased.””587 The point that the Appellate Body was making is that it not 
reasonable that “the scope of a derogation can extend beyond the scope of the 
obligation from which derogation is sought.”588 It is a valuable clarification that 
highlights the difference between Article III:8(a) and Article XX. The latter is a 
general exemption for various and multiple purposes, however Article III:8(a) is 
only relevant within the context of a foreign product being discriminated against 
under Article III.  
 
The United States’ position in India – Solar Cells and Modules was that India was 
purchasing electricity, whereas the DCR measures were about solar cells and 
modules.589 As such, they were not in a competitive relationship. This was the 
conclusion reached in Canada – Renewable Energy / Feed-In Tariff Program 
when the Appellate Body decided:590 
 
In the case before us, the product being procured is 
electricity, whereas the product discriminated against for 
reason of its origin is generation equipment. These two 
products are not in a competitive relationship. 
 
The Panel was not persuaded by India that the current dispute was distinguishable 
from that conclusion reached by the Appellate Body.591 The “generation 
equipment” referred to above included solar cells and modules, which are the 
goods in question in the current.592 In light of this, the Panel applied the Appellate 
Body’s decision and found that the DCR measures were not covered by Article 
                                                 
587 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.22].  
588 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.22].  
589 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.107].  
590 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.79].  
591 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.120].  
592 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.123].  
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III:8(a).593 The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's findings, upholding 
them.594 In making that finding, they noted that while:595 
 
a consideration of inputs and processes of production may 
inform the question of whether the product purchased is in a 
competitive relationship with the product being discriminated 
against, it does not displace the competitive relationship 
standard.  
 
Finally, India put forward the argument that their scheme fell under Article XX. 
This paper has already considered Article XX and its environmental 
considerations, however it is worthwhile to briefly address India's arguments 
because they fell under provisions that are atypical for environmental-based 
situations, subsection (j) and (d).596  
 
The Panel described Article XX(j) as establishing “a general exception for 
measures essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local 
short supply”.597 Intriguingly, Article XX(j) had never been invoked as a defence 
before.598 Therefore, both the Panel and Appellate Body built their interpretation 
from the ground up. This paper will consider the more relevant discussion by the 
Appellate Body.  
 
First, the Appellate Body considered the question of the measure needing to be 
“essential”. They considered the comment in Korea – Various Measures on Beef  
that “necessary” is “located significantly closer to the pole of 'indispensable' than 
to the opposite pole of simply 'making a contribution'”.599 Considering that the 
Oxford Dictionary defined essential as “absolutely indispensable or necessary”, 
the Appellate Body determined that essential “is located at least as close to the 
                                                 
593 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.135].  
594 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.41].  
595 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.40].  
596 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.188]. 
597 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.198].  
598 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.202]; and India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at 
[5.58].  
599 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, above n 328, at [161].  
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“indispensable” end of the continuum as the word “necessary”.600 They did, 
however, note that essential does require the same process of weighing and 
balancing as necessary does.601 
 
The Appellate Body then moved onto consider the phrase “products in... short 
supply.”602 As an initial starting point, they considered “short supply” to be 
referring to a situation where there is a “shortage”, a “deficiency in quantity; an 
amount lacking”.603 Therefore, an assessment of if there is a deficiency 
requires:604 
 
a comparison between “supply” and “demand”, such that 
products can be said to be “in short supply” when the “quantity” 
of a product that is “available” does not meet “demand” for that 
product.  
 
Further, the use of “general or local” refer to a situation where “short supply exists 
within the territory of the Member invoking Article XX(j)”.605 The Appellate 
Body noted that the provision was neutral to the origin of the products sought and 
therefore domestic and imported goods can factor into consideration.606 This was 
a rejection of India's argument that a lack of a domestic manufacturing capacity 
could be enough to establish a shortage. In essence:607 
 
Article XX(j) requires a careful scrutiny of the relationship 
between supply and demand based on a holistic consideration of 
trends in supply and demand as they evolve over time, as well 
as whether the conditions giving rise to short supply have 
ceased to exist. 
 
In light of this, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's decision that solar cells and 
                                                 
600 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.62].  
601 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.63].  
602 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.65].  
603 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.65].  
604 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.66].  
605 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.67].  
606 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.68].  
607 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.70].  
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modules were not “products in general or local short supply” and Article XX(j) 
did not apply in the current case.608  
 
India also argued that Article XX(d) could apply. Article XX(d) creates a general 
exception for measures which are: 
 
Necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices.  
 
Unlike with Article XX(j), the Panel noted that Article XX(d) had a “considerable 
body of jurisprudence”.609 The provision contains two cumulative requirements: 
the measure must be “designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations that 
are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT”, and then the 
measure must be “necessary to secure such compliance.”610 
 
The Appellate Body, in their assessment, took notice of their earlier decision in 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks.611 In that decision, the Appellate Body defined 
“laws or regulations” as:612  
 
rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO 
member, including rules deriving from international agreement 
that have been incorporated into the domestic legal system of a 
WTO Member or have direct effect according to that WTO 
Member's legal system. 
 
                                                 
608 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.90].  
609 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.267].  
610 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.267].  
611 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.106].  
612 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 24 March 
2006 (Report of the Appellate Body) at [79].  
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In India – Solar Cells, the Appellate Body went further in defining “laws or 
regulations”. They suggested that the term is not limited to instruments that are 
enforceable by law, but rather can include rules which a Member seek to comply 
with even when compliance is not coerced.613 This provides a widening scope for 
the term. When considering the question of “to secure compliance”, the Appellate 
Body noted that the measure only needs to seek to secure the observance of the 
“laws or regulations” and not that the result has to be an absolute certainty.614  
 
To conclude on their general comments, the Appellate Body provided guidance 
for future panels by saying that when considering if something is a law or 
regulation, they should consider:615 
 
(i) the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to 
which the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or 
course of action that is to be observed within the domestic legal 
system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity of the 
relevant rule; (iii) whether the rule is legally enforceable, 
including e.g. before a court of law; (iv) whether the rule has 
been adopted or recognised by a competent authority possessing 
the necessary powers under the domestic legal system of a 
Member; (v) the form and title given to any instrument or 
instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system 
of a Member; and (vi) the penalties or sanctions that may 
accompany the relevant rule. 
 
Of particular interest to environmental law is that India argued that its 
international law obligations were relevant to Article XX(d).616 However, the 
Appellate Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks ruled that international 
instruments did not meet the definition of “laws or regulation” in Article 
XX(d).617 The provision is referring “to rules that form part of the domestic legal 
                                                 
613 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.109].  
614 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.108].  
615 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.127].  
616 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.269].  
617 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.289].  
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system of a WTO member.”618 International instruments can become a part of a 
“domestic legal system”, though. The Appellate Body identified two ways this 
could be achieved. First, a WTO member could pass an “implementing 
instrument” that would implement the international instrument into domestic 
law.619 Secondly, that it in some countries, international rules can have direct 
effect within a domestic system and therefore an implementing instrument is not 
necessary.620 Therefore, international rules can fall under Article XX(d), but only 
if they “have been incorporated into the domestic legal system of a WTO Member 
or have direct effect according to that WTO Member’s legal system.”621 The 
Appellate Body noted that even if an international instrument does form a part of 
the domestic legal system, it is still necessary to then make the assessment 
detailed above to see if it counts as a “law or regulation.”622  
 
The Panel found that India failed to demonstrate that the international instruments 
had “direct effect” in India.623 India’s evidence gave the Panel the impression that 
before an international instrument can have effect in the Indian legal system, the 
government needed to have taken some action to implement it.624 As such, the 
Panel decided that India failed to show that the international instruments cited 
were “laws or regulations” under Article XX(d).625 The Appellate Body agreed, 
saying that India had not sufficiently demonstrated that the international 
instruments formed a part of it domestic legal system.626 Ultimately, it appeared 
that the Appellate Body was subtly expanding Article XX(d), giving India a 
chance to use international law, but only if it was an international law that had 
specific obligations, rather than principles, and that it had been implemented into 
domestic law. India had not met that threshold. 
 
India did, however, also provide several domestic instruments for the purposes of 
Article XX(d), though, the Panel decided that only section 3 of the Electricity Act 
                                                 
618 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.289]; Mexico – Soft Drinks, above n 612, at [69]. 
619 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, above n 612, at [69]. 
620 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, above n 612, at [69].  
621 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.292].  
622 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.141].  
623 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.298].  
624 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.298].  
625 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.301]. 
626 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.148].  
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was a “law or regulation” within the meaning of Article XX(d).627 The Panel said 
they could see “no link or nexus between the DCR measures and Section 3 of the 
Electricity Act.”628 Further, India had advanced no argument to explain the 
connection.629 In light of this, the Panel found that Article XX(d) did not apply 
with regard to any of the DCR measures.630 The Appellate Body agreed.631  
Academic Literature 
Throughout this paper, we have considered environmental measures that come 
into conflict with WTO law and academia is concerned with how to interpret or 
reform trade rules to give these environmental measures space. There has been 
very little questioning of the environmental measures themselves. The emphasis 
has been on trade law. With regards to domestic content requirements, though, this 
is not the case. Academia is very concerned with the worth of domestic content 
requirements.  
 
Rubini characterises any benefits coming from domestic content requirements as 
being “green vs. green conflict” at best.632 This is because “any beneficial green 
impact deriving from domestic industry support would be compensated by a 
detrimental green impact for the competing industries of other countries”.633 
Others argue that DCRs are even worse. Cosbey and Mavroidis note that the 
immediate impact of DCRs are “against climate change mitigation, since they 
inevitably increase the cost of installed capacity by forcing investors to source 
from more costly local suppliers”.634 It is a point that finds favour with Charnovitz 
and Fischer, who notes that the Ontario DCRs would have only made renewable 
energy more expensive in Canada.635 Even Thomas Cottier, who is more friendly 
to DCRs, notes that from a decarbonisation viewpoint, “a local content 
requirement does not make sense as it increases costs for hardware and 
                                                 
627 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.319].  
628 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.329].  
629 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.329].  
630 India – Solar Cells (Panel), above n 562, at [7.333].  
631 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.151].  
632 Luca Rubini 'Ain't Wastin' Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM 
Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform' (2012) 15(2) J Intl Econ L 525 at 530.  
633 Rubini, above n 632, at 530.  
634 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
635 Charnovitz and Fischer, above n 491, at 188.  
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installations.”636 
 
The benefits of DCRs are therefore not necessarily concerned with climate change 
mitigation. Cosbey and Mavroidis note that the real objectives and impacts of 
DCRs are “rooted in national benefits such as job creation and fostering national 
firms that can compete at the global level in the renewable energy space.”637 This 
view is corroborated by Oliver Johnson's interviews with Indian officials, who 
told him that the DCRs for the Indian Solar Scheme were concerned with  
“developing technological capabilities, ensuring energy security to sustain 
economic growth, developing technology export and leadership capacity, and 
pursuing energy access through off-grid opportunities.”638 Further, he notes that 
several people he interviewed told him that the DCRs were due to “pressure from 
manufacturers”, a belief that was confirmed by the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy.639 In light of this, such a finding seems to confirm Rubini's 
suggesting some DCRs are “clearly protectionist and cannot really be justified on 
environmental grounds.”640 Even Cottier acknowledges that DCRs can sometime 
be motivated by “rent seeking protectionism.”641  
 
Therefore, the question that is begging to be asked is whether DCRs can ever 
actually be beneficial in combating climate change. Cosbey and Mavroidis 
propose utilising a modified version of the 'Bastable test', which was originally 
stated as saying “an industrial policy measure is worthwhile if the total costs of 
support are outweighed by the present discounted value of the benefits 
derived.”642 The Bastable test is, in fact, just a following on of the ‘Mill test’.643 
The ‘Mill test’ notes that protection is only acceptable if: there is “dynamic 
learning effects”, the industry protection is temporary, and the industry must, at 
some point, become mature enough to stand alone without protection.644 The 
                                                 
636 Thomas Cottier 'Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced 
Disciplines?' (2014) 1 RELP 40 at 44.  
637 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
638 Oliver Johnson 'Promoting Green Industrial Development through Local Content 
Requirements: India's National Solar Mission' (2016) 16(2) Climate Policy 178 at 185.  
639 Johnson, above n 638, at 186.  
640 Rubini, above n 632, at 530.  
641 Cottier, above n 636, at 44.  
642 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
643 Takashi Negishi Developments of International Trade Theory (Springer, Japan, 2001) at 75.  
644 Marc J. Melitz ‘When and how should infant industries be protected?’ (2005) 66(1) Journal of 
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knowledge learned during the protection stage should be available to newcomers, 
rather than being limited to one company.645 In terms of DCRs then, they would 
be worthwhile if the future environmental benefits of the policy (such as new 
innovators and competitors in the environmental sector) end up outweighing the 
lost environmental benefits from the initial slower deployment of green 
technology.646 According to the ‘Mill test’, the protection should also only be 
limited until the industry can stand on its own. With this in mind, it is appropriate 
to consider if DCRs can meet this standard. If they do, then it may be worthwhile 
to try and tackle how WTO law could be reinterpreted to provide the policy 
breathing room. However, if DCRs do not appear to meet the ‘Mill-Bastable test’ 
then it is suggested it is not worth the potential dissent and drama that such a 
reinterpretation could cause.  
 
Rubini and Cottier both identify potential benefits from DCRs. Rubini notes that 
the argument in favour of DCRs is that they “would not only create competitive 
domestic players in the sector but ultimately, if it meant 'more agents of 
innovation' internationally, increase global competition”.647 Cosbey, himself, notes 
that “innovation in renewable energy technology is a critically important global 
public good”.648 Essentially, there is a danger to green industry if global 
competition is selected to a few countries. Cottier's argument in favour of DCRs 
are services-based.649 He notes that maintenance is an issue of particular 
importance, since it is naturally advantageous to have local producers who are 
there on hand to manage and maintain installations.650 Further, he suggests that 
DCRs may be justifiable for allowing the least developing countries build up an 
industrial base.651  
 
Cosbey and Mavroidis note that any attempt to measure the environmental 
benefits of DCRs through a modified Bastable test would be difficult and 
                                                                                                                                     
International Economics 177 at 177.  
645 Negishi, above n 643, at 76.  
646 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
647 Rubini, above n 632, at 530.  
648 Aaron Cosbey 'Renewable Energy Subsidies and the WTO: The Wrong Law and the Wrong 
Venue' (2011) 44 Subsidy Watch 1 at 2.  
649 Cottier, above n 636, at 45.  
650 Cottier, above n 636, at 45.  
651 Cottier, above n 636, at 45.  
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challenging.652 However, Oliver Johnson's case study of the effectiveness of the 
first phase of India's DCRs, that were eventually found to be WTO inconsistent, 
provides insight into the matter. Johnson's review of the Indian DCRs does not 
paint a particularly positive picture. He notes that an initial review concluded that 
the DCRs had “limited and potentially negative impacts.”653 Due to heavy losses 
for local manufacturer, an almost 50% reduction in workforce and non-existence 
R&D investment, Johnson reports that the DCRs were “widely considered to have 
failed in economic terms.”654 Ultimately, Johnson concludes “it is clear that the 
LCR failed to improve competitiveness and did not significantly increase job 
opportunities in solar manufacturing.”655 This finding is consistent with 
Hestermeyer and Nielsen's conclusion that DCRs can actually lead to an industry's 
competitiveness being hurt.656 However, Johnson does note that the capacity of 
local manufacturing had increased and that the DCRs allowed some Indian 
manufacturers to “weather stormy market conditions”.657  
 
Bearing in mind Rubini and Cosbey's comments about “innovators”, it is 
important to note that Johnson found that despite the increase in manufacturing 
capacity, there had been “no opportunity for dynamic learning effects, which are 
the cornerstone of innovation capabilities and building competitiveness.”658 This 
is again consistent with the findings of Hestermeyer and Nielsen who state that 
the “episodic empirical evidence” shows that DCRs can lead to “uncompetitive 
national industry at enormous welfare cost.”659 In his conclusion, Johnson 
characterises the first phase of India's DCRs are being:660 
 
partially successful in promoting domestic manufacturing as 
they appear to have helped Indian manufacturers weather some 
of the storm that has hit the global solar manufacturing industry 
in the past few years. In addition, LCRs did not hinder project 
                                                 
652 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 30.  
653 Johnson, above n 638, at 187.  
654 Johnson, above n 638, at 187.  
655 Johnson, above n 638, at 188.  
656 Holger P. Hestermeyer & Laura Nielsen 'The Legality of Local Content Measures under WTO 
Law' (2014) 48(3) JWT 553 at 591.  
657 Johnson, above n 638, at 187.  
658 Johnson, above n 638, at 191.  
659 Hestermeyer, above n 656, at 591.  
660 Johnson, above n 638, at 191. 
90 
 
© James Rowland 
 
developers from meeting the installed capacity targets planned 
in the NSM and have led to impressive job creation in the solar 
industry. However, they have been less successful in building 
longer-term innovative capabilities, which are necessary to 
sustain competitiveness and make India a solar leader; there 
have been significant reductions in employment in 
manufacturing and limited development of technological and 
capabilities throughout the value chain.  
 
This conclusion would seem to be consistent with that of Hestermeyer and 
Nielsen.661 Considering these findings, it is hard to suggest it is worthwhile to 
argue against Charnovitz and Fischer's assessment that when considering DCRs in 
Canada – Renewable Energy, “the Panel and Appellate Body were rightly in 
agreement that the LCR constitutes a WTO violation”.662  
Conclusion 
Domestic or local content requirements have been an increasingly common 
manufacturing policy.663 However, the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Canada 
– Renewable Energy, reaffirmed in India – Solar Cells & Modules, would seem to 
rule out any possibility that DCRs can be consistent with either the GATT or 
TRIMs Agreement. Further, DCRs make a subsidy prohibited under Article 3.1(b) 
of the SCM Agreement.  
 
However, it is unclear if DCRs are even that useful of a tool for combating climate 
change. Their primary worth is at a national level, providing economic growth and 
manufacturing jobs. They would appear to do very little at an environmental level 
and could, in fact, be outright protectionist. While some have suggested that 
perhaps they could be worthwhile at increasing competition and innovation in the 
renewable energy sector, the evidence from the Indian example suggest that any 
gains are marginal. As such, it is questionable if any effort should go toward 
pushing the boat out in interpreting WTO laws in a way that could make DCRs 
consistent with international trade law.  
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Other Areas of Potential Conflict 
There are, of course, other areas of potential conflict between WTO law and 
environmental measures. However, this paper cannot seek to address every 
conflict that might arise. Rather, when considering interpretative ideals for 
resolving the above conflicts, it might be possible to extrapolate out principles 
that can also be used when addressing these other conflicts. Of particular note are 
the issues surrounding carbon taxes and border tax adjustments, and anti-dumping 
rules.  
 
A carbon tax is a tax on producers for emissions caused during the production 
process.664 Border tax adjustments are a way to attempt to eliminate the 
advantages that exporters might gain if they come from a country which is not 
seeking to taking action against climate change.665 In other words, border tax 
adjustments are an attempt to “level the playing field”.666 Again, though, such 
environmental measures could run afoul of WTO laws, particularly Article I and 
III of the GATT 1994.667 Border tax adjustments could be considered an “internal 
tax or other internal charge” under Article III(2) of the GATT and would therefore 
run the risk of being prohibited since domestic products are not subject to the 
same tax.668 The threat of WTO action is not just an academic question when 
considering border tax adjustments, since the New Zealand's government position 
on them is that they are an undesirable option, partly because of the perceived risk 
of being in conflict with WTO rules.669 
 
Carbon taxes could also become a retaliatory measure against countries that do 
not pull their weight in addressing climate change. The idea was put forward by 
the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who suggested that if the United 
States left the Paris Agreement then the European Union should impose carbon 
                                                 
664 Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli (ed) International Trade Regulation and 
the Mitigation of Climate Change – World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press: New 
York, 2009) at 60.  
665 G. R Milner-White 'Kyoto v WTO: Carbon Tariffs – Addressing Conflict Between the Kyoto 
Protocol and International Trade Rules' (2009) 13 NZJEL 37 at 55.  
666 Milner-White, above n 665, at 38.  
667 Milner-White, above n 665, at 56.  
668 Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, above n 664, at 61.  
669 Milner-White, above n 665, at 61.  
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taxes on American goods.670 Scott Lincicome of the Cato Institute argues that such 
an approach would be inconsistent with WTO law,671 and Sarkozy was ultimately 
defeated in his campaign to return as French President, so the idea would appear 
dead. However, it might be the case that Sarkozy has opened Pandora's Box, and 
carbon taxes may be used in the future to ensure states come to the table when 
discussing international environmental action.  
 
Ultimately, a carbon tax when being discussed under Article III will involve many 
of the same issues as already outlined above when discussing “like products”. 
Therefore, any change in interpretation of “like products” to make it more 
environmentally friendly will also make WTO law more hospitable to carbon 
taxes, at least regarding Article III and carbon taxes used as border adjustment 
mechanisms. A carbon tax used in the way envisioned by Sarkozy will run into 
difficulties under Article I and the Most Favoured Nation treatment. However, 
while the idea of carbon taxes as an environmental weapon was worth comment, 
this thesis does not have the space to dedicate a detailed analysis to any issue with 
Article I that it may run into.  
 
Anti-dumping and climate change issues are highlighted by the recent dispute 
between the European Union and China, where China were producing a glut of 
solar panels and then concentrating on export-based policies.672 The concept of 
anti-dumping is covered by Article VI of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. They allow member states to implement anti-dumping measures if 
products are being dumped into their market and is causing material injury or 
threat to domestic industries who are producing like products.673 However, as 
Kulovesi notes, there is the potential where anti-dumping measures are actually 
hurting climate change action, since the Chinese solar panels may be beneficial 
for European environmental policies.674 Essentially, anti-dumping measures could 
ultimately lead to increase costs and making renewable energy more expensive, 
                                                 
670 Robbie Gramer, 'Can Europe Tax the US for Axing the Paris Climate Change Deal' (14 
November 2016) Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/14/can-europe-tax-the-u-s-
for-axing-the-paris-climate-change-deal/>. 
671 Gramer, above n 670.  
672 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 349.  
673 Kulovesi, above n 423, at 350.  
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which in terms of climate change mitigation would be unproductive.675  
 
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind, that there are other potential conflicts 
between WTO laws and climate change mitigation than in just the areas that were 
considered in-depth in the above literature review.  
Conclusion 
As is apparent, there is the potential for numerous hard and soft conflicts between 
WTO laws and measures that might be taken to combat climate change. The 
current interpretation of Article III could lead to many conflicts with 
environmental measures that focus on trying to reduce emissions or increase 
efficiency by favouring more environmentally friendly version of products. 
Article XX may provide an exception for those measures and therefore avoid any 
conflicts. However, this is not a foregone conclusion considering the limitations of 
the chapeau. Further, even if Article XX might salvage environmental measures, it 
could still hamstring them by reducing their effectiveness to make sure they are 
consistent with the chapeau. In effect, even the environmentally friendly Article 
XX could still cause soft conflicts and reduce the effectiveness of environmental 
measures. However, it must be noted that, as Brazil – Retreaded Tyres showed, the 
chapeau could actually increase the effectiveness of environmental measures by 
requiring countries to dispense with preferential exceptions to climate change 
action.  
 
The sense of conflict is even more pronounced when considering the subject of 
subsidies and the SCM Agreement. While Canada – Renewable Energy managed 
to avoid an open conflict between trade law and a crucial environmental measure, 
academia is united in its stance that the decision cannot logically stand. Without 
some sort of legal space for environmental subsidies, there will be conflict 
between trade and climate change reform unless countries simply agree not to take 
action they are rightfully allowed to undertake.  
 
However, not all potential conflicts are necessarily unwelcome developments. 
Local content requirements would appear to have limited usefulness in combating 
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climate change and helping the environment. Meanwhile, they are a potential 
breeding ground for increased protectionism in the global arena. Therefore, it is 
not necessarily a problem or a cause for concern if WTO law comes into conflict 
with local content requirements. Therefore, not all conflicts are created equal. 
However, the conflicts surrounding Article III, Article XX and the SCM 
Agreement are cause for concern and if the planet is to tackle climate change, then 
those conflicts will need to be addressed. Further, a way forward in addressing 
those conflicts might provide a template for dealing with any other areas of 
concern, such as if carbon taxes become more prevalent in the global arena.  
 
Chapter IV – Incorporating Environmental Action into WTO Law – 
Mutual Supportiveness 
The easiest way to address these conflicts between climate change measures and 
trade law would be treaty change. This is, in so many words, the “magic wand” 
option. If we lived in an ideal world, we could wave a magic wand and change the 
WTO treaties in a way friendlier to environmental measures. For instance, this 
may be done by reintroducing the idea of non-actionable subsidies and the traffic 
light ideal to the SCM Agreement, and inserting a new, far more wide-reaching 
exception to the GATT concerned with measures taken to address climate change. 
This would be the gold standard for climate change action. 
 
It is also incredibly unlikely. The prospects for any legislative solution to emerge 
in response to such issues like climate change are regarded as “low”.676 The 
Committee on Trade and Environment was designed to make recommendations 
make changes to the WTO rulebook and yet it has now largely fallen “into 
hibernation”.677 Even when the CTE has put forward proposal or discussed ideas, 
there has been “no real progress” on the matter.678 As Pietro Castagno noted when 
discussing amending Article XX, treaty change is seen as the last resort.679 In the 
face of the stalled Doha round and without any suggestion there may be a desire 
to undertake treaty change, it is suggested, for now, it must be written off as a way 
                                                 
676 Sivan Shlomo-Agon, ‘Clearing the Smoke: The Legitimation of Judicial Power at the WTO’ 
(2015) 49(4) JWT 539 at 540.  
677 Quick, above n 271, at 959.  
678 Quick, above n 271, at 961.  
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forward. As the potential threat of climate change looms over us, we need to be 
able to take urgent action.  
 
Therefore, the only realistic conclusion is that action must be taken under the 
current legal regime of the WTO and its treaties, and how those laws are 
interpreted by panels and the Appellate Body. This is not a new suggestion. In 
fact, it is possible to say that the Appellate Body has already been doing such a 
thing successfully, having a “profound impact” in the field of trade and 
environment.680 It jurisdiction has expanded into previously unexplored issues.681 
As the review above shows, the Appellate Body has already made several decision 
that would seem to extend interpretation in a way that is favourable to 
environmental arguments, whether it be EC – Asbestos and “likeness”, the 
broadening of Article XX, or the question of subsidies in Canada – Renewable 
Energy. The Appellate Body has shown itself willing to take reasonably bold 
interpretative steps.  
 
However, it would be reckless to think this would be without opposition. Three 
former Director-Generals of GATT/WTO have said that the DSU is not the right 
forum to address environmental concerns, noting that “the WTO cannot be used as 
a Christmas tree on which to hang any and every good cause that might be 
secured by exercising trade power.”682 They also stated, though, that branches of 
trade law cannot be “lopped off” just because they intersect with some other 
public policy.683 Essentially, this statement from the former Director-Generals 
suggest Matsushita and his co-authors were right in saying that the Appellate 
Body’s reluctance to tackle issues like PPMs may stem from a belief that the 
GATT is for international trade and economic concerns and that to consider non-
economic concerns would upset the status quo that the WTO and member states 
are content with.684  
 
                                                 
680 Quick, above n 271, at 980-981.  
681 Shlomo-Agon, above n 676, at 539.  
682 Arthur Dunkel, Peter Sutherland & Renato Ruggiero ‘Joint statement on the multilateral 
trading system’ (1 February 2001), World Trade Organization 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/jointstatdavos_jan01_e.htm>. 
683 Dunkel, above 682 x.  
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Considering this expansion and proclaimed doubt, the issue of legitimacy and 
judicial activism is an important one to consider. WTO practitioners are aware that 
once the WTO starts making decisions on non-trade factors, such as climate 
change measures, then a backlash might occur, with people wondering why the 
WTO should decide instead of democratic states.685 Indeed, a criticism that has 
been made against the Appellate Body is that it has exceeded its authority when 
deciding on certain cases.686  
 
This is further exacerbated by the fact that there is the potential for there to be a 
“deep-rooted institutional deficit of the WTO framework in the context of the 
tension between ‘judicial interpretation’ v. ‘authoritative interpretation.”687 While 
strictly speaking, the authoritative interpretation of WTO Agreements is vested 
with the Ministerial Conference and General Council only, they require a three-
fourth majority from all members and no authoritative interpretation has been 
made.688 This means, even if they could be changed by the Ministerial Conference 
or General Council, they are unlikely to be and as such interpretations by the 
Appellate Body have a de facto finality to them as interpretations of law.689 
Therefore, “any activist move from panels and the Appellate Body will certainly 
raise legitimacy question and inevitable carry significant implications.”690 
 
It is therefore suggested that it is important that any change in interpretation 
comes about from a consistent, interpretative principle, rather than an 
inconsistent, slapdash approach that will bring into disrepute the standing of the 
Appellate Body and, by extension, the DSU. The academic response to the 
Appellate Body decision in Canada – Renewable Energy informs that opinion, 
where an inconsistent decision has largely been picked apart by writers. Further, 
while the Appellate Body cannot add or diminish rights and obligations set down 
in WTO agreements,691 as long as the Appellate Body is interpreting provisions 
under the customary rules of treaty interpretation then they are not “adding or 
                                                 
685 Shlomo-Agon, above n 676, at 541.  
686 Howse, above n 20, at 12.  
687 Guan, above n 269, at 251.  
688 Guan, above n 269, at 251-252.  
689 Howse, above n 20, at 15.  
690 Guan, above n 269, at 252-253.  
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diminishing to existing obligations”.692 Therefore, any interpretation principle 
must have some basis in the customary rules of treaty interpretation. There is also 
a safety valve. If WTO members disagree overwhelmingly with this new principle 
of interpretation then they can clarify this through an authoritative interpretation, 
however difficult this might be.693  
 
Fortunately, a consistent approach in incorporating environmental concerns into 
the Appellate Body’s reasoning may be found through the principle of mutual 
supportiveness. Some solid groundwork on mutual supportiveness has been set 
down by Laura Stuart, and this paper intends to build on it, and then extend it 
even further to allow it to become a fully-fledged interpretative tool for the 
Appellate Body. Mutual supportiveness is the principle that the international 
community can go further than just avoiding conflicts between trade and 
environment, but rather develop “policies and laws in a ‘mutually supportive’ 
manner in order to protect the environment whilst upholding an open and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system.”694 It allows the common objectives of 
both trade and the environment to be achieved.695  
 
As a concept, mutual supportiveness is supported by several factors. Firstly, the 
UN has stressed since 1992 that economic growth and environmental protection 
should be “mutually supportive”.696 In more trade specific language, the WTO has 
“emphasized that the goals of trade liberalization and sustainable development are 
mutually supportive.”697 The Committee on Trade and Environment in 1996 
endorsed the view that multilateral solutions to environmental problems were 
appropriate and that there could be a mutually supportive relationship between 
MEAs and the WTO agreements.698 Any discussion of mutual supportiveness is 
enhanced by the fact that sustainable development is enshrined as a concept in the 
                                                 
692 Howse, above n 20, at 15.  
693 Howse, above n 20, at 16.  
694 Laura Stuart 'Trade and Environment: A Mutually Supportive Interpretation of WTO 
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preamble of the WTO Agreement.699 As a principle, mutual supportiveness works 
in the same area that says trade and environmental protection are both beneficial 
and crucial to society going forward.700  
 
Stuart proposes that mutual supportiveness can be both a foundation of policy 
development within the WTO, but more importantly for this paper, she also 
suggests that mutual supportiveness could be used as an interpretative tool when 
deciding on environmentally-related trade disputes.701  A mutually supportive 
interpretation would involve a Panel or the Appellate Body to consider the object 
and purpose of the WTO agreements in light of the wider context, including the 
rising concern about the environment, expressed by the increasing numbers of 
MEAs being created to protect and preserve it.702  
 
Essentially, at its heart, a mutually supportive interpretation is one that avoids 
conflict between WTO law and MEAs. However, it is proposed that mutual 
supportiveness can be taken further, being used in trade plus environmental 
dispute even where there might not be an explicit MEA that may be in conflict. 
First, the Paris Agreement requires states to detail their emissions reductions in 
their NDCs.703 It must be acknowledged, though, that it is doubtful if the actual 
goals of the NDCs are binding. The legally binding obligations are procedural in 
nature, such as provisions to submit NDCs once every five years,704 rather than on 
the actual subject of implementation.705 The impetus behind implementing the 
contents of the NDCs will be through more “economic, social and political 
obligations” rather than any legal obligations. 706  Regardless, it would undermine 
the spirit of the Paris Agreement, if not its law, for the WTO to block states’ 
attempt to reduce their emissions in line with their NDCs. Such a position is not 
mutually supportive. Secondly, sustainable development is embedded in the WTO 
Agreement itself.707 Therefore, there is an argument that a mutually supportive 
                                                 
699 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, above n 110, preamble.  
700 Matsushita, above n 1, at 716. 
701 Stuart, above n 694, at 382.  
702 Stuart, above n 694, at 396.  
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705 Bodansky, above n 74, at 146-147; Voigt, above n 82, at 161.  
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definition is required to give effect to the sustainable development principle of the 
WTO, even if there were no other MEAs involved. It is proposed then that a 
mutually supportive interpretation could be used when dealing with all trade plus 
environmental disputes.  
 
The question is, though, if panels and the Appellate Body have the jurisdiction to 
adopt a new interpretative tool into their arsenal. The key provision is Article 3(2) 
of the DSU. It has been crucial in allowing panels and the Appellate Body to 
assert its role as being judicial in nature.708 The Article itself reads that the Dispute 
Settlement System is “to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”709 
Essentially, Article 3(2) of the DSU sets down that the WTO is not an island, but 
rather a part of a wide set of international institutions that make up international 
law.710 This was confirmed by the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline, where they 
noted that Article 3(2) of the DSU directs the Appellate Body to ensure that WTO 
law is “not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.”711 
Therefore, Article 3(2) provides confirmation that panels and the Appellate Body 
can decide on how WTO covered agreements are interpreted, taking into account 
public international law, as long as they are consistent with these customary 
rules.712 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) has partially 
codified the customary principles of treaty interpretation.713  
 
The use of the VCLT is not unchallenged, though, based on the idea that it is 
“unreasonable, if not impossible, for a treaty created in Vienna in 1969 to codify 
interpretative rules of a treaty framework founded in 1995”, especially when not 
all WTO members are a party to the VCLT.714 Further, the VCLT's drafting history 
suggests it was “never intended to be a full codification” of law.715 However, there 
is the risk of not seeing the wood from the trees when discussing the exact place 
                                                 
708 Isabelle Van Damme, 'Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body' (2010) 21(3) EJIL 
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709 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, art 3(2).  
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of the VCLT in treaty interpretation. Article 3(2) does not necessarily mean that 
the customary rules of interpretation are the only factor of public international law 
that needs to be considered.  
 
The Panel in Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement rejected such 
a stance, saying that Article 3(2) does not mean that all other international law 
except from the customary rules of interpretation are excluded.716 Rather, if the 
WTO wanted to exclude certain parts of international law, then it had to exclude 
those within the treaty.717 This is because WTO law is just one branch of public 
international law itself.718 Therefore, while Article 31 to 33 of the VLCT are well-
established as codifying the principles of customary rules in WTO 
jurisprudence,719 the Appellate Body is now increasingly also taking note of non-
codified principles of treaty interpretation as well.720 In fact, as Isabella Van 
Damme notes, the Appellate Body is gaining in confidence, often adopting a more 
flexible approach with less reference to the VCLT.721 This is demonstrated, for 
example, by the Appellate Body’s decision in Japan – DRAMs (Korea) which 
began their analysis straight from the SCM Agreement, without reference to the 
VCLT.722   
 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT sets down that the starting point of any interpretation 
must be the actual terms of the test.723 This is used by the Appellate Body, who 
usually takes its starting point as the ordinary meaning of the term in question.724 
This does not necessarily mean a dictionary meaning is particularly useful, as the 
Appellate Body noted in EC – Asbestos, “dictionary meanings leave many 
interpretive questions open.”725 The Panel’s over-reliance with dictionary meaning 
                                                 
716 Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 June 2000 
(Report of the Panel) at [7.96].  
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in US – Gambling was criticised by the Appellate Body.726 Instead of 
concentrating solely on dictionary meanings, the Appellate Body said in EC – 
Chicken Cuts that the ordinary meaning should be ascertained according to the 
particular circumstances of the case, taking into account the intention of the 
parties and the “particular circumstances” of the case.727 Such a comment would 
appear to provide breathing room for mutually supportive interpretations. In 
climate change issues, the particular circumstances of the case may involve 
MEAs, such as the Paris Agreement, but it is also suggested that the considerable 
threat of climate change, coupled with the WTO's desire for sustainable 
development, could also be a “particular circumstance”. However, this does limit 
mutual supportiveness only to cases where there is a genuine environmental or 
climate change factor to consider.  
 
An instrumental aspect of confirming and justifying interpretations is the “object 
and purpose of the treaty”.728 It is here where Stuart sees a basis for mutually 
supportive interpretations to flourish.729 While the purpose cannot form “an 
independent basis for interpretation”, it is still an important factor.730 Since one of 
the objectives of the WTO Agreement is sustainable development, provisions need 
to be interpreted in a manner consistent with environmental objectives.731 Of 
course, sustainable development is not the only objective. Indeed, the Appellate 
Body has noted that most treaties do not have one single object or purpose, but 
rather numerous and sometimes competing objectives, especially the WTO 
Agreement.732 Therefore, it appears that the ordinary meaning must by consistent 
with the object and purpose of all other relevant elements of the treaties. For 
instance, an interpretation of Article XX(g) “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources” could not be so broad “as seriously to subvert the 
purpose and object of Article III:4”.733  
                                                 
726 US – Gambling, above n 350, at [166].   
727 European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 
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The case of EC – Chicken Cuts considered the relationship between the object and 
purpose of the entire provision and the object and purpose of individual 
provisions.734 The Appellate Body said that the “object and purpose” of the treaty 
in its entirety is a starting point, and that the purpose of certain provisions can 
inform the purpose of the treaty as a whole, and vice versa.735 Van Damme 
characterises this comment as the Appellate Body saying there needs to be a sense 
of harmony between the object and purpose of the treaty, and the object and 
purpose of a provision.736 Again, it is suggested that this aspect of customary law 
on treaty interpretation is compatible with mutually supportive interpretations. 
Sustainable development is an objective of the WTO Agreement. If an 
interpretation does not go so far as to make sustainable development more 
important than the other objectives of the agreement, then it should be a legitimate 
and justified step in interpretations.  
 
Another consideration is effectiveness.737 The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline 
noted that “an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”738 
While the principle of effective interpretation is a part of customary international 
law on treaty interpretation,739 the Panel in US – Gambling said that it was also a 
part of the good faith principle in Article 31(1) of the VLCT since an 
interpretation “should not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”740 Effectiveness has other beneficial elements as a principle of 
interpretation. It assists in allowing an evolutionary interpretation of the treaty to 
occur since “the treaty must remain effective rather than ineffective” and as such, 
the interpretation of the treaty may need to evolve to ensure this occurs.741 
Further, it assists in making sure that treaty interpretation is kept intellectually 
                                                 
734 Van Damme, above n 708, at 632.  
735 EC – Chicken Cuts, above n 727, at [238]. 
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coherent by ensuring that there are no contradictions.742  
 
It is here, when discussing effectiveness, that another argument in favour of 
mutually supportive interpretations to ensure sustainable development can be 
made. As mentioned at the very start of this paper, the consequences of climate 
change could lead to both huge human and economic costs. The annual cost could 
be up to 20% of world GDP,743 and the reality is no one can really know how high 
the price of climate change might end up being.744  Good faith and effectiveness 
as principles mean that interpretations should not lead to results, which are 
“manifestly absurd or unreasonable”.745 It is arguably “unreasonable” or even 
“absurd” that WTO laws could stop countries from taking action against climate 
change, which if not taken could lead to a disruption in international trade, 
therefore limiting the effectiveness of the purpose of the WTO. On its own, this 
argument is a long bow to draw. However, as merely one side factor in favour of 
mutual supportiveness, coupled with the more substantial points of sustainable 
development as an object of the WTO, and the existence of other multilateral 
environmental agreements, the idea of mutual supportiveness is strengthened.  
 
Considering these interpretative rules for the WTO, the question becomes if 
mutual supportiveness can be used as an interpretative tool? The answer appears 
to be yes. Stuart certainly appears to agree. She makes the argument that Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention provides a way for panels to incorporate the 
principle of mutual supportiveness into treaty interpretation since it requires 
treaties to be interpreted in “good faith” and to consider “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”746 In light of 
this, panels could take a mutually supportive approach by interpreting WTO rules 
in a way consistent with international environment law, which would then give 
effect to the WTO objective of sustainable development.747 MEAs can therefore 
be considered when the subject matter is directly relevant to the issue in 
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dispute.748 
 
However, mutual supportiveness can go beyond what is suggested by Stuart. One 
of the purposes of the WTO Agreement is sustainable development, as set out in 
the preamble. According to the VCLT, an important consideration for 
interpretations is the purpose or objective of the treaty. Therefore, sustainable 
development, through mutual supportiveness, should inform any interpretation of 
WTO laws, even when there are no direct conflicts with MEAs to consider.  
 
As long as a mutually supportive interpretation fits within the customary rules of 
interpretation, and are therefore unlikely to add or diminish WTO rights or 
obligations,749 then there should be no reason why it cannot be utilised throughout 
the DSU process. Therefore, it is proposed that a way to alleviate conflict between 
trade rules and climate change-related measures is for panels and the Appellate 
Body to consider mutually supportive interpretations, based on not just relevant 
MEAs, but also mutually supportive to the concept of sustainable development 
itself.  
 
Chapter V – Mutual Supportiveness' Potential 
Mutual supportiveness therefore has many attractive elements to it. As 
demonstrated above, using mutual supportiveness as an interpretative tool can be 
said to fit within the pre-existing rules of interpretation for the Appellate Body 
and panels. Further, unlike comprehensive treaty reform, mutual supportiveness 
can be used from tomorrow as an interpretative tool. It would not need to be 
incorporated into some future trade round. Instead, the Appellate Body could just 
begin to use it as a part of their method of interpretation without any formal 
trigger. Therefore, mutual supportiveness has considerable benefits for it as a tool 
to help resolve conflict between climate change measures and WTO laws.  
 
This paper identified three areas where conflicts may exist: Article III and 
measures that tackle the efficiency of a product (as well as carbon taxes), Article 
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XX and how the general exceptions are used, and environmental subsidies and the 
SCM Agreement. Each area has interpretative questions that would have to be 
resolved to allow climate change measures to become consistent with WTO law. 
The question is how far mutual supportiveness can go in resolving those conflicts.  
Article III and “Like Products” 
Article III could be a considerable roadblock for WTO members who want to 
tackle climate change through environmental measures. Both efficiency-based 
differentiation on goods, and potential carbon taxes, are just the main examples of 
measures that might be limited or blocked by the enforcement of WTO law. For 
instance, a state may want to phase out the sales of certain inefficient goods or 
impose a carbon tax as a part of their NDC under the Paris Agreement. However, 
these measures may struggle to avoid coming into conflict with Article III. This is 
because they may differentiate between products that for all appearances, 
including the Appellate Body's four step assessment for likeness, look to be “like 
products”. However, if climate change is to be addressed and potential severe 
consequences are to be avoided, then these measures need to be given a certain 
amount of breathing room in WTO law. As stated above, the most practical and 
preferable way to approach this is through a mutually supportive interpretation of 
“like products”.  
 
Before considering how this can occur, it is important to address Article XX. 
Article XX provides exceptions for these measures to survive, however this still 
might not be enough room for climate change measures. Further, as will be 
discussed later, it is suggested that it would be problematic and dangerous to 
broaden the Article XX exceptions much further. They are already quite liberal 
with only the chapeau serving as a narrow door. Therefore, it may be preferable to 
“fix” Article III, rather than just ballooning Article XX out until it is so wide, it 
threatens to undermine WTO law.  
 
There are two potential mutually supportive interpretations that may make Article 
III friendlier to climate change measures. First, the long-running issue of PPMs 
could be tackled, broadening the meaning of “like products” by taking into 
account their PPMs, and also the emissions that they cause while being used, as a 
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part of their physical properties and consumers' preference. Secondly, there could 
be some type of “intent” test reincorporated into Article III, like the old “aims and 
effect” test. This paper proposes that, in terms of a mutually supportive 
interpretation, the latter option is preferable.  
 
That is not the equivalent of saying that the issue of PPMs could not be 
satisfactorily solved. As both Howse and Pauwelyn argue, this could be done by 
considering the preferences of consumers.750 The point is essentially that as 
climate change becomes more of a problem, consumers will begin to differentiate 
products in accordance with their impact on the planet via their PPMs.751 
Essentially, as people come to terms with the potential consequences of 
greenhouse emissions, they will buy goods, such as appliances, which have been 
produced in an environmentally friendly way. There is a problem in this argument, 
though, and that is highlighted by the Appellate Body's decision in US – Clove 
Cigarettes.752  
 
US – Clove Cigarettes is a case that involved Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, 
rather than Article III of the GATT. However, the Appellate Body noted the 
similarities between the two provisions in the interpretation of “like products”, 
and also took guidance from an earlier decision, Philippines – Distilled Spirits, 
which was a case involving Article III.753 Ultimately, the Appellate Body said 
that:754 
 
it is not necessary to demonstrate that the products are 
substitutable for all consumers or that they actually compete in 
the entire market. Rather, if the products are highly substitutable 
for some consumers but not for others, this may also support a 
finding that the products are like. 
 
This is a genuine problem to the Howse and Paulwelyn argument about 
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WT/DS406/AB/R, 24 April 2012 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
753 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 752, at 143.  
754 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 752, at 142.  
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consumers' preference and PPMs. Some consumers do not accept that climate 
change exists. Some may believe in climate change, but will not change their 
preferences. Therefore, to some consumers, energy efficient and non-efficient 
products are still “highly substitutable” and therefore that will support a 
conclusion that products are alike despite their differences in PPMs. This does not 
mean that Howse and Pauwelyn's arguments are untenable; it just means that there 
is another aspect of Appellate Body interpretation that would have to change. A 
threshold would have to be set for how large a segment of consumers could get 
without factoring into the Appellate Body's thinking.  
 
On the other hand, the “physical properties of the product” could be broadened to 
include emissions caused via the use of the product, in a similar way to how 
alcoholic content has once been used.755 It is suggested that this is more viable 
than considering PPMs using this argument. The carbon content of the production 
process is not inherent to the product.756 However, there is a far stronger argument 
in suggesting that the carbon footprint of a product’s lifetime of use is inherently a 
physical property of the product itself. The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos said 
that the “physical properties of the product” is intended to “cover the physical 
qualities and characteristics of the products”.757 The carbon footprint of a product 
when it is used is clearly a characteristic of that product. Further, the Appellate 
Body noted that those physical properties “that are likely to influence the 
competitive relationship between products in the marketplace” in particular are of 
importance to the assessment.758 Companies have begun to advertise their goods 
and services on the basis of their environmental friendliness and their carbon 
footprints. As such, it seems there is ample room to consider a product's carbon 
footprint during its lifetime of use as a “physical property” that must be assessed. 
Therefore, without little interpretative change, there could be a successful 
argument that under the first head of the “likeness” assessment, an energy 
efficient product and another version of that product which is inefficient (such as 
fridges), are in fact not “like products”.  
 
                                                 
755 US – Malt Beverages, above n 260, at [5.71]-[5.73].  
756 Condon, above n 238, at 909-910.  
757 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at 110.  
758 EC – Asbestos, above n 148, at 114.  
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As such, it would appear that there are potential ways to interpret “like product” 
in a mutually supportive way that relies on the actual likeness of the product itself. 
PPMs would be considered via the way consumers prefer goods that have been 
produced in an environmentally friendly way. Meanwhile, the energy efficiency of 
a product would be a factor of its physical properties. It would be two 
interpretative changes that would appear to make Article III mutually supportive 
with the concept of sustainable development and environmental agreements. 
However, it is still suggested it is not the best way to go forward.   
 
First, there is the fact that such an interpretation will be going against previous 
jurisprudence. While this is not a fatal flaw, and will be discussed later when 
considering an “intent test”, it is suggested that if the Appellate Body is going to 
take a controversial interpretation, it should be an interpretation that is guaranteed 
to work. This is not the case here. It is hard to get over the point made by 
academics such as Quick, Lau, Marceau and Trachtman that identical products 
cannot be differentiated by consumers’ preferences alone.759 There would likely 
need to be some other difference to make the products “unlike”, which cannot be 
guaranteed. Further, there is the risk of abuse since consumers’ preferences can be 
manipulated by government and therefore used as a potential shield for 
protectionism.760 Finally, it places climate change reform at the whims of 
consumers. Consumers may not factor in environmental measures when 
purchasing, even if they are aware of the consequences of climate change. It is 
easier for consumers, with pinched wallets, to not consider a more energy efficient 
item even if it is vital that they should do so. When considering the comments of 
US – Clove Cigarettes, it means that consumers might defeat PPMs making 
products unlike. Therefore, while this mutually supportive interpretation could 
potentially work, its effectiveness is questionable.  
 
Ultimately, Bernasconi-Osterwalder and her co-writers suggest that something 
like the “aims and effect” test is necessary if PPMs are going to be an Article III 
consideration.761 The intersection between an “intent test” and PPMs is an 
                                                 
759 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 432; Marceau and Trachtman, above n 253, at 859.  
760 Quick and Lau, above n 166, at 432-433.  
761 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, above n 140, at 210.  
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important one to consider, because there is a risk of inventing an interpretation 
that is not needed. An “intent test” would also give room for climate change 
measures concerned with PPMs. However, a PPMs friendly interpretation of 
Article III does not necessarily do much good for anything other than PPMs 
factors. Therefore, it seems only sensible to see if a mutually supportive 
interpretation of Article III can be constructed that would take introduce some sort 
of “intent test”. 
 
It is important to note that unlike the PPMs issue, where jurisprudence has 
stubbornly ignored all attempt to factor it in,762 Article III did used to have an 
“intent test” in the form of the “aims and effect” test, which was expressed by a 
Panel in US – Taxes on Automobiles.763  This test came about because Article III:1 
notes that Article III is concerned with domestic laws and taxes being applied “so 
as to afford protection to domestic production”. Therefore, if states were applying 
measures, but not in a way that afforded protection to domestic products, then 
Article III had not been breached. It is a test that gave context to Article III as 
being “an obligation not to discriminate” but not condoning all deregulations.764 
The “so as to afford protection to domestic production” seems like an important 
foundation on which to build a mutually supportive interpretation.  
 
However, the elephant in the room must be addressed. The Appellate Body has 
already struck down the idea of such a test in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. The 
Appellate Body essentially declared intent an irrelevant consideration, noting that 
it “does not matter” even if the member state had no intention to engage in 
protectionism.765 Therefore, if an “intent test” is to be revived, the concerns of the 
Appellate Body from that decision must be overcome.  
 
It is important to note that the Appellate Body's jurisprudence lies somewhere 
between the traditional positions of common law and civil law when considering 
the doctrine of precedence. In a common law system, under stare decisis, the 
                                                 
762  Matsushita, above n 1, at 190.  
763  US – Taxes on Automobiles, above n 184, at [5.10].  
764  Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 291.  
765 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 27-28.  
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ruling of courts have binding power over lower or equal courts.766 However, in a 
civil law system, often it is the rule that no judge can establish a legally binding 
precedent.767 Rulings of the Appellate Body fall somewhere in the middle. Like a 
civil law system, the DSU sets down that the Appellate Body's decision is only 
binding on the “parties to the dispute.”768 An earlier Appellate Body decision is 
not binding on some future dispute. However, the Appellate Body has suggested 
in both Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and United States – Stainless Steel 
(Mexico) that there may be some slight resemblance of stare decisis in the DSU 
system.769  
 
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body noted that while adopted 
reports are not binding outside of their specific dispute, they are “often considered 
by subsequent panels” and “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, 
and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.”770 More recently, in United States – Stainless Steel (Mexico),771 the 
Appellate Body has been even stronger in its desire for some semblance of stare 
decisis. The Appellate Body stressed the need for “consistency and stability” and 
“security and predictability.”772 They spoke harshly of the Panel's failure to 
“follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issue.”773 
Ultimately, the Appellate Body concluded that they were:774 
 
deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from 
well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the 
interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel's approach has 
serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO 
dispute settlement system, as explained above.  
 
                                                 
766 Woraboon Luanratana & Alessandro Romano, 'Stare Decisis in the WTO: Myth, Dream, or a 
Siren's Song' (2014) 48(4) JWT 773 at 775-776.  
767 Luanratana, above n 766, at 776.  
768 Dispute Settlement Understanding, above n 9, art 17(14).  
769 Luanratana, above n 766, at 776.  
770 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 14.  
771 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, 20 May 2008 (Report of the Appellate Body).  
772 US – Stainless Steel, above n 771, at [161].  
773 US – Stainless Steel, above n 771, at [161].  
774 US – Stainless Steel, above n 771, at [162].  
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Therefore, the Appellate Body has shown a strong desire for panels to follow their 
decisions, and for there to be consistency and predictability in decisions under the 
DSU. However, ultimately the Appellate Body decisions are only binding on the 
specific dispute being heard. Therefore, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II's disdain 
for an “intent test” for Article III does not have to be followed. In fact, the 
circumstances of that decision, involving alcohol around twenty years ago, are 
vastly different to the discussion of climate change and environmental measures 
now. As such, the Appellate Body is not beholden to that previous decision.  
 
The words of Justice Abraham in the International Court of Justice case, 
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom),775 seem 
appropriate to mention, however. The Justice noted that while it is a judicial 
imperative to be “highly consistent in its jurisprudence”, ultimately “precedent is 
not inviolate” and the Court has the right to “change course or overturn its 
jurisprudence if, exceptionally, it considers that there are compelling reasons to do 
so.”776 In light of the Appellate Body’s desire for there to be consistency and 
predictability, echoed by Justice Abraham’s comments in the International Court 
of Justice, it seems appropriate to consider Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and 
why it should not be followed, instead of choosing to ignore it altogether.  
 
The Appellate Body’s rejection of the “aims and effect” test was founded in both 
the test’s failure to consider protectionism as a key principle, and the idea that 
“government intent was too subjective.”777 The first concern seems more readily 
fixed by ensuring any test still factors protectionism into the mix. The main issue 
is the Appellate Body’s desire to stay far away from the question of “subjective 
intentions”.778 The Appellate Body has noted in Chile – Alcoholic Beverages that 
one of the reasons it does not consider subjective intentions is that they are “not 
accessible to treaty interpreters.”779 Matsushita and his co-authors suggest that the 
                                                 
775 Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to 
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections), 5 
October 2016.   
776 Declaration of President Abraham, above n 776, at 10-11.  
777 Lydgate, above n 162, at 438.  
778 Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 192, at [62].  
779 Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 192, at [62]. 
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Appellate Body does not want to delve into the workings of member states, some 
of them being dictatorships and military governments.780 This is all well and good, 
but it is suggested that such an approach is a question of taking the easiest route, 
and not necessarily the correct one.  
 
Article III: 1 informs the interpretation of Article III and the phrase “so as to 
afford protection to domestic production” is an important factor of any 
interpretation. If a member state does not intend to protect domestic industries, but 
is rather trying to tackle climate change, then has Article III really been breached? 
This thesis suggests that no real mutually supportive interpretation with 
sustainable development can exist where the Appellate Body and panels limit the 
ability for states to differentiate like products, not to engage in protectionism, but 
because there is a very real environmental need to do so. Further, member states 
may need to take certain steps to address their level of emissions and follow the 
plans set out in their NDCs under the Paris Agreement. For instance, the interim 
NDCs lodged by both the United States and the European Union note the transport 
sector is an important area to address.781 The United States explicitly discuss the 
need for fuel economy standards.782 Therefore, vehicles may have to be treated 
differently depending on their fuel efficiency. A mutually supportive interpretation 
of Article III should allow those measures room to breathe if they are intended as 
action under the Paris Agreement and not a matter of protectionism.  
 
An example of a similar approach could be seen by the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute's ('ICSID') decision of Philip Morris v. 
Uruguay.783 Uruguay had taken measures against smoking after adopting the 
World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
('FCTC'). Philip Morris took action under a Bilateral Investment Treaty between 
                                                 
780 Matsushita, above n 1, at 188.  
781 Submission by Latvia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and its 
Member States (6 March 2015) 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-
EU%20INDC.pdf>;  U.S Cover Note INDC and Accompanying Information 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20o
f%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Informatio
n.pdf>.  
782 U.S Cover Note INDC and Accompanying Information, above n 782.  
783 Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay ARB/10/7, 8 July 2016.  
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Switzerland and Uruguay, with one such argument being that the measures were 
arbitrary. The ICSID noted several aspects when ruling in favour of Uruguay. 
First, the measures taken by Uruguay were recognised as measures that were 
effective in protecting public health by the WHO.784 Secondly, the measures were 
taken “in accordance” with the FCTC.785 Thirdly, an inquiry should consider 
whether “there was a manifest lack of reasons for the legislation.”786 Finally, the 
ICSID noted that the FCTC should be used as “a point of reference on the basis of 
which to determine the reasonableness of the two measures”.787 Therefore, there 
could be a situation when the Appellate Body has to decide if a measure is an act 
or protectionism or an environmental measure related to the Paris Agreement. The 
Appellate Body could use the Paris Agreement as a point of reference to decide, 
and also possibly receive information from environmental organizations as to the 
effectiveness of the measure.  
 
Ultimately, the question of divining the real intent of the member state may be 
difficult, but it is necessary to provide a mutually supportive interpretation and 
give full effect to the goal of sustainable development. Further, because the 
element of intent will become a factor due to the necessity of mutual 
supportiveness, it means that not all Article III disputes will require the Appellate 
Body to delve into the intentions of a member states. They will only have to do so 
in a situation where it is necessary to be mutually supportive with sustainable 
development or other MEAs.  
 
The Appellate Body may also be hesitant to enact an intent test because it is afraid 
of being seen as overstepping their jurisdiction and therefore calling their 
legitimacy into question.788 The Appellate Body might consider that the WTO is 
an economic forum and that member states may be unhappy with attempts to 
factor in more non-economic issues.789 Simply put, the time has come where 
climate change is an economic factor and has to be addressed, and therefore the 
latter point should be overcome, even if some dissent is raised. On the question of 
                                                 
784 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, above n 783, at [391].  
785 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, above n 783, at [395].  
786 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, above n 783, at [399].  
787 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, above n 783, at [401].  
788 Horn and Weiler, above n 145, at 143.  
789 Matsushita, above n 1, at 190.  
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legitimacy and jurisdiction, it is suggested that as long as any mutually supportive 
interpretation is made in line with the customary rules of treaty interpretation, 
then the Appellate Body or any panel would be acting within their jurisdiction and 
therefore legitimately.790 As noted above, some of the factors to take into account 
in interpretation are: the actual terms, the particular circumstances, the object and 
purpose of the treaty and the individual provision, and consistency.  
 
When considering the customary rules of interpretations, there are considerably 
strong arguments in favour of a mutually supportive interpretation that provides 
some sort of “intent test”. First, there is the object and purpose of both WTO law 
as a whole and Article III. One of the objects of the WTO Agreement is 
sustainable development.791 Therefore, when considering an interpretation, the 
Appellate Body and panels should also factor in if it is mutually supportive with 
the ideal of sustainable development. Further, and very importantly, it does not 
appear such a contradiction would contradict with the purpose of Article III. 
Article III’s purpose is stated plainly that it is to ensure domestic laws or internal 
taxes “should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.”792 Article III’s purpose is to stop 
protectionism, explaining why the Appellate Body seemed concerned that the 
“aims and effect” test did not consider the principle of protectionism enough.793 
Preventing protectionism and ensuring sustainable development are not exclusive 
of each other, though. If a state is genuinely taking action due to an environmental 
reason, and is not concerned with domestic production at all, then it is not 
engaging in protectionism even if that might require differing treatment of 
products that could be regarded as like.  
 
This would also seem to go to the heart of the question of what the member states 
intended when they signed up to the GATT. It seems far-fetched to suggest that 
states intended to sign away their rights to regulate products when considering 
Article III but rather, they were intending to limit protectionism on the global 
                                                 
790  Howse, above n 20, at 15.  
791  Agreement on the Establishing of the World Trade Organization, above n 110, preamble.  
792  GATT, above n 6, art III.  
793  Lydgate, above n 162, at 438.  
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stage.794 Therefore, some sort of “intent test”, some test that sees if the measure in 
question is a protectionist measure or one with a genuine and legitimate regulatory 
goal, seems not only workable but actually essential to giving full effect to both 
the purpose of the treaty and also the intention of the parties when they signed it.  
 
Furthermore, an “intent test” would provide a much more consistent relationship 
between Article III of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The need 
for a consistent relationship has been stated in academia, but also by the Appellate 
Body. While noting that the two provisions are different,795 the Appellate Body 
has said that Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement “closely resembles” Article III.796 
Ultimately, the Appellate Body declared that “the two Agreements should be 
interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner.”797 It is a point that was agreed 
with by James Flett when he wrote that Article III:4 and Article 2.1 “must be 
interpreted in a coherent and consistent manner.”798 However, currently Article 2.1 
of the TBT has a built in “legitimate regulatory distinction” test. Article III does 
not, states having to rely solely on the exceptions in Article XX.  
 
This is arguably not a consistent and coherent approach. It has led to a situation 
where the TBT is an easier test to get through than the GATT,799 and therefore 
there is at least one example where a member has relied solely on the GATT to 
bring a claim, ignoring the newer TBT Agreement.800 Essentially, if the current 
interpretation stands, there is the risk that the United States will be right in saying 
that there is a “very real possibility... that Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement will 
become superfluous, and the legal approach developed in the recent TBT disputes 
will become just an historical footnote.”801 However, if Article III had an “intent 
test” as a part of its interpretation, it would be more consistent with the Article 2.1 
and its test of a “legitimate regulatory distinction.” This would satisfy the 
                                                 
794 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 291.  
795 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 752, at [101].  
796 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 752, at [99]. 
797 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 742, at [91].  
798 Flett, above n 171, at 70.  
799 Lydgate, above n 162, at 426.  
800 Lydgate, above n 162, at 443.  
801 Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, 
18 June 2014 <https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/June.18.DSB_.Ins_.final_.as-delivered.pdf>.  
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comments found in the Appellate Body's decision of US – Clove Cigarettes.802  
 
Therefore, it seems readily apparent that an “intent test” should be the mutually 
supportive interpretation of Article III. It will allow WTO members to undertake 
climate change reform, possibly in line with their NDCs under the Paris 
Agreement, and therefore will give effect to the WTO goal of sustainable 
development. It does not contradict the purpose of Article III, which is prohibiting 
protectionism. Instead, it seems to give full effect to the intention of states that 
Article III is about discouraging protectionism, but not the prohibition of all 
regulations. It would make the TBT Agreement and the GATT more consistent 
with each other. The question then becomes how such an “intent test” should be 
formulated.  
 
There are several ways that an “intent test” could be done, all of which requiring 
the Appellate Body or panel to look into the intent of the measure in dispute. First, 
the “aims and effect” test could be revived, or repackaged slightly as the “effect 
and purpose” test.803 This would require there to be “intent – actual or 
constructed” for the measure to be protectionist.804 Alternatively, “like products” 
could have both a market dimension and a policy dimension.805 Therefore, a 
product must be both “policy like” and “market like” to trigger Article III.806 
Finally, there is the more radical option of allowing the member states to 
determine the critical factor in the “likeness” of two products.807 This would allow 
a state to say that the question is if the products are alike in terms of their 
efficiency or carbon footprint.808  
 
The latter choice seems the most eye-catching and it would certainly be a boon for 
climate change reform action. However, it goes further than just creating an 
“intent test”. It changes the interpretation of Article III fundamentally. Arguments 
could be made that the test would be too susceptible for abuse. Protectionist 
                                                 
802 US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 752, at [91].  
803 Howse & Regan, above n 204, at 257; Horn & Weiler, above n 145, at 137.  
804 Horn & Weiler, above n 145, at 138.  
805 Grossman, above n 205, at 205; Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294.  
806 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294.  
807 Horn & Weiler, above n 145, at 139.  
808 Horn & Weiler, above n 145, at 140.  
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measures could be hidden as states choose alternative comparators that mask the 
real protectionist intent. Whereas a disguised restriction on trade can be stopped 
by Article XX’s chapeau when that Article is being abused, it is not clear if Article 
III:1 could serve the same purpose. Further, while it is possible such an 
interpretation could be justified under the customary rules of treaty interpretation, 
it is suggested that the Appellate Body would seem unlikely to take to such a 
radical reinterpretation, especially when considering the comments of Matsushita 
and his co-authors, and the three former Director-Generals of the WTO about their 
concerns around non-economic factors being involved in trade issues. This thesis 
is not suggesting that an alternative comparator is impossible to make work, but 
rather takes the position that the path of least resistance for the most gain is the 
ideal for any interpretation and this option does not meet that standard.  
 
While the “aims and effect” test may have familiarity going for it, the idea 
“likeness” having both a market and policy dimension seems the most sustainable 
approach going forward. The reason for that statement comes mostly down to 
trying to make intent a little easier to gauge, to make it slightly less subjective. 
The “aims and effect” test requires the Appellate Body to ascertain what the 
intention of the member state was when passing the measure. It is a task that the 
Appellant Body has been reluctant to do in the past,809 and opponents would argue 
that intent could be used to hide protectionist measures. However, the question of 
“policy likeness” could be slightly easier to decide on, following a mixed 
subjective-objective test.  
 
“Policy likeness”, as previously defined by Cosbey and Mavroidis, is a 
consideration of whether it is “desirable from an international efficiency point of 
view to treat” products alike or unlike.810 In terms of a mutually supportive 
interpretation, the phrasing could be that products are policy “unlike” where it is 
“desirable from a sustainable development viewpoint to treat products as unlike”.  
It is suggested that the mutually supportive interpretation of Article III should be 
as followed. First, the Appellate Body would consider if the products are “market 
                                                 
809 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 147, at p 29; Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, above n 192, 
at [62].  
810 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 183, at 294.  
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like”, as they currently do now. However, they would then tackle the question of if 
the products are “policy like” or if there is a genuine, non-protectionist reason for 
treating them differently. The Appellate Body should consider the reasoning given 
for the measure by the challenged member state, therefore bringing in the “intent” 
factor. However, the Appellate Body would also go further when making 
assessment. They could consider if the intent is genuine or if it is merely hiding a 
protectionist measure. The Appellate Body could take account of the international 
context to see if this type of policy difference is recognised by science or other 
members of the international community, such as if it is appearing in NDCs under 
the Paris Agreement.  
 
In effect, the new test would appear to be something very similar to that proposed 
by Grossman, Horn, and Mavroidis on one hand,811 and Lydgate on the other.812 
Such an approach would give climate change reform room to breathe, while being 
mutually supportive of both the principle of sustainable development and the 
desired goal to discourage and prohibit protectionism in order to liberalise trade.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis is suggesting that when dealing with climate change 
measures, the Appellate Body should adopt a mutually supportive interpretation of 
Article III. Such an interpretation essentially leads to a revised “aims and effect” 
test. This ensures that Article III is being interpreted to stop protectionism, but not 
prohibit genuine regulatory action. The approach being proposed is to add another 
element to the “like product” assessment, by introducing a “policy like” factor on 
top of the current market approach. This would be a mixed subjective-objective 
test to ensure that the measure in question is to combat climate change rather than 
engaging in protectionism.  
The General Exceptions of Article XX 
Broadly speaking, it is suggested that Article XX’s current interpretation is 
already mutually supportive with sustainable development and provides crucial 
room for climate change reform to breathe. Article XX(g) is a broad test, that 
                                                 
811 Grossman, above n 205, at 205; Horn & Weiler, above n 145, at 137-138; Cosbey & Mavroidis, 
above n 183, at 294.  
812 Lydgate, above n 162, at 425.  
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should be easily met by any climate change measure.813 Even the narrower Article 
XX(b) is likely to also be accessible to most climate change measures, with a 
“relative relaxation of the “necessity test””.814 Certainly, not all climate change 
measures would meet these two exceptions, but those measures that fail to meet 
(g) or (b) probably do have structural problems that need to be addressed. A 
climate change measure that fails to meet (g) probably does not have a 
corresponding measure on domestic products and such a flaw should be 
addressed. Similarly, if a climate change measure does not meet (b) then it is 
probably because there is an alternative measure that is less trade restrictive but 
just as effective. In the spirit of mutual supportiveness, the less trade restrictive 
measure should be preferred if it is equally effective.  
 
The potential issue of Article XX is around its chapeau, which is the most 
restrictive part of the Article XX process, at least for environmental concerns.815 It 
may limit member states from taking climate change action or force them to 
engage in multilateral negotiations that may be fruitless and waste valuable time. 
Arguments could be made that the chapeau needs a more mutually supportive 
interpretation. One such way might be to flip the burden of proof on the chapeau 
so that there is an assumption the chapeau has been met unless the challenging 
party can prove that it has been breached.816 However, this goes against the very 
notion that when a party is claiming a defence, it is up to them to then prove that 
defence exists.817 Further, there is the risk that if Article XX is interpreted too 
broadly then it would ultimately defeat the entire purpose of the GATT,818 a fact 
that would not be in line with the customary rules of interpretation.  
 
Ultimately, as this paper noted earlier when discussing Article XX, there are two 
ways the Appellate Body can tackle the task of minimising conflict between the 
GATT and climate change measures. First, there could be the choice of 
broadening Article XX, with the most obvious target being the chapeau, which 
could be interpreted in a more lenient way. Secondly, the substantial provisions of 
                                                 
813 Wells, above n 316, at 224; Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 147; Doelle, above n 305, at 98.  
814 Castagno, above n 320, at 146.  
815 Deane, above n 300, at 155; Doelle, above n 305, at 98.  
816 Gaines, above n 419, at 852. 
817 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 258.  
818 Wells, above n 316, at 228.  
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trade law itself, such as Article III, could be interpreted in a mutually supportive 
way so that climate change measures would not come into conflict with them. 
This paper has chosen the latter as the best way forward. It allows Article XX to 
maintain its position as an important exception with a necessary bottleneck as a 
safeguard through the chapeau.819 It also ensures that states who take climate 
change action do not have to rely on an exception, but instead can rest easier 
knowing that they have not breached a WTO obligation.  
 
However, that is not to say that there are no changes that can be made to make 
Article XX more mutually supportive toward the concept of sustainable 
development and other multilateral environmental agreements. It is suggested that 
the interpretation of “laws or regulations” in Article XX(d) could have a more 
mutually supportive interpretation that supports multilateral environmental 
agreements, like the Paris Agreement. This is highlighted by the decision of the 
Appellate Body in India – Solar Cells. In that decision, the Appellate Body ruled 
that India’s environmental obligations under international law were not “laws or 
regulations” for the purposes of Article XX(d).820 This was because they had 
failed to meet the definition found in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks which 
defined “laws or regulations” as needing to have “been incorporated into the 
domestic legal system of a WTO member or have direct effect according to that 
WTO Member’s legal system.”821 Either the international instrument had to be 
implemented by passing an “implementing instrument”,822 or the law has to have 
“direct effect” due to a country’s legal system automatically implementing 
international instruments into the domestic law.823  
 
This current interpretation would exclude certain environmental agreements, such 
as the Paris Agreement, which is a legal treaty,824 ratified by states but likely never 
to be implemented or have direct effect in a country’s legal system. Such a stance 
does not appear to be mutually supportive. One of the Paris Agreement’s 
objectives is to hold global average temperature rises to “well below” 2 degrees 
                                                 
819 Pietro Castagno, above n 320, at 151; Wells, above n 316, at 228.  
820 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.148].  
821 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drink, above n 612, at [79].  
822 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drink, above n 612, at [69].  
823 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drink, above n 612, at [69].  
824 Savaresi, above n 61, at 15; Bodansky, above n 74, at 150.  
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Celsius.825 Further, the Agreement requires countries to publish NDCs explaining 
how they will combat climate change.826 While meeting these NDCs is not a 
requirement of the Agreement,827 a failure to do may bring international shame on 
a country. However, currently, if a WTO member state enacts a measure as stated 
in their NDCs, they cannot rely on Article XX(d) as an exception when accused of 
breaching trade rules. At first glance, this seems problematic and, as such, a more 
lenient interpretation that takes into account international law, even if not in direct 
effect, could be worth looking at.  
 
The Appellate Body would appear to be open to somewhat broadening the 
interpretation of Article XX(d) when they said in India – Solar Cells that a rule 
also included rules which a Member seek to comply with, even if compliance is 
not coerced.828 However, ultimately, the Appellate Body still declared that the 
various international treaties and the agreements that India had signed up to were 
not, for the purposes of Article XX(d), a part of India's domestic legal system.829 
Therefore, the mutually supportive interpretation of Article XX(d) would try to 
rectify that issue. It would take the position that when member states sign and 
ratify an international agreement, then they intend to be obligated to follow such 
an agreement, even if it has not been directly implemented into their domestic 
legal system.  
 
However, the mutually supportive interpretation would have to go further than 
this. Even if an international agreement is considered a part of a country's 
domestic system, it still needs to be a “law or regulation”. The Appellate Body 
said that panels should consider the following when deciding if there is a law or 
regulation:830 
 
(i) the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to 
which the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or 
course of action that is to be observed within the domestic legal 
                                                 
825 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 2(1)(a).  
826 Paris Agreement, above n 63, art 4(2).  
827 Voigt, above n 82, at 161.  
828 India - Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.109].  
829 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.148].  
830 India – Solar Cells, above n 106, at [5.127].  
122 
 
© James Rowland 
 
system of a Member; (ii) the degree of specificity of the 
relevant rule; (iii) whether the rule is legally enforceable, 
including e.g. before a court of law; (iv) whether the rule has 
been adopted or recognised by a competent authority possessing 
the necessary powers under the domestic legal system of a 
Member; (v) the form and title given to any instrument or 
instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system 
of a Member; and (vi) the penalties or sanctions that may 
accompany the relevant rule. 
 
However, this approach would struggle to include the Paris Agreement as a “law 
or regulation”. As stated several times before, following the measures set out in 
NDCs under the Paris Agreement is not a binding requirement.831 Therefore, even 
if a country argues that they are enacting this measure to secure compliance with 
their NDC, it may struggle to be a law or rule under Article XX(d). There is not 
much specificity, the law is not legally enforceable, and there are no 
accompanying penalties or sanctions. Therefore, a mutually supportive 
interpretation would also have to shift how a law or regulation is defined. It could 
be done, but the question that needs to be addressed is if it is necessary to do so.  
 
Paragraph (g) and (b) seem to be an easy threshold for climate change measures to 
meet, as previously discussed. The issue climate change measures will have is 
threading the needle through the chapeau. It begs the question if it is worthwhile 
to try and concoct an interpretation to also make (d) more of an environmentally 
friendly exception as well since those measures in danger can probably already 
rely on either (g) or (b). As this thesis has and will show, with regards to Article 
III and the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body should not be afraid to challenge 
existing interpretations and create new ones in the search for mutual 
supportiveness. However, in this situation, where its usefulness is in doubt, this 
thesis suggests that discretion might be the better part of valour.  
Subsidies and the SCM Agreement 
One of the key weapons in a country's arsenal when combating climate change 
may be the use of subsidies to promote green industries. The most obvious 
                                                 
831 Voigt, above n 82, at 161.  
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example of this is found in the energy and electricity industry. Renewable energy, 
such as solar or wind power, may need government assistance to be able to 
compete with the more readily established oil and coal industries, which are 
known to damage the environment and contribute to climate change. However, 
due to the failure to renew Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, there is now the 
potential for a near fatal conflict between trade law and climate change reform.  
 
Article 8 used to provide safe harbour for potential environmental subsidies, 
giving them a green light under the traffic light system.832 Without Article 8 now, 
though, there would appear to be no exemptions. It seems uncontroversial to say 
that the most preferable option would be treaty change.833 The return of Article 8, 
or something even stronger in its place, could once again provide a “green light” 
for environmental subsidies to survive.834 However, as already discussed in this 
paper, the likelihood of substantive treaty change seems unlikely. Further, this 
paper doesn't subscribe to Rubini's conclusion that the Appellate Body should take 
the SCM Agreement to its logical extreme of frustrating all worthwhile subsidies 
to highlight how ridiculous the current law is and how it needs to be changed.835 
While the end goal may be worthwhile, climate change is a concern now and any 
further delay may fatally undermine the planet's attempt to halt warming before it 
becomes catastrophic. Therefore, the question becomes: is there some mutually 
supportive interpretation that can be adopted to ease or negate any conflict 
between environmental subsides and the SCM Agreement.    
 
First, there is the matter of the current interpretation used by the Appellate Body, 
reasoned in Canada – Renewable Energy. For a subsidy to be in existence there 
must be a benefit that has been conferred. The Appellate Body deemed that a 
marketplace assessment is required when deciding if a benefit has been conferred. 
Such an assessment should take into account supply-side factors and other 
demand-side factors beyond its physical properties.836 In terms of electricity, 
while renewable and non-renewable generated electricity may be identical, the 
                                                 
832 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 490, at 39.  
833 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 490, at 42; Bigdeli, above n 555, at 191; Rubini, above n 483, at 
235. 
834 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 490, at 46.  
835 Rubini, above n 483, at 230-231.  
836 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.170]-[5.171].  
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supply-side factors led to a situation where they were essentially different 
markets, and therefore a marketplace assessment should only look at renewable 
energy.837 It has to be said that such an interpretation appears to be one that 
endeavoured to be mutually supportive.  
 
However, it has been the subject of considerable, if not overwhelming, 
criticism.838 Unlike with adding a policy dimension to “likeness” in Article III, 
where there is academic support for such a move, the consideration of supply side 
factors in a marketplace assessment for Article 1 of the SCM Agreement seems 
universally condemned. In the face of such criticism, it is hard to seriously 
contemplate maintaining such an interpretation. As such, there are two potential 
roads that can be taken by the Appellate Body. First, they could consider other 
potential interpretations for “benefit” so as to avoid environmental subsidies 
falling under the SCM Agreement. Essentially, “benefit” would have to be 
interpreted in such a way that it does not include the government providing a 
financial contribution to renewable energy producers. The second option is to 
attempt to incorporate the Article XX exceptions into the SCM Agreement, 
therefore offering some sort of safe harbour for environmental subsidies, while 
ensuring that Article 1 of the SCM Agreement is interpreted in a way that is above 
reproach.  
 
On the question of Article XX's relevancy to the SCM Agreement, there are strong 
voices against it being applicable to SCM Agreement disputes. The arguments 
against it are diverse. First, Article XX refers to “this Agreement”, suggesting it 
only applies to the GATT.839 Secondly, negotiators made no attempt to incorporate 
Article XX-esque language into the SCM Agreement.840 Also, Article 8 of the 
SCM Agreement appears to take the place of Article XX and its existence would 
suggest there was no intention for Article XX to apply to the SCM Agreement.841 
In the face of these arguments, Marceau and Tratchman has suggested that it 
would require a “heroic approach to interpretation” to incorporate the Article XX 
                                                 
837 Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at [5.190].  
838 Rubini, above n 483, at 218.  
839 Condon, above n 238, at 903.  
840 Condon, above n 238, at 904. 
841 Cosbey & Mavroidis, above n 490, at 34.  
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general exceptions into the SCM Agreement.842  
 
However, there are some potential approaches that can be taken to try and justify 
Article XX's inclusion into the SCM Agreement. First, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products demonstrates that the Appellate Body is willing to extend 
Article XX to other WTO agreements.843 That dispute involved China's decision 
to regulate the importation of media-related goods, such as books and DVDs.844 
The United States argued this was in conflict with China's Accession Protocol to 
the WTO.845 China argued that since the Accession Protocol included the phrase, 
“without prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with 
the WTO Agreement”, they could invoke Article XX in this situation.846 The 
Appellate Body ultimately decided that Article XX could be relied on as long as 
China's measures “are of a type that the WTO Agreement recognizes that Members 
may take when they satisfy prescribed disciplines and meet specified 
conditions”.847 Furthermore, there needs to be a “clearly discernable, objective 
link” between the measure and the regulation of the trade in issue.848 Essentially, 
the Appellate Body was opening the door to Article XX applying to the Accession 
Protocols as long as certain conditions have been met.  
 
Another argument in favour of Article XX applying to the SCM Agreement can be 
made around the customary rules of lex specialis and lex generalis. Customary 
international law dictates that a lex specialis provision takes precedence over a lex 
generalis provision.849 This tends to be because lex specialis rules are more to the 
point and more effective than lex generalis rules.850 Therefore, in situations 
concerning subsidies, the SCM Agreement takes precedence over that of the 
GATT Agreement. However, that does not stop the GATT Agreement from filling 
in gaps in the more specific law, when the SCM Agreement is silent on the 
                                                 
842 Marceau and Trachtman, above n 253, at 874.  
843 Farah and Cima, above n 54, at 1115. 
844 China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications 
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, 19 January 2010 (Report of the 
Appellate Body) at [1].  
845 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, above n 845, at [2].  
846 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, above n 845, at [205].  
847 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, above n 845, at [230].  
848 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, above n 845, at [230].  
849 International Law Commission, above n 115, at 56. 
850 International Law Commission, above n 115, at 60.  
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matter.851 Finally, there is just a matter of consistency and effectiveness. Currently, 
while many trade restrictive measures can be justified via Article XX, subsidies, 
which are often less trade restrictive, cannot be salvaged.852  
 
Each of these arguments, though, contains flaws. While China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products demonstrated a willingness of the Appellate Body to extend 
Article XX to other agreements, the later decision in China – Raw Materials did 
not extend Article XX to another agreement outside of the GATT.853 Further, the 
SCM Agreement does not contain the same language as the Chinese Accession 
Protocol. The trouble with an interpretation along the lines of lex specialis and lex 
generalis is that the lex specialis, the SCM Agreement, did have a provision for 
this situation and the gap only exists due to the intention of the parties not to 
renew the provision. This is not a genuine situation where there is an unforeseen 
gap in a lex specialis treaty that a lex generalis treaty can fill. Finally, while it may 
seem logically inconsistent that a subsidy cannot be salvaged in the same way a 
ban or quota can, countries have decided that subsidies should have its own 
specific treaty and they chose not to renew the non-actionable section. As such, it 
appears that trying to incorporate Article XX exceptions into the SCM Agreement 
would be a difficult endeavour.  
 
Tackling the interpretation of “benefit” in a way that is mutually supportive is also 
problematic, mainly since the most obvious mutually supportive interpretation has 
been shredded by criticism. However, it is not the only approach that can be taken. 
One potential option may be an “adequate remuneration” or “internalization of 
external environmental costs” interpretation, which was identified by Cosbey and 
Mavroidis.854 They, ultimately, decided such an option would be too difficult to 
work.855 However, in the absence of any other obvious approach, it is worthwhile 
to at least consider the practicalities of such a suggestion.  
 
According to WTO jurisprudence, a benefit is conferred “if the recipient has 
                                                 
851 Farah and Cima, above n 54, at 1114.  
852 Farah and Cima, above n 54, at 1114-1115.  
853 China – Raw Materials, above n 281, at [307].  
854 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 36.  
855 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 37.  
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received a “financial contribution” on terms more favourable than those available 
to the recipient in the market.”856 The potential cost to a government does not 
factor into being a benefit.857 The potential argument goes that a feed-in tariff 
might not be a benefit under this definition if it is merely adequate remuneration, 
or an internalization of external environmental costs.858 Essentially, the argument 
is as followed: non-renewable electricity providers are providing electricity. 
Renewable providers, who may have a feed-in tariff programme, are providing 
electricity too, but they are also delivering other environmental benefits for the 
state. Therefore, the feed-in tariff is “adequate remuneration” for those otherwise 
“unpaid social benefits”.859 Any remuneration for social or environmental benefits 
is not a “financial contribution on terms more favourable than those available to 
the recipient in the market”.  
 
The flaw in such an interpretation, though, is how the Appellate Body could 
measure what is “adequate remuneration”. There must be a way to recognise when 
a government is overpaying for the environmental benefits, and therefore giving a 
favourable financial contribution to a recipient, otherwise the effectiveness of the 
SCM Agreement is threatened. However, there seems to be no obvious way to 
measure such a factor. Charnovitz and Fischer suggest that competitive bidding 
might be one way to set prices,860 and Cosbey and Mavroidis do consider such an 
approach.861 Their conclusion, though, is that would be too difficult to exactly 
match the subsidy to the social benefit and therefore any such “adequate 
remuneration” argument is infeasible.862  
 
Let us consider this approach through the lens of it being an interpretation that is 
mutually supportive with the concept of sustainable development and other 
environmental factors, such as the Paris Agreement and NDCs that might rely on 
subsidies or feed-in tariff to increase energy generated by clean, green means. It is 
clearly mutually supportive to recognise the fact that renewable energy provides 
                                                 
856 Canada – Aircraft, above n 447, at [157]; Canada – Renewable Energy, above n 424, at 
[5.163].  
857 Canada – Aircraft, above n 447, at [155].  
858 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 36. 
859 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 37.  
860 Charnovitz and Fischer, above n 491, at 207.  
861 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 37. 
862 Cosbey and Mavroidis, above n 490, at 37.  
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other benefits than just the generation of electricity. The benefits of renewable 
production are less greenhouse emissions, which is a considerable fact when 
considering that around 70% of greenhouse emissions come from the electricity 
sector.863 In fact, the change from non-renewable to renewable energy may be the 
single most important action in the fight against climate change.864 Therefore, to 
recognise that there are benefits to renewable production is mutually supportive to 
the concept of sustainable development. A company that receives income for 
producing such a benefit is not receiving a more favourable financial contribution 
than non-renewable producers, because they are, in effect, providing a different 
service or product. This approach leads to the same conclusion of the Appellate 
Body in Canada – Renewable Energy, that renewable and non-renewable 
electricity production are different markets, but hopefully in a cleaner, less 
controversial way. 
 
The final aspect that must be tackled, though, is how to calculate what reasonable 
remuneration is and what is not. It is suggested that the most mutually supportive 
way forward is to leave that as an element that the challenging party must prove, 
just like they would be asked to show if there is “less favourable treatment” in an 
Article III GATT dispute. After all, “the burden of proof rests upon the party... 
who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim”.865 This is a principle that has 
been consistent applied by the Appellate Body and panels.866 Since the 
challenging party is asserting there is a benefit, it would be up to the challenging 
party to show that the feed-in tariff is providing a price that is so generous it 
amounts to a benefit. This could be done in several ways. The challenging party 
could use a similar market from another jurisdiction as an example of what 
adequate remuneration really is. They could use examples of competitive bidding 
in other jurisdictions. It would be up to the challenging party to demonstrate that a 
benefit exists because the measure in question is too generous.  
 
Such an approach is, arguably, the best way forward. It recognises the importance 
                                                 
863 Weber and Koch, above n 105, at 757.  
864 Weber and Koch, above n 105, at 757.  
865 United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WT/DS33/AB/R, 23 May 1997 (Report of the Appellate Body) at 14.  
866 Van den Bossche, above n 270, at 258.  
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of renewable energy production and allows producers to be paid adequately and 
fairly for their investment. Meanwhile, it still ensures that the SCM Agreement 
has teeth. If a measure is so obviously generous, then a challenging party should 
have little difficulties in establishing that a benefit is in existence. If a measure is 
“adequate remuneration” then it will stand freely. Only the grey area, where it is 
not clear cut if the scheme is too generous, will trouble emerge. It will be difficult, 
if not impossible, to draw an exact line between what is adequate and generous. 
However, it is suggested that this is the “least bad” option. It can still be argued 
under the customary rules of treaty interpretation, is also mutually supportive, and 
can salvage these potentially crucial environmental measures.  
 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that the best way forward is to replace the 
interpretation of Canada – Renewable Energy with a mutually supportive 
interpretation based on “adequate remuneration”. It recognises that renewable 
energy is different to non-renewable energy production because it provides other 
benefits than just the production of electricity. Therefore, a benefit is only in 
existence if the price being paid is too generous and is therefore providing a 
financial contribution beyond one which is merely an internalization of external 
environment costs. It is up to the challenging party to prove that the price is too 
generous.  
 
Chapter VI – Conclusion 
International trade and environmental issues, most notably climate change reform, 
are two of the biggest areas that need to be tackled by the modern world. Trade is, 
arguably, the engine of global growth and has reduced poverty across the planet. 
Meanwhile environmental issues are now more important than ever before. 
Combating and limiting climate change is critical in ensuring that severe and 
damaging change to the planet does not occur. Otherwise, climate change could 
lead to expensive costs, and the loss of human, animal and plant life. And yet, 
climate change measures can, and do, run into conflict with the trade laws set 
down and governed by the WTO.  
 
As an example, measures seeking to promote more efficient or climate-friendly 
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products could fall foul of Article III of the GATT and the “like product” 
assessment. The same can also be said about carbon taxes. Subsidies and feed-in 
tariffs, potentially crucial in moving the planet away from non-renewable energy 
to cleaner, greener electricity, can be threatened by the SCM Agreement. Local or 
domestic content requirements can offend the principles of both the GATT and 
SCM Agreements. While Article XX of the GATT can attempt to resolve some of 
these conflicts, through the general exceptions to trade law, its applicability is not 
universal to all trade and environment disputes.  
 
It is worthwhile to note that not all conflicts are created equal. Some conflicts 
should be resolved to allow trade law and environmental measures to flourish in 
conjunction with each other. Other conflicts do not require such immediate action. 
While it is necessary to try and salvage a safe space for subsidies and feed-in 
tariffs for renewable energy in international trade law, the questionable 
effectiveness of domestic content requirements means that the latter does not 
warrant the same vigour as the former. A central tenet of this thesis is that while 
conflicts should be resolved when necessary for environmental reasons, the path 
of least resistance should be followed if possible.  
 
The most obvious resolution to these trade and environment disputes is treaty 
change. However, based on current and past examples of WTO negotiation, any 
attempt seems doomed to failure. In its place, this thesis suggests the best way 
forward is to use the principle of mutual supportiveness as an interpretative tool. 
WTO law should be interpreted in a way which is not only consistent with other 
multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Paris Agreement, but also in a 
way which is mutually supportive of the WTO goal of sustainable development. 
The Appellate Body can adopt such an interpretative tool in line with the DSU and 
the customary laws of treaty interpretation without putting their legitimacy into 
question.  
 
Armed with mutual supportiveness as an interpretative tool, the Appellate Body 
could and should resolve some of the conflicts identified in this thesis. Article III 
can be interpreted in such a way as to include a “policy likeness”, which would 
create a space for governments to regulate goods for genuine environmental 
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reasons. Such a reinterpretation of Article III could also provide more space for 
carbon taxes to be properly utilised by WTO members. Meanwhile the chaos left 
behind by the Appellate Body’s ruling in Canada – Renewable Energy could be 
eased via a mutually supportive interpretation of benefit that allows for some sort 
of “adequate remuneration” for renewable energy producers.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis concludes that both international trade and action against 
climate change is important, and where the two conflict, resolution should be 
sought instead of trade law being used to shut down climate change reform. As 
such, WTO law would be interpreted in a way which is mutually supportive 
toward its goal over sustainable development. A couple of practical examples of 
mutual supportiveness in action have been put forward, and can hopefully be used 
as a foundation to address any further conflicts that arise between trade law and 
climate change reform.  
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WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 10 January 2001. 
 
Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
24 March 2006.  
 
United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WT/DS406/AB/R, 24 April 2012.  
 
United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, 
WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, 23 July 2012.  
 
United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, 25 March 2011. 
 
United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, 20 May 2008. 
 
United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, 20 April 2005.  
 
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996.  
 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998.  
 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 
November 2001.  
 
United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, 13 June 2012.  
 
United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India, WT/DS33/AB/R, 23 May 1997.  
 
Reports of the Panel: 
 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R, adopted 
17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS332/AB/R.  
 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R and 
Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R. 
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Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD 
35S/116, 22 March 1988. 
 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R.  
 
India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
WT/DS456/R and Add.1, adopted 14 October 2016, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS456/AB/R. 
 
Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 23 July 1998. 
 
Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 
June 2000.  
 
United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005. 
 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R.  
 
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS2/AB/R.  
 
United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 11 October 1994 (Report of the 
Panel). 
 
International Agreements 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 14 (signed 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995). 
 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1867 UNTS 14 (signed 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 2: Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1869 UNTS 14 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995). 
 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force 1 
January 1995).  
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 UNTS 194 (signed 30 October 1947, 
entered into force 1 January 1948).  
 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into force 1 
January 1995). 
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Paris Agreement (opened for signing 22 April 2016, entered into force 4 
November 2016).  
 
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 
(opened for signing 4 June 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). 
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